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ABSTRACT
Party Leadership Fights in the House of
Representatives: The Causes of Conflict, 1895 to 1955
(April 1976)
Maureen R. Romans, B.A.
,
Northwestern University
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Glen Gordon
Robert L. Peabody in his article "Party Leadership Change in the
United States House of Representatives" hypothesizes that the Republi-
cans in the House of Representatives were more prone to conflict be-
tween 1955 and 1966 than the Democrats because they were 1) the minor-
ity party, 2) had suffered a series of election defeats culminating in
the 1958 and 1964 losses, 3) were a junior party, 4) were highly co-
hesive in terms of region and ideology and therefore could afford the
luxury of a leadership fight without sacrificing their unity on roll
call votes, and 5) their leaders were not as skilled as Sam Rayburn
and John McCorniack in keeping in touch with the rank-and-file. Other
observers, however, have offered different hypotheses and variables
to explain leadership change and conflict in Congress. Barbara A.
Hinckley suggests that extensive membership turnover and changes in
the regional and ideological composition of a party bring pressure
for leadership change. Randall B. Ripley hypothesizes that party is
a more important variable than majority or minority status because
the Republicans have been rocked by more revolts than the Democrats
since the 1910 power struggle over Speaker Joe Cannon. Charles 0.
Jones thinks that the size of the Congressional party and the nuni^er
of freshmen are important variables, and finally former Speaker Joe
Martin argues that Presidential intervention can encourage leader-
ship fights.
This dissertation tests these hypotheses by examining intra-
party leadership conflict in the House of Representatives from 1895
to 1955. Because the historical information about the contests is
widely scattered and even believed lost by some political scientists,
the fights have been recounted in detail and heavily footnoted for
others doing research on past Congresses. The rest of the disserta-
tion systematically analyzes the composition of each Congressional
party in terms of 1) majority-minority status, 2) size, 3) election
results, 4) membership turnover, 5) the number of freshmen, 6) the
proportion of members with at least ten years seniority, 7) regional
factions, and 8) where possible ideological factions. An important
point is that all Congressional parties from 1895 to 1955 have been
reconstructed regardless of whether a fight occurred in order to see
if stable parties had different characteristics from combative parties
The skill of the leaders and Presidential intervention have been con-
sidered i.esidual variables that were used to explain deviant cases,
but the accounts of the fights do discuss the President, lobbyists,
and the personality of the competitors when relevant.
Briefly, the findings show that in the Democratic party extensive
membership turnover and changes in the regional and ideological
vi
alignments that bolstered the faction underrepresented in the leader-
ship were most conducive to conflict. In the Republican party before
1933 ideological cleavages produced conflict. Afterward, rapid mem-
bership turnover seemed most important in predicting a leadership
clash. Two conditions that were not determinants of leadership con-
flict between 1895 and 1955 were party and majority-minority status.
vil
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Who leads the House of Representatives is important. House leaders
play a major role in the formation of public policy by controlling de-
bate, lining-up votes, influencing committee assignments, and co-
ordinating information. Tliey also exert considerable influence over
the careers of their colleagues through committee selection, recognition
for floor debate, and election help. Changes in the leadership-both
inter-party changes and changes within a party hierarchy-
-will affect
legislative outcomes by altering the distribution of power and influ-
ence in a party as different individuals and factions gain greater ac-
cess to the leaders and others fall out of favor. Yet, compared with
the President, little is known about the selection of the House leader-
ship.
Since the late 1930 's Democrats and Republicans in the House have
followed different patterns in choosing their leaders. The Democrats,
despite the public image of a brawling, quarrelsome, divided party,
have had remarkably stable leadership in the last thirty- five years.
Since 1940 when Sam Rayburn and John McCormack began their long
tenures as Speaker and Majority Leader, the Democrats have evolved a
system of routine promotion and advancement within the leadership
hierarchy. Upon Rayburn 's death, McCormack moved up to the Speaker-
ship and Carl Albert, Whip since 1955, became Majority Leader. When
McCormack retired, this orderly succession continued with Albert's
elevation to the Speakership and Hale Boggs ' promction from Whip to
Majority Leader, ^'hen Boggs died, Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, who had been
appointed Whip only two years earlier, advanced to Majority Leader.
Although some of the promotions were challenged, none of the contests
overturned or altered the arranged succession. This step-by-step pro-
gression to the top of the leadership ladder seems even more striking
when one realizes that in the Democratic party the Whip is appointed
by the other party leaders, particularly the Speaker, and not elected
by the merabership-at-large as in the Republican party. Thus, the
Democratic rank-and-file continually ratified the choices of the high-
est party leaders.
In contrast, the Republicans, who perhaps more typically project
a public image of stability, conservatism, and unity, have engaged in
a series of internal fights over the party leadership in the House of
Representatives. Between Joe Martin's selection as Minority Leader
in 1939 and John Rhodes' election in 1973, no Republican had become
Minority Leader without a caucus fight. Unlike the Democrats who com-
peted over vacancies, the Republican leadership was buffeted by two
successful revolts. In 1959 Charles Halleck deposed Martin as Minor-
ity Leader only to be overthrown himself six years later by Gerald
Ford. The one element of stability within the Republican hierarchy
was Leslie Arends , who served as Whip from 1943 through 1974. Yet
even his 1*. vig reign did not escape challenge. In 1965 Arends was
barely able to beat back an attempt to dump him along with Halleck.
Why have the two parties behaved so differently? Robert L.
Peabody in his groundbreaking article "Party Leadership Change in
the United States House of Representatives^' theorizes that majority-
minority status, election returns, the structure of the House party in
terms of junior and senior members and regional and ideological factions,
and the skill of the incumbent leaders were the key variables explain-
ing contested leadership change in the House of Representatives. He
concludes that the Democrats' stability between 1955 and 1966 resulted
from majority status, the long string of victories, the large body of
experienced members, the continuing regional and ideological division
in the party that forced the competing wings to compromise on middle
of the road leaders, and the skill of the leaders themselves in keep-
ing in touch with the membership. He attributes the Republicans' re-
volts to prolonged minority status and successive election defeats,
which caused frustrated members to search for a scapegoat; to the
lack of a large group of senior representatives to balance the junior
classes; to strong voting cohesiveness which seemed to permit the party
almost the luxury of skirmishing over leadership positions without
sacrificing unity on major roll call votes; and to the inability of
the leaders to cultivate strong ties with the rapidly changing member-
1
.
ship.
Peabody's study is limited by his time period, 1955 to 1966, be-
cause the conditions under which each party operated vrere fairly con-
st;iD.t. For the entire twelve years the Democrats were the majority
pa;.M:y, suc:;sssful at the polls, and divided deeply by region and
Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States
House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LXI
(September, 1967), pp. 687-690, 692-693).
ideology whereas the Republicans were always in the minority, losing
elections, and dominated by Midwestern conservatives. Thus, the
"variables" Peabody suggests as facilitr.ting or inhibiting the chances
for conflict do not really vary much at all and ir^y simply be character-
istics of the parties during this particular era rather than causative
influences. A related problem is that since there is little variation
it was impossible for Peabody to control for one variable to see the
effect of another. Perhaps only one or some of Peabody 's attributes
accounted for the difference in parties. In order to test the validity
of Peabody 's explanatory scheme, it would be necessary to examine the
parties' behavior under different circumstances. A study of the Re-
publicans as a majority party and the Democrats as a minority party,
for instance, might yield valuable information about whether the Re-
publicans historically were a more combative party than the Democrats
or whether minority status is usually associated with greater intra-
party competition.
Another problem is that Peabody has not systematically looked at
his variables in each Congress between 1955 and 19&6 to see whether
the stable years within this time period differ from the contested
years. He does analyze such relationships occasionally--for example,
he notes with election returns that the 1959 and 1965 Republican re-
volts follow election disasters, but he usually correlates the
variables with specific years sporadically. Peabody is more inter-
ested in the aggregate differences between the parties over time
rather than in the differences within each party from Congress to
Congress. To be able to predict more accurately under what conditions
a leadership fight is likely to develop, it would seem necessary to
dwell on th*ise biennial fluctuations within the party.
Furthermore, in order to assess whether other variables and ex-
planations for leadership conflict are possible, the contributions of
other political scientists and politicians to leadership selection
must be reviewed.
Majority-minority status
. Randall B. Ripley in Party Leaders
the House of Representatives agrees with Peabody that prolonged minor-
ity status can produce frustration and upheaval, but he differs from
Peabody by stressing the impact on the leaders rather than on the
rank-and-file. Not only are Minority Leaders more likely to be ousted
than Majority Leaders, but they also voluntarily leave their posts
more often in order to seek more rewarding careers outside the House.
This higlier rate of leadership turnover, by creating more openings
than a majority party would ordinarily have to fill, increases the
opportunities for conflict in the minority party.
In contrast to Peabody and Ripley, Charles 0. Jones suggests
that a lengthy period of minority status may produce an entrenched
leadership and stagnation in the party rather than rapid turnover and
more frequent leadership contests. Jones maintains that over time a
minority party will be led by those representatives who are elected
from the saiest districts and are most acept at surviving party
losses. Leadership change would be difficult, in his view, unless
2
Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives ,
(Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 32.
there is a large influx of freshmen connnitted to altering the direction
of the party by recruiting more innovative leaders.^
Jones also contends that the size of=. the minority party may be
an important influence on its behavior. He offers the hypothesis that
a minority that is small in size-he was referring to House Republicans
in the 1930's-will act differently from a minority party that may be
.larger but is divided by ideology-here he is thinking of the Republi-
cans during the New Freedom.'^ Jones, however, does not predict how
these two theoretically distinguishable minorities will act.
Election trends
.
Like Peabody, Martin in his own analysis of his
ouster as Minority Leader, cites the 1958 election results, which were
disastrous for Congressional Republicans, as a major reason for the
revolt to unseat him. Young Republicans, especially, were afraid that
the 1958 losses forecast doom for the party in the 1960 presidential
election and wanted to change the Republicans' image before then.^
Si££2££llZ' Jones, while in agreement with Peabody that young
members are an important element in changing the leadership of a party,
stresses the role of freshmen whereas Peabody places his emphasis on
junior members (those with less than ten years service)
,
particularly
the disproportionate balance between junior and senior members. Jones
^Charles 0. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress
,
(Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 16-18.
4
Ibid
.
, p . 34.
^Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics
,
(New York: McGraw
Hill, 1960), pp. 4-9.
thinks that freshmen are the key to change because the socialization
process in Congress quickly begins to erode the differences between
old and new meinbers.
Barbara A. Hinckley in "Congressional Leadership Selection and
Support: A Comparative Analysis" hypothesizes that the more senior
and stable the membership of a party is, the more senior and stable
the leadership will be/ Her analysis of leadership selection con-
verges with Peabody in underlining the importance of seniority, but
she adds the concept of membership stability. Stability or its con-
verse membership change raises interesting possibilities. Peabody
has theorized that election defeats of thirty to fifty seats are an
Important cause of leadership contests, but an election victory of
landslide proportions, which would also bring about major shifts in
the composition of the party, might be as unsettling to the leader-
ship as an election defeat. Furthermore, Hinckley's idea would take
into account new members who are not freshmen, such as former Con-
gressmen and party switchers. For example, in 1915 a high percentage
of the new Republicans were actually returning representatives who
had been defeated in the 1912 fratricide. Likewise, in the Democratic
party, many of the victims of the Harding landslide regained their
seats in the 1922 election and made up a large segment of the new
members in 1923. Party switchers, although never a major element
^Jones
,
p. 18.
^Barbara A. Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and
Support: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics , XXXII
(May, 1970), p. 270.
in altering the structure of either party, were a much more frequent
phenomenon in the 1890 's than today when silver Republicans, gold
Democrats, ?ud Populists were in the process of realigning their
party allegiance. Following the 1912 Republican split, party switch-
ing again increased.
Factionali^. Ripley concurs with Peabody that ideological unity-
or at least the desire for cohesion-
-within the Republican party has
been a primary reason for the internal crises. Ripley argues that
ideological unity has been much more important to Republican House
leaders than to their Democratic counterparts. The Republican hier-
archy has been more willing to discipline mavericks through committee
assignments than the Democratic leaders, who have been wary that a
move to punish dissenters might only widen the ideological cleavage
within the party. Consequently, the Republican membership has or-
•
ganized revolts and tinkered with the institutional arrangements for
choosing leaders more often than the Democrats because "they realize
that party leaders exercise considerable power over their careers
and futures in the House. Thus, they constantly seek a greater voice
8
in internal party decisions as a means of self-protection." Demo-
crats, instead, knowing that their careers are safe, have given their
leaders greater security. Ripley contends that this difference be-
tween the parties has existed since 1910, a product of the fight over
9
"Cannonism. " Ripley's thesis, if correct, would undercut Peabody 's
^Ripley, the direct quote in from p. 192; otherwise, pp. 191-192.
^Ibid.
,
p. 190.
notion that minority status is an important variable in explaining
leadership fights and majority status for maintaining stability. In-
stead, Ripley suggests that intra-party fighting has been common to
Republican behavior in both majority and minority years because of
the tension within the party over dissent.
Hinckley has theorized that no Congressional party majority or
clearly predominant faction--in terms of region and ideology--will
over time be without at least proportionate representation among the
leadership. The time lag is important because an aspiring faction
must wait until its seniority catches up with its growing numbers.''"^
Hinckley's research suggests that if an imbalance persists, a contest
might be expected as the under-represented faction seeks its share of
power. Compared with Peabody, who was dealing with fairly stable
blocs, Hinckley's formulation stresses how change in the composition
of the party will bring pressure to change the leadership. A Con-
gressional party that is more receptive to accommodating shifting
alignments will perhaps be less susceptible to revolts and internal
conflict than a party that resists or is slow to make the leadership
congruent with the changing membership.
David Mayhew, in studying roll call voting on selected domestic
issues, has observed that between 1947 and 1962 House Democrats were
more skilled at inclusive compromise than Republicans. Democrats
generally voted for legislation that benefited other Democrats' con-
stituents although of no particular interest in their ovm districts.
Hinckley, p. 270.
as
10
Republicans, however, tended to oppose bills that would help only one
wing of the party and were called the party of exclusive compromise.
Mayhew is not sure whether this behavior was related to majority stat;
or to differences in the parties .''^ On leadership selection, do
parties that are rocked by contests also exclude major factions from
leadership posts whereas parties that have more peaceful patterns of
leadership change make an effort to bring members from competing wings
into the leadership or at least select moderates who can appeal to
more than one group?
Skill of the incumbent
. Martin concurs with Peabody that a
leader's talent in communicating with the rank-and-file is important
for staying in office. Martin believes his inability to forge strong
bonds with the junior members V7as one reason for his defeat.
The toll of the years had removed a number
of my staunchest old supporters from the
House, and in the press of affairs, I had
never become as close to various of the
younger and newer members as they and I
might have wished. 12
Jones also believes that for a leader to maintain power over time, he
13
must be "adaptive, communicative, accommodating, and accountable."
This argument is somewhat troublesome because in both examples a
David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen : The Differ -
ences between Democrat s and Republican s , 1947 - 1962
,
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 149-159.
^^artin, p. 8.
Charles 0. Jones, "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An
Essay in the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,"
Journal of Politics, XXX (August, 1968), p. 618.
inajor transformation in the party structure preceded the leader's com-
munication problems. Martin had to contend with rapid membership
turnover while Cannon's reputation for arbitrary tactics coincided
with the growth of the Progressive wing of the Republican party.
2l iiesident. Finally, Martin would add the role of the
President or the administration to Peabody's list of key variables.
Martin thinks that Eisenhower's neutrality in 1959 in contrast to his
hostility in earlier years and Nixon's probable encouragement of the
California delegation to round up votes for Halleck were decisive in
the formation of the revolt to dump him.'^'^
Thus, an analysis of the literature on leadership selection shows
that Peabody's thesis can be challenged on several points and that'
other interpretations are suggested. The major points of contention
are summarized below.
1) Party may be a more important determinant of con-
flict than majority-minority status.
2) Minority status is more likely to produce sta-
bility than conflict.
3) Freshmen as opposed to junior members are critical
to the formation of leadership fights.
4) The amount of membership turnover may be more con-
ducive to conflict than the size of the election
defeat
,
5) Changes in the regional- ideological composition of
a party are more likely to bring pressure for
leadership change than extensive regional or
ideological unity.
Martin, pp. 4-9.
12
6) The size of the party and the attitude of the Pres-ident may also contribute to leadership conflict
.
and should be added to Peabody's original list of
variables
.
Because there is substantial disagreement about the causes of Con-
gressional leadership fights and because no one has done the historical
research necessary to pick intelligently among these alternative hypoth-
eses, an examination of the disputed variables over time seems needed.
This study will analyze leadership contests in the House of Repre-
sentatives from 1895 to 1955 for the offices of Speaker, Majority
Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, and Minority Whip to determine
which, if any, of the hypothesized conditions can account for the pat-
tern of conflict. The years 1895 to 1955 have been selected because
the variables do vary considerably in this sixty year time span. The
Republicans were the majority party for thirty-two years and the Demo-
crats for twenty-eight years, an almost even balance. Each party suf-
fered massive defeats and won handsome victories, with 1894, 1912,
1920, 1932, and 1936 standing out as important milestones. Member-
ship turnover fluctuated enormously from the very high levels of new
members at the turn of the century to the high levels of incumbents
in the last two or three decades. Additionally, from 1901 until the
early 1930 's the Republicans were severely split into two persistent
factions, the regulars and the insurgents or Progressives, which con-
trasts sharply with the united, homogeneous Republican party Peabody
describes. The Democrats during most of their minority years were
predomiinantly a Southern party, which is very different from the more
even distribution of seats between the North and South that character-
izes the Democrats when in the majority.
13
The leadership posts to be studied have been selected for their
visibility. One of the drawbacks with historical research is that
the data needed are not always available or recorded in full detail.
In fact, Peabody cautioned that
Newspaper accounts of all but the most recent
contests are likely to be fragmentary and super-
ficial. Biographies rarely describe leadership
contests in any detail and usually these accounts
are anecdotal and one-sided.
Despite Peabody 's doubts, the historical material exists--the New York
1
6
T^^^QS is the single most reliable source-
-but the accounts of the con-
tests are naturally fuller and more complete for the most important
and visible leadership offices.
A contest has been defined as being under way when there were
at least two publicly declared contenders for the job. If a candi-
date contemplated running, made a few soundings, but then dropped •
the idea before announcing his intentions to run, no contest was deemed
to have occurred. Moreover, rivalries or changes that were decided
by appointment rather than election were not counted as contests.
Since definitions of this type are to a certain extent judgment calls,
the contests have been recounted in some detail both so the reader
can make his own decision but also to pull this widely scattered
^^Peabody, p. 676.
16
Memoirs and biographies of House leaders and Presidents, his-
tories of Congress, and the reports on Congress published regularly
in the American Political Science Review until 1951 also provided
valuable insights into some of the contests and helped fill out and
balance the New York Times' accounts.
14
infonnation together in a single volume.
Between 1895 and 1955 there were twenty-eight leadership fights,
but in soD.e Congresses a party competed over more than one office.
Therefore, there were only twenty- three Congressional parties that
fought. Because the focus of this research will be the conditions
that encouraged conflict, "N" will be considered as twenty- three or
the number of Congressional parties that skirmished over the leader-
ship rather than twenty-eight or the number of contests. Although
twenty-three may seem like a relatively small number of examples,
there are two important points to keep in mind. First, the cases
under investigation represent the total population and are not a
sample from which generalizations about the whole will be inferred.
Second, the Congresses in which no contests developed are also of
interest for comparative purposes. The thirty-seven Congressional
parties that did not fight will be examined to see if there are dif-
ferent correlates of stability. If the same conditions shox7 up re-
gardless of whether or not a contest took place, then we can safely
conclude that the variable hypothesized as stimulating conflict was
coincidentally present rather than one of the causes of conflict. In
other words, there are sixty Congressional parties that will be studied,
with twenty-three examples of leadership conflict and thirty-seven
examples of leadership stability.
The specific variables to be analyzed are defined below.
1. Ma j or i ty -minor i ty status . The number of Congresses a party
stayed as the majority or minority and the number of partisans in each
majority or minority party will be checked as well as which party or-
ganized the House.
15
2. Election returns
. The number of seats a party gained or lost
since the last election will be examined,
3. Membership turnover
. Membership turnover will be measured in
terms of the percentage of new members, who will be defined as freshmen
plus party switchers plus returning Congressmen who did not serve in the
immediately preceding Congress.
4. Hierarchy
.
Freshmen, sophomores and third termers will be
Congressmen elected for the first, second, and third time respectively
whereas senior members will be defined as those who have served at
least ten, but not necessarily continuous, years in the House. ''"^ xhe
rationale for counting total years rather than continuous service is
that seniority for party leadership is not calculated by Congressmen
in the same manner as seniority for committee rank. Despite breaks
in service. Cannon and Nicholas Longworth for the Republicans and
Henry Rainey and Champ Clark on the Democratic side v/ere not handi-
capped in their bids for office.
5. Regional factions . Republicans will be divided into four
regional categories--East
,
Midwest, West, or South-Border State--where-
as the Democrats will be classified as representing a constituency in
the North, South, or Border States. The different classification scheme
for each party seenis justified by history and follows the research of
Gerald Marwell who indicates that the regional division that is most
important among Republicans is the East-VJcst one while the North-South
T. Richard Witmer , in "The Aging of the House," Political Science
Quarterly , XXIX (December, 1964), pp. 526-541, also counts total rather
than continuous service.
cleavage is the most critical in Democratic politics/^
6. Ideological factions
.
For the Republicans, because the Pro-
gressives were so widely known in their own day and have received so
much attention from historians, it is possible to compile a list of
their names and then to construct a rough index of insurgent strength
for nearly three decades. In defining insurgency within the Republican
party, both Midwestern Progressives as exemplified by Senator Robert
LaFollette of Wisconsin and Bull Moosers, who preferred the leadership
18Gerald Harwell, "Party, Region and the Dimension of Conflict in
the House of Representatives, 1949-1954," American Political Science
Review, LXI (June, 1967), pp. 380-399. For the purposes of this paper
for the Democratic party, the South will be defined as the eleven
states of the Confederacy—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia. Border States will be Delaware, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. The North will be all
other states unless otherwise noted. For the Republicans, the East
will be considered the six New England states- -Maine
, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut--plus New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Midwest will consist of Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. The West will be defined as
Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. The South-Border States will be
defined in the same way as for the Democrats.
l^otis L. Graham, Jr. in An Encore for Reform ; The Old Progres -
sives and the New Deal
,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967),
used a more elaborate version of this method for locating Progressives
in all levels of government. The main sources used for Progressive
names were the New York Times; Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive
Politics : A Historical S tudy of Its Origins and Developmen t , 1870 -
1958
,
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959); Kenneth
Hechler, Insurgency : Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1940); and Graham's study men-
tioned earlier. In addition, studies of the Progressives in indi-
vidual states such as Carl H. Chrislock's The Progressive Era in
Minnesota
,
1899-1918, (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1971),
and George Mowry's The California Progressives
,
(Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1950), were also helpful. One last source was
Robert M. LaFollette 's political organ, LaFollette' s Weekly .
of Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, have been counted.
For the Democrats, it is impossible to apply the same technique
to measure the size of various factions over time because so little
information is available about the ideological preference of most
individtial Democratic Congressmen. Therefore, in order to get some
idea of the size of the competing blocs in the Democratic party in
the House, roll call studies and the estimates and comments of con-
temporary newspaper reporters and politicians will be presented when
available.
7. Congruence. The regional and ideological characteristics
of the leaders will be compared with the rank-and-file to see if any
major faction is over or under-repre sent ed
.
20^Among the best roll call studies for both parties were David
W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era : A S tudy of the
McKinley Houses and a Comparison to the Modern House of Representa -
tives
,
(Lavjrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1973); George
L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Con'j
^
ress on Foreign Policy
,
(Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins, 1951); and Julius Turner, Party and Constituency
Pressure s on Congress
,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951). Especially
useful for the Democrats were Edward M. Silbert, "Support for Reform
among Congressional Democrats, 1897-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation. Northwestern University, 1965); Anne Firor Scott, "Progres-
sive Wind from the South, 1906-1913," Journal o_f Southern History
,
XXIX (February, 1963), pp. 53-70; David Burner" The Politics of Pro-
vincialism; The Democra tijc Part^r in Tran s it ion, 1918 - 1932
,
(New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); James Patterson, Congressional Con-
s ervatism and the New Deal
,
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1967) ; and V. 0. Key, Jr. , Southern Politics in State and Nation ,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. Studies helpful for the Republi-
cans were James Holt, Congressional Insurgents and the Party System ,
1909- 1916
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); John D.
Hicks, Republican Ascendancy , 1921 -1933, (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1960); Harry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority
Role, 1933-1938," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University
of Iowa, 1960).
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This list of variables includes all of Peabody's conditions,
except the skill of the incumbent leader, plus the additions and mod-
ifications suggested by his critics, except for the role of the Presi-
dent. The President's attitude and the ability of the House leaders
will be considered as a residual category that will be referred to
only if the other variables fail to provide an adequate explanation
of leadership conflict.
To reconstruct the conditions for each Congressional party be-
tween 1895 and 1955, the following items were collected from the
Biographical Directory of the American Congress
,
1774-1971 for every
Congressman serving in the House between 1895 and 1955: party identi-
fication, dates of House service, and state represented. From these
facts the composition of each party for every Congress was calculated
for the day Congress opened. Tliis date was chosen since most leader-
ship contests took place shortly before the opening of the new Congress,
Tl-ie next four chapters will describe the leadership contests and
examine the circumstances under which they formed. Chapter II will
focus on leadership conflict in the Democratic party from 1895 to
1931. Chapter III will compare the Republican contests for the same
Congresses to see whether a different set of conditions produced the
conflict. Chapter IV continues the Democratic story from 1931 to
1955 and Chapter V follows the minority Republicans during the same
years. In Chapter VI the findings from the four historical chapters
will be aggregated and analyzed to decide which of the variables and
hypotheses discussed in this chapter seem valid for the entire sixty
year period and which should be modified or discarded.
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The main contribution of this topic will be the testing of some
recent theories about leadership conflict in the House of Representa-
tives, but the historical approach also makes it possible to observe
leadership selection as part of a long range, ongoing process. Are
any trends developing? Is leadership conflict becoming more common
or is it diminishing? Are the phenomena of bureaucratization and
institutionalization, evident in the development of coinrdttee leader-
ship selection, also influencing party leadership selection? Finally,
the historical perspective should add to our knowledge of earlier
Congresses. Although a great deal has been learned about the post-
World War II Congresses, other Congresses, especially those of the
1920 's and 1930' s, have been badly neglected. A by-product of this
study should be some new information about the leaders, factions,
membership, and quarrels of those little studied Congresses.
CHAPTER II
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP CONTESTS, 1895 to 1931
Leadership Contests
,
1895 to 1911
American political history is customarily taught as Presidential
politics. As every American school child well knows, the Republican
party dominated Presidential politics from the Civil War until the de-
pression but what is not nearly so well known is that the Democratic
party was alive and healthy at other levels of government. In the House
of Representatives the Democratic party was usually the majority party
between 1871 and 1895. The 1894 election, rather than the elections im-
mediately following the Civil War, established firm Republican control
in the House that was not broken until 1931 except -for the brief Demo-
cratic interlude during the Taft and Wilson administrations.
As the 1394 election approached, Grover Cleveland was entering the
last two years of his final term and the Democrats controlled both houses
of Congress, with an especially commanding and impressive margin in the
House: 218 Democrats to only 126 Republicans and 11 Populists and other
third party members. Depression and agrarian unrest, however, were sweep
ing the nation and combined to give the Democratic party a resounding de-
feat, its worst since 1866. Both the Senate and the House returned
Republican majorities, but the Democrats' defeat in the House was par-
ticularly spectacular. The House Democratic contingent was reduced to
a mere 105 members. Arthur W. Dunn, a contemporary journalist, described
the Democrats' plight: "Only the rock-ribbed solid South--which was not
quite solid--resisted the Republican sweep.
The tiny band of Democrats that regrouped to select a Minority Leader
was almost leaderless. William Wilson of West Virginia, the party's
Majority Leader, had been defeated; so had Richard "Silver Dick" Bland of
Missouri, the great silver spokesman in the House. Younger members who
showed leadership potential, such as Jam.es Beauchamp "Champ" Clark and
David DeArmond, both of Missouri, had also lost their seats in the
2
debacle. The only prominent leader to survive was Charles Crisp of
Georgia, Speaker of the House for the last four years and former Minority
Leader from 1890 to 1891. At the Democratic caucus Crisp was easily
chosen Minority Leader. The only dissenting voice came from William H.
Grain of Texas, who disregarded the caucus action to vote for his fellow
Texan, David B. Culberson, for Speaker on the floor of the House.
^
During Crisp's tenure as Minority Leader, rumors began circulating
that Crisp was making plans to run for the Senate, The speculation was
confirmed when Crisp told his colleague, Joseph W. Bailey of Texas:
Nobody can lead this wrangling, quarrelsome,
factionalized Democratic minority. I do not
intend to return to the House. I am going
home to stand for the Senate. If I lose that,
I will quit public life forever.
•^Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding
,
(2 vols.; New York:
Putnam's, 1922), I, 141.
^Ibid.
^ew York Times
,
Dec. 1, 1895, p. 2; Dec. 3, 1895, p. 2. (Hereafter
the New York Times will be referred to as NYT
.
)
Champ Clark, M^ Quarter Century of American Politics
,
(2 vols. ; New
York: Harper, 1920) II, 10
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When Congress reconvened after the 1896 election,- the Democrats faced
the prospect of choosing a new Minority Leader in an uncertain 'situation,
crisp, victorious in his Senate primary race, had died on the eve of the
1896 election; there was no heir apparent to be elevated to the vacancy;
and William Jennings Bryan's defeat had left the direction of the national
party hazy. m this vacuum a contest quickly developed. By 1896 House
Democrats were "practically all anti-Cleveland men"^ in the sense they
represented mainly Southern and Western constituencies that had fiercely
opposed Cleveland's gold policies. Yet many of these anti-Cleveland
representatives, while aligned with Bryan on silver, cannot be counted as
pro-Bryan. Many of them were more conservative than Bryan on other issues,
The contest for Minority Leader not only involved policy differences
but also foreshadowed the jockeying for the 1900 Presidential nomination.
The more conservative^ wing of the party presented two candidates: Bailey
of Texas and James Richardson of Tennessee. Bailey was bright, able, and
magnetic, but he was only thirty-four years old with six years service in
the House and "a Bryan man under protest."'^ The contemporary view of
^Dunn, II, 230.
^In labeling party factions, I have followed the usage of the times
as closely as possible rather than try to impose our own terminology on
groups that were dealing with completely different issues. Thus, no
one should infer that a political faction that is called conservative or
radical actually or necessarily advocated such policies. Perhaps the
best way to understand these terms is to consider the conservative bloc
as the more conservative wing in the party or the radicals as the more
radical facti-)a of the party.
7
NYT, Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2; Dunn, I, 218.
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Bailey was
-To 'boom' Bailey is to 'down' Bryan. The anti-Bryanite
faction in the party thought one way to block a second Presidential try
by Bryan was to groom Bailey as his rival. Richardson, the other con-
servative candidate, was a more expected and logical nominee. He was a
senior man, one of the ablest parliamentarians on the Democratic side, and
had served as the temporary chairman of the Democratic National Convention.
He carried a serious handicap into the fight, however. His o^m Tennessee
delegation was not united behind him because of the candidacy of Benton
McMillin, also from Tennessee.
McMillin, who was from the Bryan wing of the party, ^ campaigned hard
for the leadership post. Because of his high rank on the Ways and Means
and Rules Committees, McMillin was looked to for guidance by several of
his colleagues, but his abrasive personality irritated another bloc of
members who "refused to be led by him."'''^ Bland of Missouri, also from
the more radical wing of the party, was something of a dark horse candi-
date. The New York Times believed that if Bland wanted the post enough
to campaign energetically for it, his popularity would carry him into
office. But Bland had Presidential ambitions--he had polled 291 votes''''''
at the 1896 Democratic convention before the Bryan stampede— and was re-
luctant to engage in any armtwisting that might hurt his chances for
^Ibid
.
,
-Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.
^
Ibid
.
, Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2.
^^Ibid. , Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.
^^ichard C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records
,
(Washington,
D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1960), Appendix D.
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another Presidential bid.
The more conservative faction, apparently to narrow the contest to
a clear-cut choice between Bailey and McMillin, struck a compromise.
Shortly before the caucus met, Richardson withdrew to become the permanent
chairman of the caucus. At the caucus Bailey's victory was quickly as-
sured when Bland was nominated. With the radical vote split, Bailey won
with fifty-six ballots as opposed to McMillin with thirty ballots and
Bland with twenty- two. Bailey's votes came "principally from the South"
plus four of New York's five votes. "^^
Dissatisfaction with Bailey's leadership began almost immediately
after his election as Minority Leader. Within six weeks of his selection,
DeArmond publicly called on Bailey to provide more effective leadership
and to pay more attention to the Populists. In December, 1896, dissatis-
faction with Bailey surfaced again when McMillin demanded his resignation
because of his stand on the tariff on raw materials. The New York Journal,
owned by William Randolph Hearst, echoed McMillin 's call, but Senator
George G. Vest of Missouri, the state most likely to put forward a candi-
date to oppose Bailey, came to his rescue by praising his anti-imperialist
14
views. Despite Vest's support. Bailey's leadership continued to be
marked by a series of crises followed by votes of confidence in caucus.
^^NYT, Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.
^^
Ibid
.
, Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2.
Ibid.
,
Apr. 15, 1897, p. 3; Sara H. Acheson, Joe Bailey : The Last
Democrat
,
(New York: MacMillan Co,, 1932), pp. 124-12*5.
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The climax occurred in March, 1899, when Bailey wanted the Democrats to
support his resolution declaring the seats of all Congressmen serving in
the Spanish-American war vacant. When his colleagues balked, Bailey
announced he would not serve as Minority Leader in the next Congress/^
House Democrats once again rallied to assure Bailey that their differences
were over issues rather than a repudiation of his leadership, but Bailey
characterized his decision as "irrevocable . "''^
Finding a new Minority Leader proved to be difficult because there
was still some doubt that Bailey's decision was really final. In the nine
months between Bailey's withdrawal in early March and the Democratic
caucus in early December, only two candidates stepped forward: Richardson,
Bailey's conservative rival in 1897, and DeArmond
, who had pushed Bailey
to be more responsive to the Populists and was the candidate of the silver
wing in the Rouse.
At the caucus, the Democrats tried to head off the brewing leadership
fight between Richardson and DeArmond by drafting Bailey. Bailey, how-
ever, begged off by pleading that he would need all his time for campaign-
ing in Texas for the Senate. '^^ With Bailey definitely removed from con-
sideration, four candidates were nominated: Richardson, DeArmond, John
Bankhead of Alabama, who, like Richardson, was a member of the party's
more conservative wing but had two years less seniority than Richardson:
15
Achesou, pp. 128-129.
^^r, Mar. 4, 1899, p. 2.
^^Acheson, p. 133.
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and William Sulzer of New York, whose candidacy may have been more of a
bargaining wedge for Tammany than a serious try for the Minority Leader-
ship. Sulzer was young and inexperienced, but Tammany had elected
eighteen representatives in 1898 to make it the largest Democratic dele-
gation in the House.
On the first ballot Richardson led the voting with forty-three votes,
followed by DeArmond with thirty-nine, Bankhead with thirty-four and
Sulzer with twenty-four. The next four ballots showed little change.
At the end of the fifth ballot, Oscar Underwood of Alabama moved to break
the deadlock by withdrawing Bankhead 's name. On the sixth ballot the
tally was Richardson sixty-five votes, DeArmond forty- five, and Sulzer
twenty as two-thirds of Bankhead 's votes switched to Richardson. With
the trend clear, Sulzer withdrew and threw his support to Richardson.
The final count gave Richardson ninety votes, DeArmond forty-seven, and
Sulzer two.
The Sulzer maneuver was probably pre-arranged. His votes, the bulk
coming from his fellow Tammany representatives, had been held in a bloc
until the trend to Richardson appeared. Then, as planned, they were
19quickly released to give Richardson a clear-cut victory. There is no
evidence of a deal beyond the pre-arranged aspect and there may not be
anything especially sinister in Tammany's support of Richardson. Given
the final choice of a Southern conservative or a Border State Bryanite,
^"NYT, Dec. 3, 1899, p. 2.
l^lbid.
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it is not surprising that Tammany would side with the conservative. Like
other machine Congressmen from the Northeast, the Tammany delegates
vehemently opposed Bryanism. Their intensity can be felt in a resolution
New York introduced at the 1901 Democratic caucus: New York "wants the
country to know that the Democrats of the East are tired of Bryanism and
Populism and will have no more of it."^'''
In 1901, after Bryan's second defeat and another setback for House
Democrats, Richardson was unanimously re-elected Minority Leader. The
only post to change hands was the Whip. In 1900 the Democrats had created
the Whip as a formal position. Underwood, the chief sponsor of the motion,
had been appointed by Richardson to fill the spot.^^ In 1901, Richardson
replaced Underwood with James Lloyd of Missouri. It is a matter of debate
whether this change should be construed as a demotion for Underwood.
Burton Hendrick believes that Richardson promoted Underwood to serve in-
formally as his first lieutenant during the last part of Richardson's
tenure, presumably 1901 to 1903, but he does not distinguish these duties
23from those of the Whip.
20
Russell B. Nye, Midwes tern Progressive Politics : A Historical
Study of Its Origins and Development
,
1870-1958, (East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 1959), 226. See also Geoffrey Blodgett, The
Gentle Reformers
: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era
,
(Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press 1966) .
^^NYT, Dec. 1, 1901, p. 2.
^^andal'j. B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives
,
(Washington, D.C. : The Brook ings~TjnstTtutTon7~ly 6 / } , p . TT.
23
-^Burton J. Hendrick, "Oscar W. Underwood, a New Leader from the
South, "McClure's Magazine
,
XXXVIII (February, 1912), p. 414.
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In 1903, Richardson retired from politics unexpectedly to become
Grand Commander of the Scottish Rites Masons even though he had been
elected to serve another term in the Hou^.e. Some of his peers suspected
that the real reason for his rather sudden retirement was that he could
not be re-elected Minority Leader without a fight. Although there is
no hard proof for these assertions, there were calls for stronger
leadership. The Democrats had picked up seats in the last election but
felt hard pressed by the positive and activist image of Theodore
Roosevelt. There was concern that during Richardson's four years as
Minority Leader the Democrats had not compiled a strong legislative
record to present the country and had been unable to overcome their
public image as an unruly lot, difficult to lead, and united only on
River and Harbor bills, the traditional pork bari^el legislation. The
only specific piece of information attached to these fairly nebulotis
rumors was that the dissatisfied element in the party was focusing on
25John Sharp Williams of Mississippi to oppose R.ichardson.
With Richardson's retirement three candidates were mentioned as
possible successors: Williams, DeArmond, and Clark. Williams was re-
puted to be the House Democrats' ablest debater and one of their best
parliamentarians. Ideologically he is hard to classify. He was
probably a conservative but had enough reform tendencies to make him
acceptable to a broad spectrum of the party. For example, he supported
2ACharles W. Thompson, Party Leader s of the Times
,
(New York:
G. W. Dillingham Co., 1906), pp. 184-185.
^^NYT, Jan. 10, 1903, p. 8.
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the direct election of Senators, an income tax, pure food legislation,
free rural mail delivery, and strengthening the Interstate Commerce
Commission. On the other hand, Tom Watson, the Georgia Populist,
"wrote letters to the Mississippi press saying that Williams' election
would mean that 'corporations would have just one more doodle-bug in the
United States Senate. '"^^ At the opposite end of the ideological scale
was DeArmond, who had lost to Richardson in 1899 and was now the most
senior Democrat among non- Southerners
. His radicalism, partisanship
(he did not befriend colleagues with opposing points of view) , and repu-
tation for sarcasm had not mellowed with age. Clark was closer to the
Bryan wing of the party than Williams but more of a moderate than
DeArmond. Some observers thought Clark with his persuasive, concilia-
tory personality might well have beaten Williams for Minority Leader
if DeArmond had not also been a candidate.
All three candidates began campaigning intensely but the battle
was resolved quickly. With two candidates from Missouri, "the Missouri
delegation," according to Clark's Memoirs
,
"of its own motion, so far as
I know, took the matter of our candidacy into its own hands, and
29DeArmond prevailed by one majority." DeArmond 's one vote victory
^"George G. Osborn, John Sharp Williams : Planter - Statesman of the
Deep South
,
(reprinted; Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 142-143.
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Albert D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks : Mississippi Politics,
1876-1925
,
(reprinted; Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 180.
^^Dunn, I, 388.
Clark, II, 28.
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has usually been attributed to his seniority. With Clark eliminated
from the race, opinion quickly crystallized behind Williams, who was
unanimously selected Minority Leader at the Democratic caucus.
Williams re-appointed Lloyd as Whip, likely an astute political decision
since both of his opponents were from Missouri.
In 1905 Williams was re-elected Minority Leader without opposition
although there were rumors of a possible revolt. DeArmond's name was
linked to the stories but nothing seems to have developed beyond "the
loud talk /_tha_t/ always ended at the caucus door."
In 1907, new rumors of a revolt against Williams began circulating,
but this time the revolt was more organized, more open, and had more
substance to it than the loud talk of 1905. The revolt was led by
Lloyd, the Democratic Whip; Ollie James of Kentucky; James Hay of
Virginia; and William Lamar of Florida. Others who participated were
DeArmond and Dorsey Shackelford of Missouri.
A number of ingredients were involved in the revolt. James opposed
32
Williams because he was not enough of a Bryanite. Lamar, DeArmond,
Hay, Shackelford, and possibly Lloyd probably shared James' sentiment.
Another element was the attitude of newspaper publisher Hearst, who had
served in Congress from 1903 to 1907 as a Democrat. When Williams
denied Hearst a seat on the Labor Committee, Hearst had gone behind
^%YT, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 1.
^^
Ibid
.
, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.
32
Ibid., Jan. 12, 1907, p. 2; William R. Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon ,
Archfoe of Insurgency : A His tory of the Rise and Fall or Cannonism,
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 97^
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Williams' back to line up support from labor leaders. He eventually
got the assignment he wanted, but Williams blocked legislation he in-
33
troduced. By 1907 the Hearst newspapers were criticizing Williams'
leadership. In addition, during the 1904-1905 session, the Democratic
caucus instructed members on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee to back a moderate bill on railroad regulation rather than
Hearst's more stringent measure. Two Democrats on the Committee,
Shackelford and Lamar, flouted the caucus decision to vote for the
Hearst bill, which Lamar contended had not received a fair hearing at
the caucus. In retaliation, at the start of the 1905 session, Williams
had removed them from the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and
had transferred them to "inferior committee assignments.""^'^ Afterwards,
the disciplined twosome worked to overthrow Williams as much from
grudge and personal animosity as from policy differences.
The major problem confronting the anti-Williams faction was to
find a candidate. Their first choice was Clark, whose popularity made
him the only candidate with a real chance of upsetting Williams but
Clark was ambivalent about the approaches. In his Memoirs he acknowledges
A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst
,
(New York: Scribner's, 1961),
p. 209.
34
Osborn, pp. 124-125; NYT, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5. Shackelford was
placed on the District of Columbia and Claims Committees whereas Lamar
was demoted to the Foreign Affairs and Pacific Railroad Committees.
Speaker Camion, in an interesting departire from customary procedure,
had given Minority Leader Williams the right to make Democratic com-
mittee assignments. The Speaker normally held this power, but Cannon
decided to permit Williams to assume this responsibility because of
their strong, personal friendship and in hopes of sowing dissension
and discord in Democratic ranks. Although Cannon's strategy worked
beautifully, he never granted Clark similar power.
32
35his leadership ambitions, but he also recognized Williams' ability
and believed he was sympathetic to Clark's leadership aspirations.
On January 11, 1907, Clark announced he would m.ake his decision
public within twenty-four hours. Meanwhile, Williams told the press
he thought Clark would refuse to run and that the opposition had over-
estimated its strength. The betting was that Clark would not run. On
January 12, as predicted, Clark declined to be the challenger. The
anti-Williams faction felt Clark had let them down. According to
their scenario, Clark privately agreed to run on the 11th, then met
with Williams, who asked him not to be a candidate because a contest
would be embarrassing to Williams during his campaign for the Senate.
The insurgents placed Clark's refusal to run following his meeting with
Williams. Williams denied that he asked Clark to drop out of the
36
race but later developments indicate that Williams and Clark may well
have struck a deal: Clark would pull back and Williams, if victorious
in his Senate battle, would help Clark become the new leader.
The revolt was expected to collapse because the only other possible
contender, Albert Burleson of Texas, also rebuffed the insurgents' ap-
proaches. The next day, however, ten to twelve of the dissidents asked
Clark to reconsider his decision. They assured him that their oppo-
sition to Williams was based entirely on his methods of leadership on
the floor and not on his committee assignments. They predicted that
^^Clark, II, 27.
^^NYT, Jan. 12, 1907, p. 2; Jan. 13, 1907, p. 1.
they could deliver seventy votes at the caucus whereas Williams was
certain of only sixty-one. Eighty-three votes would be needed to win.^^
Clark again refused to run. After Clark 'r final refusal, the in-
surgents turned to DeArmond, who as always was ready to take on a
leadership fight. With DeArmond as the candidate, the anti-Williams
faction claimed to be only seven votes short of victory, a figure
which seems inflated since Clark, their first choice, was considered
thirteen votes short.
After DeArmond 's entrance into the race, Robert Henry of Texas,
the caucus chairman and staunch Bryanite, declared his candidacy while
John A. Moon of Tennessee was rumored to be getting ready to make an
announcement. DeArmond 's backers were enraged with the appearance of
new candidates
:
Inasmuch as it is a man's job to beat Williams
under the most favorable circumstances, the op-
position looks with dismay on the possibility
that its strength will be scattered among a lot
of candidates
.
Nevertheless, despite all the announcements, speculation, charges, and
countercharges, the only serious candidacy was DeArmond 's. Yet even
his candidacy, after the initial ballyhoo, quietly faded away. By
the time the new Congress convened in December, 1907, the Democrats
^^Ibid. , Jan. 13, 1907, p. 1; Jan. 14, 1907, p. 1.
Ibid
.
, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.
^^Ibid. , Feb. 24, 1907, p. 4.
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had rallied around Williams, whose leadership had been given a boost
by his Senate victory.'^^ A few days before the caucus met, DeArmond
withdrew.
There were at least two reasons for DeArmond 's withdrawal. One
was that the insurgents had simply exaggerated their strength. The
other was that after Williams' election to the Senate DeArmond pos-
sibly thought he had a good chance of succeeding Williams as Minority
41 ^
Leader. Rather than risk alienating future votes in a brawl that he
might easily lose, DeArmond seemed to prefer bowing out gracefully
in order to increase the likelihood of his winning when Williams re-
tired.
Shortly after the 60th Congress opened, the long standing resent-
ment between Williams and DeArmond erupted in a fist fight on the floor
of the House. After the fight, Williams proceeded to make two moves to
insure DeArmond would not follow him as Minority Leader. Williams be-
lieved that DeArmond 's most likely competitor would be Clark. To
aid Clark's prospects, Williams resigned from the Ways and Means Com-
mittee which left Clark as the senior Democrat. Since it was
customary for the Minority Leader to also serve as the ranking
minority member on Ways and Means, Clark gained a great deal of prestige
and became something of an heir apparent by this move. In June, 1908,
Senate elections were often held several years in advance. When
Williams beat Vardaman, his Senate term would not begin until 1911.
Williams took two years off from public life to study issues and po-
litical theory.
^^NYT, Dec. 20, 1907, p. 1.
Osborn, pp. 137-138.
Williams privately notified Clark that he was going to resign shortly
as Minority Leader. This decision would surprise DeArmond since no
one expected Williams to retire as Minority Leader until March, 1909,
when his term as a representative expired. When Clark received W
Williams' letter. Congress was in recess, but Clark quickly began
rounding up commitments. As he later recalled, "I acted on his hint,
and immediately wrote to every Democratic member except Judge DeArmond
and one other, stating that I would be a candidate for the minority
leader." When "Williams' resignation was publicly known, Clark had
been pledged the support of a majority of minority members. "^^ De-
Armond had been completely outflanked and at the December, 1908,
caucus Clark was elected unanimously.
In 1908 Lloyd resigned as Whip to become Chairman of the Con-
gressional Campaign Committee. The post remained vacant until 1913.
Clark sometimes acted as his own Whip; at other times, Underwood or
John Nance Garner of Texas performed the duties of Whip, but not in
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an official or full time capacity.
In 1909, as the Democrats began their last two years as the minor-
ity party in this time period, Clark was unanimously re-elected Minority
^^Clark, II, 28.
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Leader. There were no rumors or hints of discord-perhaps because the
pereimial anti-leadership organizer, DeArmond, died shortly before the
new Congress opened.
Summary of the 1895 to 1911 Contests
During the Democrats' sixteen years as the minority party, three
characteristics stand out about the pattern of leadership change.
First, there was frequent leadership turnover. Between 1895 and 1911
five different Congressmen served as Minority Leader, with tenures
ranging from two years for Crisp and Bailey to five for Williams. In
the shorter time span of 1900 to 1908 there were two Whips with
Underwood serving one year and Lloyd for seven years, the longest term
for any of the Democratic leaders. Except for Clark, who went on to
the Speakership when the Democrats became the majority party in 1911,
the other Minority Leaders retired from politics or resigned because
they were ambitious to advance to the Senate. As for the Whips,
Underwood was not re-appointed and Lloyd becacne Chairman of the Con-
46gressional Campaign Committee.
Second, when compared to the modern Democratic party in the House
of Representatives, the number of leadership contests seems high.
Between 1895 and 1911, the Democrats waged four battles--in 1897, 1899
1903, and 1907 over the Minority Leadership. Aside from the abortive
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These findings are compatible with the career patterns of the
Speaker and the membership at large at the turn of the century. See
Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of
Representatives," American Political Science Review
, LXII (March,
1958), pp. 144-168.
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uprising against Williams, incumbents were not challenged but every
time a vacancy occurred from Crisp's easy resumption of the Minority
Leadership in 1895 to Clark's unanimous selection in 1908 a contest
developed, m 1908 a fight over Williams' vacancy was probably avoided
only because Williams adroitly timed his resignation. Table 1 sum-
marizes the Democratic contests.
Third, there is little evidence of the highly structured pattern
of routine advancement and promotion in the leadership hierarchy as
one would find today in the Democratic party in the House, Between
1895 and 1911 only two contenders may have had a special claim to the
leadership. In 1895 when Crisp moved from the Speakership to the
Minority Leadership, he was following the precedent set by John G.
Carlisle, Democrat from Kentucky, who served as Speaker from 1883 to
1889. When the Democrats became the minority party in 1889, Carlisle
had also stepped down to be Minority Leader. '^'^ The vicissitudes of
Crisp's career, building from the Carlisle example, may mark the start
of the leadership ladder that now operates among House Democrats. The
Whip had clearly not been built into any formal succession at this
stage. In every case where the Minority Leadership was vacant, the
Whip was bypassed as a potential candidate. Even in 1907 when Lloyd
was leading the revolt against Williams, he was never mentioned as an
eligible contender even though almost every other outspoken dissident
was openly discussed as a possibility. "le second example of a
Ripley, pp. 14 and 30,
38
TABLE 1
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1895-1911
Minority Leader
Year Status of Post What Happened Outcome
1895 Vacant
(Party became
Minority)
1897 Vacant
(Crisp retired)
1899 Vacant
(Bailey declined
to run again)
1901 No vacancy
1903 Vacant
1905 No vacancy
1907 No vacancy
1908 Vacant
(Williams
resigned)
1909 No vacancy
1900 Vacant
1901 No vacancy
1903 No vacancy
No contest
Contest--4 candidates;
1 ballot.
Contest--4 candidates;
7 ballots.
No contest
Contest--3 candidates;
all but 1 withdrew
before caucus
.
No contest-
-rumors of a
revolt but no action.
Contest--revolt organized;
candidate withdrew before
caucus
.
No contest
No contest
Whip
Richardson nam.es 1st
Whip.
Underwood replaced
Status quo
Crisp elected
Bailey elected
Richardson
elected
Richardson
re-elected
Williams
elected
Williams
re-elected
Williams
re-elected
Clark elected
Clark
re-elected
Underwood
appointed
Lloyd named
Lloyd renamed
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TABLE 1-
-Continued
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1895-1911
Year Status of Post
Whip
What Happened Outcome
1905 No vacancy- Status Quo Lloyd renamed
1907 No vacancy Status Quo Lloyd renamed
1908 Vacant
(Lloyd resigned)
No appointment Left vacant
1909 Vacant No appointment Left vacant
special claim to a leadership post is Clark's becoming the senior Demo-
crat on the Ways and Means Committee by virtue of Williams' resignation.
The DeArmond forces thought this move gave Clark an unfair advantage
because traditionally the Minority Leader also acted as the ranking
minority member on Ways and Means. What cannot be over
-emphasized is
that the usual procedure was for the new Minority Leader to be elevated
to this rank only after his election as Minority Leader. In the 1895-
1908 time span there is no example of the senior Democrat on Ways and
Means automatically or necessarily moving up to the Minority Leader-
ship when the previous leader retired. For instance, in the 54th Con-
gress, Crisp ranked first among the Democrats on both the Ways and
Means and Rules Committees. Next in line on both committees was
McMillin, who did indeed run for Minority Leader in 1897 and lost to
Bailey, the low man in seniority on the Elections Committee, of
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middling rank on the Judiciary Conmdttee, and second highest on Law
Revisions, a minor assignment. After Bailey's election, McMillin con-
tinued as the Democrats number two man op Rules and Ways and Means,
right behind Bailey, who before his victory had not even been a mem-
ber of either committee. Before Richardson won the Minority Leader-
ship, his committee assignments in the immediately preceding session
had been limited to the Printing and District of Columbia Committees
and Williams, prior to his election as Minority Leader, had served on
the Agriculture and Insular Affairs Committees .^^ In sum, the only
possible case of an heir apparent between 1895 and 1911 was Crisp's
stepping down from the Speakership to the Minority Leadership when the
Democrats lost control of the House in 1895. No alternate route of
succession via committee assignments existed. Without an heir ap-
parent arrangement or a formal set of expectations about the succession,
free-for-all contests easily flourished.
Analysis of the Variables 1895 - 1911
Ha j or ity-mino r i ty status. As a minority party, the Democrats fre-
quently skirmished over the leadership. In their first eight years as
the minority party, they settled two of the three Minority Leadership
vacancies through caucus votes. In their last eight years as the
minority, one of the two Minority Leadership openings was fought over
and a revolt was organized to dump the incumbent Minority Leader. If
48
See the Congressional Directory for the 54th, 55th, and 57th
Congresses.
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any trend is discernible overtime, the Democrats may have become less
combative. Tenures for both Minority Leader and I^ip began to
lengthen, contests were resolved at an earlier stage, and Williams
helped pave the way for a smooth transition by grooming Clark as his
replacement.
What seems more important than the length of time as the minority
party is the size of the minority party. As the Democrats increased
in size and began to near the 50 per cent mark of majority status, the
number of leadership contests also rose. As Table 2 shows, in the
three instances in which the Democrats held under 40 per cent of the
House seats, only one fight took place. In the five cases in which
the Democrats controlled 40 per cent or more of the seats, three con-
tests occurred. When the 40.0 to 49.9 per cent category is further sub-
divided, one can see that each time the party's proportion of the seats
reached 45 per cent a fight developed.
TABLE 2
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SIZE OF PARTY, 1895-1911
% of Democratic seats # of Congresses 0= of contests
Under 30 1 Q
30 to 39.9 .2 1
40 to 44.9 3 1
45 to 49.9 2 2
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Election trends. Because the size of the House of Representatives
was rapidly changing during the time span under consideration, both the
raw election statistics and the percentage of Democratic seats at the
opening of each new Congress are presented in Table 3. As the chart
indicates. Democratic leadership fights between 1895 and 1911 always
followed an election upsurge and election defeats consistently coincided
with leadership stability, which is, of course, the reverse of the
TABLE 3
DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1895-1909
Year ir of House Change from % of Democratic
Seats Won Previous Election Seats when Congress
Opened
ioyJ 104
-109 29.5
1897 126 + 22 35.3
1899 163 + 37 45.4
1901 154
- 9 42.9
1903 175 + 21* 46.1
1905 136
- 39 35.5
1907 163 + 27 43.3
1909 172 + 9* 43.8
indicates a contest
* If the 1903 results are adjusted using 1901 as the
base figure
,
then the Democrats
'
gain is reduced
to +9 seats ; if the 1909 results are adjusted using
1907 as the base year, then the Democrats won only
7 seats.
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recent Republican pattern. Specifically, the 1895 beating was ac-
coiT,.anied by Crisp's harmonious election to the Minority Leadership;
in 1897 the party picked up twenty-two scats and faced a divisive
battle over the vacant Minority Leadership; in 1899 there was further
improvement and a four way struggle developed to fill the opening
caused by Bailey's resignation; the 1901 downturn coincided with a
quiet caucus; a three way contest followed the 1903 upsurge; the 1905
loss of thirty-nine seats accompanied talk of revolt but no action;
in 1907 the Democrats added twenty-seven seats and were confronted
with an attempted revolt; in 1909 the Democrats showed a small gain
but had no contest. Only 1909 deviates from the general pattern. It
is the single instance when an increase was not followed by a leader-
ship fight. Of all the upward shifts, the 1909 results altered the
party alignments the least. By the time Congress met the Democrats
had improved their share of the seats by only half a percentage point
for deaths, resignations, and special elections had whittled the Demo-
cratic pickup to a mere four seats. Thus, leadership competition in
the Democratic party between 1895 and 1911 seems directly related to
election victories, and leadership stability to election losses or
situations in which the upward trend is so slight that there is vir-
tually no change in the division between the two parties.
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The elections, of course, took place in even numbered years,
but they are labeled here wi.th odd numbers so that they are uniform
with the rest of the data. Otherwise, it can become quite confusing
to keep track of contest years, election years, and the opening dates
of the first session of Congress.
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Men^ership
.
Chan^. As Table 4 shows, leadership conflict in the
Democratic party clearly correlates with high n.e:*ership turnover. At
the start of each Congress in which new meinbers accounted for more
than one-third (and incmnbents for less than two-thirds) of the Demo-
cratic seats, a fight ensued, when the composition of the House party
underwent less change, the Democrats were free from internal strife.
In these Congresses, new members ranged from a low of 15.3 per cent
in 1905 to a high of 28.1 per cent in 1901.
TABLE 4
DmOCRATIC CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1895-1911
7o New Members
^ Incumbents
1895 26.7 73.3
1897 61.9 38.1
1899 37.0 63.0
1901 28.1 71.9
1903 38.6 61.4
1905 15.3 84.7
1907 37.1 62.9
1909 21.1 78.9
______
indicates a contest
Hierarchy o A large freshman class regularly appears as an element
in the contests. As Table 5 shows, every time the Democrats faced a
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leadership fight, the ratio of freshmen was over 30 per cent. The
range was from 30.5 per cent in 1907 to 54.8 per cent in 1897. When
there was nc contest the proportion of freshmen was always below 30
per cent, ranging from 14.6 per cent in 1905 to 25.7 per cent in 1895.
When second term or sophomore members are added to freshmen, the
relationship between low seniority and conflict is not as strong as
with freshmen alone. Throughout the 1895 to 1911 era, the combined
proportion of first and second members in the Democratic party was
strikingly high, encompassing nearly two- thirds of the membership be-
fore 1900. Although contests do occur in the years with the very high-
est levels of freshmen and sophomores as in 1897 and 1899, the combined
freshmen- sophomore figure was lowest in 1907 when the dissidents moved
to overthrow Williams. One reason the correlation between freshmen and
conflict becomes muddied when sophomores are included is that two di-
verse groups are being lumped together. Between 1895 and 1911 large
freshman classes on the Democratic side--usually elected in off years--
consisted mostly of Northerners whereas Southerners dominated the sopho-
more classes, originally chosen in Presidential years when the coat-
tails of Republican Presidents were hurting Northern Democrats.
There is a tendency for the proportion of senior Democrats to rise
in years in which no contests develop and to decline in Congresses
marked by leadership conflict, as Table 5 indicates. Two caveats
should be mentioned. First, the pool of senior members before 1907 was
^^The method for counting sophomores was to include every second
term representative no matter how many years earlier he had been first
elected. Most sophomores, hov/ever, had been elected for the first time
in the immediately preceding election.
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TABLE 5
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1895-1911
Year % Freshmen
lo Sophoinores X Seniors
1895 25.7 30.5 13.3
1897 54.8 11.1 10.3
.1899 34.6 36.4 5.6
1901 24.8
9.8
1903 35.4 16.3 8.4
1905 14,6 30.7 10.9
1907 30.5 12.6 19.2
1909 21.1 22.2 19.3
indicates a contest
small, averaging around 9 to 10 per cent of the Democratic membership,
and the magnitude of the fluctuations was also small, usually amounting
to only a few percentage points. Second, there is a major exception to
the pattern described above. In 1907 the proportion of senior Demo-
crats jumped from 10.9 per cent to 19.2 per cent. Yet this much larger
reservoir of senior members was not able to prevent a revolt from form-
ing against Williams. In short, between 1895 and 1911 a large freshman
class was a constant ingredient in the fights but an enlarging body of
senior representatives was not necessarily associated with stability.
Re^onal FacUonallsa. Democratic leadership fights followed shift
in regional alignments very closely. Between 1895 and 1911 the proper-
tion of Border State delegates was fairly stable, usually 14 to 15 per
cent of the Democratic membership, so the regional variation critical
for understanding leadership conflict is the comparative sizes of the
Northern and Southern delegations. As Table 6 shows, except for 1909.
whenever the Northern contingent became larger, a fight developed and
each time the Northern share of seats declined, vacancies went un-
contested and incumbents unchallenged. For the Southerners the pat-
tern is the mirror image of the Northern one. Except for 1909
, when-
ever the proportion of Southerners rose, no contest occurred, but in
TABLE 6
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1895-1911
Year % North
"L Border States 7o South
1895 16.2 10.5 73.3
1897 24.6 15.1 60.3
1899 33.3 14.8 51.9
1901 29.4 14.4 56.2
1903 30.9 15.7 53.4
1905 16.8 14.6 68.6
1907 27.5 15.6 56.9
1909 33.3 13.5 53.2
indicates a contest
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each election in which the Southerners lost ground, there was a fight.
Ideological Factionalism. The consensus of contemporary journal-
ists and politicians was that House Democrats were deeply divided dur-
ing the minority years. For example, a newspaper reporter thought the
Democrats were "a nerveless, wrangling, disorganized, undisciplined
mob" and Clark believed he had been lucky to lose the Minority Leader-
ship in 1903 because his colleagues were "so thoroughly factionalized
that it may well be doubted whether any man could have led them in four
Congresses without making enemies enough to defeat him for Speaker.
"^^
The three great issues that divided the party were silver, tariff re-
form, and imperialism. Silver split the party regionally. Most
Southern and Western Democrats belonged to the silver wing whereas
most Easterners backed Cleveland's preference for' gold. What is often
overlooked, however, is that the silver wing had deep cleavages of 'its
own. The more progressive element, which included Bryan, Bland,
DeArmond, McMillin, and probably Clark, used silver as a rallying de-
vice for other reforms, such as an income tax and railroad regulation.
The more conservative faction consisted of Southerners, such as Bailey
and Williams, who had converted to silver "to take the wind out of the
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Populist sails" in the South but were less interested in pushing hard
^^Thompson, pp. 184-185.
^^Clark, II, 27.
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for reform. On the tariff, the Democratic party favored levying the
tariff for revenue only but on key votes Democrats who wanted protect
for a local product frequently strayed. For example, during the debat.
on rules reform in 1909 Speaker Joseph Cannon convinced twenty-three
Democrats, mainly from Georgia, Louisiana, and New York, to support the
status quo by pledging to protect sugar, lumber, oil, and gloves.
Imperialism was an issue that cut across the Bryanite-Cleveland di-
vision in the party. Bryan, Cleveland, Bailey, Clark, and Williams
were staunch anti-imperialists while Sulzer and Hearst ar-ued for ex-
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pans ion.
Roll call studies by David W. Brady and Edward M. Silbert do not
bear out the observation that House Democrats were deeply factionalized
Their research, instead, shows that the Democrats were highly unified
between 1897 and 1911. Roll call analyses may not reflect the full
extent of factionalism inside a party in an age where party leaders
used caucuses to hammer out the party stand. Furthermore, the more
radical members such as DeArm.ond or Hearst often had no place to bolt
on roll calls since the Republicans usually adopted more conservative
positions than the Democrats.
Despite these drawbacks, the Brady and Silbert roll call studies
do show in a limited way that ideological differences tended to widen
54Claude E. Barfield, Jr., "The Democratic Party in Congress,
1909-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University,
1965), pp. 32-46.
'Hollingsworth, chaps. 7 and 8.
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in the years of leadership conflict. Brady found that between 1897
and 1901 Democrats from the safest districts, generally in the South,
had higher party support scores than Democrats representing the most
competitive districts, usually in the East and Midwest, m 1899 when
the proportion of Northerners increased, voting cohesion dropped on
tariff, currency, and defense bills. Silbert examined party voting
on five broad reform issues overtime. He discovered that there were
only four Congresses between 1897 and 1911 in which more than one-
fifth of the Democratic votes cast on a particular topic disagreed
with the party's majority position. In 1897, 21 per cent of the Demo-
cratic votes on the direct election of Senators and 27 per cent of the
votes on railroad regulation opposed the party's stand; in 1899, 21 '
per cent of the votes on railroad regulation and in 1903, 25 per cent
of the votes on trust regulation opposed the Democratic position; and
in 1909, 29 per cent of the votes on railroad legislation were record-
ed against the party majority. What is interesting about this pat-
tern is that in three of the Congresses in which Brady and Silbert ob-
served less cohesion--1897, 1899, and 1903--the Democrats battled over
the party leadership.
Congruence
.
Aside from Clark, the Democrats elected a string of
Southern conservatives to be Minority Leader during this period. The
^^David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era
,
(Lawrence,
Kansas: Th2 University Press of Kansas, 1 973), pp. 120-142 and 182-193.
^^Edward M. Silbert, "Support for Reform among Congressional Demo-
crats, 1897-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Florida, 1966), pp. 298-304.
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membership was also predominantly Southern and probably conservative,
particularly when the Democrats were losing seats nationally. ,^en the
Democrats were improving their margin in the House, the Bryanite or
more radical wing of the party picked up momentum. Although never a
majority, the radicals were persistent and vocal and for a decade-
1897 to 1907-challenged the conservative leadership in the upward
years. After Alton Parker's defeat as President in 1904, the Demo-
cratic party began to move to the left, m 1906 and 1908 progressive
Democrats belonging to neither the old Cleveland nor old Bryanite
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wmg of the party started to be elected to Congress. The influx of
these young reformers, when combined with the veteran Bryanites, brought
increased pressure for leadership change as seen in the revolt against
Williams and then the selection of Clark, who was' neither a Southerner
nor a conservative. Clark liked to identify Missouri with the West
and at this stage of his career was called a moderate and "a politician
of the Bryan type Mio7 had accumulated a consistent progressive record
over the years."
As for the Whips, Underwood in geography and philosophy reinforced
the leadership dominance of the Southern conservatives, but his succes-
sor, Lloyd of Missouri, with ties to the more radical bloc, brought
balance to the Democratic Leadership between 1901 and 1908.
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Summary of the Variables. 1895
-1911
The conditions associated with the Democratic contests between
1895 and 1911 were 1) election upswings, 2) extensive membership turn-
over (over 35 per cent of the Democrats were newcomers), 3) a high
proportion of freshmen (a minimum of 30 per cent), 4) low seniority,
and 5) rising Northern representation. In sharp contrast. Congresses
free of leadership conflict were usually characterized by 1) election
defeats, 2) lower percentages of new members and freshmen, 3) in-
creased seniority, and 4) expanding Southern membership; The only
common factor was minority status. As a minority party the Democrats
were overwhelmingly a Southern party with a broad consensus on policy.
An election reverse-contrary to Robert Peabody's expectations-did
not lead to conflict because in defeat an increasingly bigger share
of the Democratic Congressional delegation came from the South. This
basic political fact m.eant that the House Democratic Minority Leaders,
also recruited from the South until 1908, better mirrored the rank-
and-file after a defeat than after a victory. What forecast trouble
for the established leadership coterie were large-scale membership
changes and greater regional and ideological diversity produced both
by election victories and by the escalating size of the House. Such
membership changes repeatedly galvanized the Bryanites, who in the
House were led by the large and senior Missouri contingent, into action
and occasioi.ally propelled the Tammany delegates into the midst of the
fray. One suspects that Tammany itched to play a greater role in the
contests but was prevented in this period from capitalizing on its
size because its representatives usually had little seniority--partly
ss
erva-
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because of the intense coB^etition between Republicans and Democrat
in New York City and partly because Tanunany deliberately rotated it
politicians between Congress and local office. The Southern cons
tive leadership was able to withstand the successive assaults of the
Bryanites because they retained a majority within the Democratic caucus
and also because their opposition was usually divided. Nevertheless,
the Bryanite bloc was enough of a thorn that Southern Minority Leaders
made sure a Bryanite served as Whip between 1901 and 1908 in hopes of
deflecting some of the discontent.
The only Congress which does not fit neatly into the pattern is
1909, which resembles the other stable Congresses except that there
was an increase in Northern representatives. Despite the Northern ad-"
vances, there was no leadership fight probably because the leadership
had already changed to reflect a more moderate viewpoint with Clark's
election in 1908. The regional-ideological membership changes of 1909
simply reinforced Clark's position in the party just as the previous
Northern influxes had undercut the more conservative leadership.
Leadership Contests
, 1911 to 1919
With "Cannonism" dividing the Republican party into Progressive
and regular camps, the Democrats staged a comeback in 1910 and won
enough seats to capture control of the House of Representatives, the
only branch of government under Democratic rule. Clark seemed like
the natural choice for Speaker. He had served for three years as
Minority Leader, his moderate voting record and Border State back-
ground could serve as a bridge between the North and the South, and he
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had carnpaigned actively, along with Bryan and Parker, for Congressional
candidates in 1910. No Democrat, however, had previously been ele-
vated to th. Speakership without a struggle. Another contest seemed
possible in the first few weeks after the election. As soon as the
election results were tabulated, Clark forinally announced his candi-
dacy for the Speakership, but Henry of Texas and Hay of Virginia
served notice that Clark's promotion would not go unchallenged. The
New York Times wondered if their opposition might be more for tactical
purposes than a real effort to derail Clark. Not only did the Demo-
crats have the normal task of choosing a Speaker and Majority Leader
but, in the aftermath of the revolt against Cannon, they also planned
to restructure the method of making committee assignments in order to
distribute the Speaker's power more widely. With so much power at
stake, there may have been quite a lot for an opponent to gain by
forcing Clark to bargain for the Speakership. Not long after the
November election. Hay and Henry began to take soundings in Washington
and soon decided not to pursue a fight, When no other rival ap-
peared, Clark won unanimous backing.
Underwood of Alabama, who had served as Clark's chief lieutenant
in an informal capacity in the last session and was the second ranking
Democrat on Ways and Means (right behind Clark), was the only candidate
^^Clark, I, 308; Barfield, p. 268.
^^NYT, Nov. 9, 1910, p. 4 and NTT, Nov. 10, 1910, p. 1.
^^Barfield, p. 273.
mentioned for Majority Leader. Long before the caucus
.et, it became
widely assumed and understood inside the party that Clark and Undervood
would be the Deniocratic leaders in the next Congress/^
In 1912, with the Republicans badly split between Taft and
Roosevelt, the Democrats swept to a landslide victory in the House
and regained control of the Senate and the White House for the first
time since 1892. Some of Wilson's supporters were disconcerted when
they realized that the House would be led by two of Wilson's defeated
convention rivals. Underwood had been the favorite Presidential can-
didate of the conservatives but had polled only 130 votes at the con-
vention. Clark, however, had v7on over a majority but not the two
thirds plurality needed for nomination when Bryan denounced him on the
floor of the convention for accepting Tammany support. After Bryan's
speech, the tide turned to Wilson. Nevertheless, there was no attempt
by the Wilson forces to change the House leadership. In an atmosphere
of "harmony and good fellowship"^^ the Democrats renominated Clark for
Speaker and Underwood for Majority Leader. Thomas Bell of Georgia was
appointed Whip, the first time the post had been officially filled
since 1908.
In 1915 Clark was unanimously nominated for Speaker by the caucus
but Underwood had been elected to the Senate. The leading contender
for Majority Leader was Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, the second
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ranking Democrat on Ways and Means during the last session and one of
the few House Democrats who still retained close ties to Bryan. As
Majority Leader, Underwood had probably been the person most responsi-
ble for passing Wilson's New Freedom legislation in the House, but
Kitchin had followed a much more independent course of the administra-
tion. Compared with Wilson, Kitchin was "too much of a free trader,
too much of an agrarian, and too anti-militaristic."^^ Publications
such as the Saturday Evening Post began speculating that the adminis-
tration would fight Kitchin's election. Although the White House im-
mediately denied the story-Joseph Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, labeled
the rumor "'a lie which had no foundation in fact,'"^^ the New York
Times_ reported that a movement was brewing to make Finis Garrett of
Tennessee the Majority Leader, with administration backing. The
gossip died when Garrett refused to run.^^ At the caucus Kitchin was
unanimously elected.
Bell was not reappointed Whip. He had not played a prominent
role in the last Congress when he had been overshadowed by Underwood,
who used the binding caucus to marshal Democratic votes, and Wilson,
who sometimes went to the Capitol to do his own lobbying and arm-
. .
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twisting. No one was named to replace Bell and the office remained
^Alex M. Arnett
, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies
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vacant until 1921.
As Wilson became more concerned with military preparedness,
tension began to mount between Kitchin and the administration. In
a letter to Victor Murdock, the former Republican Progressive Con-
gressman from Kansas, Kitchin confided his '"many misgivings as to
the success of my leadership in the coming Congress. ' "^^ In February,
.1916, one year after Kitchin's election, rumors appeared in the press
that Kitchin might be forced out as Majority Leader if he did not be-
come more congenial to the administration's military policy, men
Wilson let his militant Secretary of War Lindley Garrison resign, the
New York Times believed a compromise was underway between the adminis-
tration and the House leadership. The administration had gotten rid
of Garrison so now it was Kitchin's turn "to fall in line or step
,,70
aside." Kitchin, however, stood fast and no concrete steps were
taken to oust him.
The 1916 election deadlocked the House of Representatives with
five independents holding the balance of power between the Democrats
and Republicans. With the Democrats fighting to retain control of
the House, there was little time for intra-party conflict. Despite
the tension between Kitchin and the Wilson administration, Clark and
Kitchin were unanimously re-elected at the caucus.
Arnett, p. 69.
'ibid., p. 88.
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In April, 1917. the differences between Kltchln and the adminis-
tration intensified when Kitchin voted against declaring war on Germany.
Wdiately after Kitchen spoke in opposition to the war resolution,
Thomas Heflin of Alabama rose to the floor of the House to demand
Kitchin 's resignation as Majority Leader. Newspaper editorials began
anticipating or calling for Kitchin's removal but House Democrats
seemed reluctant to act. One or two members tried to convene the
caucus to replace Kitchin but the move found little support. The
caucus never met.^^
Kitchin's hostility to the war became a serious problem for Wilson.
Clark was not a strong leader and without a Whip the chore of lining up
votes on key bills fell to the Majority Leader. When Kitchin objected"
to an administration measure, he would turn the floor leadership over
to a Democrat friendly to the legislation and oppose the bill as an
individual Congressman rather than as Majority Leader. But this con-
cession did not really minimize the dilemma of keeping track of waver-
.
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mg Democrats.
Furthermore, Tumulty recognized that Kitchin was becoming a lia-
bility for the party, especially in the East and West. In these regions
Kitchin was unpopular because of his role as Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee in levying the heavy wartime taxes. In the East the
excess profit taxes hit hardest whereas in the West wheat had to be
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sold under a price set by Congress. The price of cotton, however,
operated without restraint because Southern Democrats had blocked
the legislation designed to hold down cotton prices. "Kitchinism,
"
much like Cannonism in 1910, was shaping up as an important campaign
issue. Eastern Republican newspapers hammered away at the theme that
another Democratic victory would mean that Kitchin would continue as
the Ways and Means Chairman and Majority Leader since he would certain
ly be returned by his constituents.'^^
Among the Wilson manuscripts is an "unsigned memorandum 'Analysis
of Democrats in the 65th Congress . '"^^ Wilson wanted to replace
Kitchin and Clark, who Wilson thought acted as Kitchin 's "unfailing
ally," and asked one of his advisers to undertake the above report.
The conclusion was that it was "'hopeless'" to locate new leadership
because "the few able northern Democrats were no match for the experi-
enced Southerners as floor managers or debaters. "^^ Wilson abandoned
the idea of formally trying to replace Clark and Kitchin and instead
set up an informal liaison arrangement with Garner, who was on the
Ways and Means Committee and who had been recoinmended to the Presi-
dent by Postmaster General Burleson, also from Texas. Beginning in
mid-April, 1917, Garner met confidentially with Wilson twice each
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week, but Garner never forally supplanted Kitchin as Majority Leader
and the leadership impasse continued to the end of the 65th Congress.
^^SEiaiZ 2l the 1911 to 191_9 Contests
Con^ared with rapid turnover of the minority years, the Democratic
leadership was much more stable between 1911 and 1919. Clark served
the full eight years as Speaker and there were only two Majority
•Leaders, Underwood and Kitchin, who each served four years. The of-
fice of Whip was vacant for six of the eight years with Bell filling
the only two year term.
There were no leadership fights between 1911 and 1919 (see Table
7), which is a second contrast with the minority period. Each time a
vacancy occurred-the Speakership in 1911 and the Majority Leadership
in 1911 and 1915, a consensus choice emerged at a very early stage.
In 1911 Clark was the clear frontrunner as soon as the November elec-
tion results were tallied and all ideas of challenging his advancement
had been dropped by the end of the month. With Underwood no other nominee
was even suggested for Majority Leader in 1911 and in 1915 Kitchin was
the only candidate who actively sought the Majority Leadership. The
speed and unequivocal manner in which Garret denied the hints that
he might enter the race against Kitchin raise the possibility that
the rumors about his candidacy did not originate with him but may have
been a trial balloon launched by the administration. In addition.
^'^Timmons, pp. 28-83; Marquis James, Mr. Garner of Texas
,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
, 1939), p. 72.
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TABLE 7
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1911-1919
Year Status of Post
Speaker
What Happened Outcome
1911
1913
1915
1917
1911
1913
1915
1917
1911
1913
1915
1917
Vacant
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
Vacant
No vacancy
Vacant
No vacancy
Vacant
(No Whip since
1908)
Vacant
Vacant
(Btll not re-
named)
Vacant
No contest--Minority
Leader agreed upon at
early date.
No contest
No contest
No contest
Majority Leader
No contest— consensus
choice quickly emerged
No contest
No contest—only one
candidate despite gossip
that the administration was
looking for an alternative.
No contest
^
Whip
No appointment
Clark appoints first
Majority Whip
No appointment
No appointment
Clark
elected
Clark re-
elected
Clark re-
elected
Clark re-
elected
Underwood
elected
Underwood re-
elected
Kitchen
elected
Kitchin re-
elected
Left vacant
Bell named
Left vacant
Left vacant
's
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no revolts were threatened or organized against the leadership.
H--rr^ P^"^^ °f succession seeins to have been slowly evolving for
the speakership. Although Clark's experience as Minority Leader
..de
him the most logical candidate for Speaker, nobody argued that Clark':
previous service entitled him to the Speakership or that he should b.
promoted. Clark's election may have had the effect of strengthening
the precedent set by Crisp of moving up to the Speakership from the
Minority Leadership in 1891. Crisp won the Speakership only after a
wild battle that included trading the Chairmanship of the Ways and
Means Comraittee for a bloc of votes at a crucial stage in the caucus
balloting whereas Clark's elevation was easy and harmonious
.
- With the Majority Leader, the Democrats seemed to have had a firmer
set of expectations about the succession between 1911 and 1919. Tra-
ditionally, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee had concur-
rently served as floor leader in both parties because of the critical
in^ortance of the tariff in an era without an income tax. The posts
had been officially separated at the turn of the century but the close
connection between the two jobs remained. As has been stressed
earlier, the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee in the
minority years did not automatically advance to the Minority Leader-
ship, but during the majority years the senior Democrat on the commit-
tee did regularly move up to the Majority Leadership. Underwood
Clark, I, 273.
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progressed from being the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means
to Chairman and Majority Leader. When he retired, Kitchin, the second
ranking Denocrat on Ways and Means, also became Chairman and Majority
Leader.
.
A final contrast between the periods is the role of the adminis-
tration in leadership selection. As a minority party, there were only
a few isolated examples of minor outside interference-Senator Vest's
defense of Bailey in 1898 is typical. There is no evidence that
Cleveland intervened during the last two years of his Presidency or
that Bryan participated in the leadership fights although he frequently
skirmished with House Democrats over legislation. Following Under-
wood's retirement Wilson seems to have repeatedly wanted to restrict
Kitchin 's influence although he was never able to rally much support
from rank-and-file Democrats or find a strong opponent. Cleveland'
also is reported to have intervened in House leadership disputes when
the Democrats were the majority party. In 1893 Cleveland supposedly
warned Speaker Crisp to replace the chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee or face an opponent endorsed by the administration. Although
Clark, who relates this story, tends to minimize Cleveland's influence,
it is worth noting that Crisp did change the chairman of the Ways and
79Means Committee and was re-elected Speaker without opposition.
Analysis of the Variab!' es
,
1911-1919
Majority -minority status . Majority status is clearly associated
Ibid., 327.
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with the absence of leadership conflict between 1911 and 1919. The
size of the inajority was not inrportant since the DenK^crats organized
the House with a bare plurality in 1917 and had a lopsided margin in
1913. The length of time as the inajority party also was not relevant.
Election trends. There is no correlation between the lack of
fights and the election returns during the majority interlude. As
Table 8 shows, in 1911 the Democratic share of House seats jumped
nearly 15 percentage points from 43.8 per cent in 1909 to 58.2 per
cent in 1911; in 1913, the Democratic margin increased to 66.4 per
cent; in 1915, the downward slide to minority status began as the
TABLE 8
DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1911-1919
Year # of House Seats Change from Pre- % of Democratic
vious Election
. Seats When House
Met
1911 228 +56 58.2
1913 291 +63* 66.4
1915 230
-61 52.4
1917 216
-14 49.0
*
When the 1913 figures are adjusted to compensate for the
rapid growth of the House, then the Democratic pick up,
based on the 1909 House size, would amount to only 33
seats.
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DenK^cratic proportion of seats fell to 52.4 per cent and in 1917
sloped further to 49.0 per cent. Despite the large shifts in seats,
no contests occurred either when the lar.e gains of 1911 opened up the
Speakership and the Majority Leadership (as one would expect from the
pattern in the Democratic minority years) or when the major off-year
losses of 1915 coincided with the Majority Leader vacancy created by
Unden^od's election to the Senate (as one would predict from the Re-
publican example between 1955 and 1966).
Membership
,
Change. The proportion of new members is lower through
out the 1911 to 1919 period than in any Congress in which a contest
developed during the minority era. As Table 9 indicates, in 1911 and
1913 new members composed 35.2 per cent and 35.0 per cent of the Demo-
cratic membership in the House, figures just sligiitly below the 37.0
per cent level characteristic of the contest years between 1895 and
1911. The low membership change of 1915 and 1917 is similar to the
turnover for the stable years between 1895 and 1911.
TABLE 9
MEMBERSHIP CHAInIGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919
Year % New Members % Incumbents
1911 35.2 64.8
1913 35.0 65.0
1915 16.2 83.8
1917 18.8 81.2
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Hierarchy, when the aggregate figures for freshman members for
1895 to 1911 are compared with those for 1911 to 1919 (see Table 10),
the proportion of freshman within the Democratic party dropped during
the majority interval. These findings would seem to support the hy-
pothesis that conflict is more likely with a large freshnian class.
TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF FRESHMEN MEMBERS IN
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1895 - 1911
1895 to 1911 1911 to 1919
% Freshmen
average
range
30.2%
54.8 to 14.6%
24.2%
33.2 to 15.0%
However, when the data from the individual Congresses between 1911 and
1919 are examined, the level of freshmen in both 1911 and 1913 was over
30 per cent, which is the figure that in the earlier period had con-
sistently been identified with leadership conflict. In 1915 and 1917
the proportion of freshmen (see Table 11) is low, just as in the Con-
gresses with no leadership fights between 1895 and 1911. Thus, in the
majority years leadership stability occurred regardless of the size of
the 'reshman class.
The number of Democrats with at least ten years experience was
rising, as Table 11 illustrates. This growing body of senior members
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TABLE 11
SENIORITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919
Year
7o Freshmen
1911 33.0 17.6
1913 33.2 15.5
1915 15.4 20.2
1917 15.0 24.4
tends to correlate with the leadership stability evident between 1911
and 1919. For instance, the average number of senior Deicocrats between
1911 and 1919 was 19.4 per cent; for the stable years between 1895 and
1911 13.3 per cent; and for the contest years in the identical tine
span 10.9 per cent. Moreover, the figures for individual Congresses
indicate that the proportion of senior Democrats in 1915 and 1917 was
higher than in any minority Congress and that the 1911 and 1913 per-
centages were higher than for any of the contested years between 1895
and 1911 except 1907.
Regional factionalism
. Table 12 shows that in contrast to the
minority years the South never held a majority of the seats between
1911 and 1919 although the South remained the dominant regional faction
in 1915 and 1917. Unlike the minority phase where conflict developed
80 per cent of the time the Northern share of seats was expanding, no
contests were fought in 1911 or 1913 even though the Northern wing of
party was sharply increasing in size.
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TABLE 12
REGIONALISM WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919
1911 41.9
1913 34.6
1915 43.0
1917 46.9
Year % from South % from Border States
15.0
13.1
16.7
% from North
43.2
52.2
40.3
16.9 36.2
Although regionalism showed no important relation to leadership
stability in this period, the regional distribution of senior members
may be of significance in understanding the process of leadership
selection. As Table 13 indicates, Democrats with ten or more years
of experience overvzhelmingly came from the South. Only a handful of
the members with the longest service were Northerners. In 1911 all
four senior Northerners were from New York and three of these Con-
gressmen—John Fitzgerald, Henry Goldfogle, and George Lindsay-
-had
deserted the binding caucus decision on rules reform in 1909 to side
with Cannon. Afterwards, this trio had been among those threatened
with discipline by the caucus. Of the Northern senior representatives
only Sulzer had remained loyal to the party in the 1909 fracas, but by
1912 he had resigned from the House to become Governor of New York.
In 1913 two of the three Northerners were again 1909 bolters from New
York and the third was Henry Rainey of Illinois, who during the New
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TABLE 13
SENIOR DEMOCRATS CLASSIFIED BY REGION, 1911-1919
Year # of Senior
Democra ^ q
# from South # from Border
States
# from North
1911 40 31 5 4
1913 46 36 7 3
1915 46 34 7 5
1917 52 30 12 10
Deal would become the first Northern Democrat to be elected Speaker in
over fifty years. By 1915 and 1917 the Northern contingent began to
include a fev; more Midwesterners among its senior members. These data
illustrate why Wilson had difficulty locating suitable Northern leader-
ship to challenge Clark and Kitchin. In 1913 when the Northern faction
obviously had the votes to make a change in the leadership, the Northern
membership in the House, still reflecting the party's long minority
status, was young with most of its senior people ideologically out of
step with the rest of the party. In 1915 and 1917 when the Northerners
began to produce a larger pool of potential leaders, the South had re-
verted to its dominant position in the House.
Ideological Factions
. In ideological terms the Democrats were a
hodgepodge of contrasting groups. James >IacGregor Burns has described
them as "a patchwork of old Cleveland Democrats, urban bosses, Bryan
Populists, conservative Southerners, /and/ urban middle-class
70
80progressives." m 1911 this jumble of factions produced a liberal
or refonn-oriented majority that clashed with the conservatives as
soon as the Democrats began to organize the House. The reformers op-
posed placing any conservative Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee
or as committee chairmen. Robert Broussard of Louisiana was forced
off the Ways and Means Committee because he had voted too often with
the Republicans; Edward Pou of North Carolina was pushed aside for
Kitchin because he was not enough of a free trader. Fitzgerald of
New York, slated to become Chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
was opposed because he had helped Cannon in the struggle over rules
reform in the previous Congress. Fitzgerald decided to fight. Knowing
he was outnumbered if he fought along ideological lines, he sought to
"
turn the issue into a regional one in order to rally his fellow
Northerners. Only three Northern Democrats stood to become committee
chairmen. With the reshuffling of committee members, Sulzer of New
York had been denied the Chairmanship of Military Affairs and had been
given Foreign Affairs instead. Fitzgerald argued
You have deposed one northern Democrat, Sulzer, from
his rights in order to give his place to a southerner.
Now, if you want to, go ahead and take the only im-
portant chairmanship that goes to a northern Democrat
and give it to a southerner. You won't get away with
it without a fight in caucus and another on the floor
of the House. And I'm not sure you'll be able to
organize the House after the fight is made.^^
80James MacGregor Burns
, The Deadlock of Democracy
: Four -Party
Politics in America
,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963), p. 131.
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The outcome was that Fitzgerald assumed the chair^nship of a carefully
stacked coH^ittee. The Democrats' deep cleavages flared on other
issues, too, such as child labor, merchant marine legislation, Panama
canal shipping tolls, and campaign publicity restrictions .^^ Never-
theless, despite these divisions. Underwood used the binding caucus to
meld these disparate factions into an exceptionally unified voting bloc
that built a progressive record on tariff reform between 1911 and 1913
and passed the New Freedom legislation between 1913 and 1915.
After 1915 the Democrats' remarkable solidarity began to crumble.
Since Kitchin opposed much of Wilson's military program, he did not use
the caucus to build a consensus. Even on domestic matters as the focus
shifted from reforms long advocated by the Bryanite and agrarian wing
of the party to urban industrial problems the party's factions began
84to reappear on roll call votes. The movement from unusually high
voting cohesion to greater heterogeneity was not associated with leader-
ship conflict as was usually the case during the minority period.
Congruence. In terms of region, the leadership did not reflect the
North's growing numbers, but it also should be stressed that the North
held a majority of the seats only in 1913; in 1911 there were more Con-
gressmen from the North than from any other section but the South and
Border States together accounted for 56.8 per cent of the representatives;
in 1915 and 1917 the South was the largest region and when combined with
the Border Suates held 59.7 and 63.8 per cent of the seats respectively.
^^Silbert, p. 296; Ripley, pp. 97-98.
^'^ipley, pp. 42 and 95-98; Burns, pp. 143-45.
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Thus, the leadership, while not responsive to short-term changes in the
party's membership, did reflect the strongest and most stal^le regional
groups within the party over the long haul.
With ideology it is harder to judge whether the leaders reflect
the rank and file because most academicians have concentrated on the
gulf between Wilson and the House leaders rather than on the degree of
congruence between the hierarchy and membership in the House. Clark
probably stood in the middle of the House membership whereas Underwood,
although a conservative, should not be lumped with the standpat Republi
can leadership. For instance, during the 62nd Congress he compiled an
impressive reform record by voting for the establishment of the
Children's Bureau, for workmen's compensation for railroad employees,
85and for the Clayton Ant i- Injunction Act. Kitchin and Bell are the
real question marks. Kitchin 's opposition to the war and his leader-
ship of the pacifist band in the party, which consisted of some "thirty
odd Democratic representatives from rural districts in the South and
West--inheritors of Populist traditions and prejudices and followers
. 86
of
. . .
Bryan," may distort the public image of the rest of his
record. Only a detailed roll call voting study that pays special at-
tention to domestic legislation will reveal whether Kitchin was as out
of step with the party membership as he was with the President. As for
Bell there is no information available about his ideological ties.
85Anne Firor Scott, "A Progressive Wind from the South," Journal
of Southern History
,
XXIX (February, 1963), p. 68.
^ink, Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916, p. 28.
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Sungnary of the Variables
. 1911
-1919
Aside from majority status and to a limited extent more senior
members, there is no clear pattern that characterizes the four stable
Congresses between 1911 and 1919. Based on the pattern from the
minority years, one would expect a contest in two of the Congresses
in this period, m 1911 and 1913 the Democrats had won significant
victories, had a large body of new members and freshmen, and had
become more Northern and reform oriented in composition. Yet no
fight was organized even though the North was excluded from the
leadership. There are at least two plausible explanations for this
stability. As noted earlier, there were few Northerners eligible for
a leadership post, but perhaps the better explanation is that idealog-"
ically there was no reason to rebel against Clark and Underwood's
leadership, which had been effective and progressive. The cleavage
between the House leaders on one side and the administration and the
Northern wing of the party on the other side developed over Wilson's
foreign policy and the war. By the time the Northern Wilsonians
strenuously objected to the House leadership, the South and the Border
States had the votes to dominate the caucus so no change was possible.
Leadership Contests
,
1919 to 1931
The 1918 election results gave the Republicans a comfortable ma-
jority in the House of Representatives and returned the Democrats to
minority status. Shortly after the election Kitchin announced that
Clark would be the Minority Leader while he (Kitchin) would remain on
the Ways and Means Committee as the ranking Democrat. The purpose of
Kitchin's early statement was to forestall gossip that he would be
unwilling to step down as floor leader and would instead challenge
87Clark for the post. *
Administration loyalists, however, had other ideas about the House
leadership. For months Northern Congressmen had been chaffing about
the South
-s domination of the party. Tumulty was also concerned that
the leadership of the party was reverting to the South and wanted "to
remedy the situation" before the 1920 election "by bolstering the Demo-
cratic organization with Northern Wilsonians, by taking the President
to the hustings, and by removing Clark and Kitchin from leadership in
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Congress." By January, 1919, even Wilson was believed ready to cur-
tail Southern influence in his administration by restricting the number
89
of future Southern appointments.
In March, 1919, the rumblings of discontented Democrats became
more specific. A group of eighteen House Democrats, generally thought
to be loyal to Wilson, formed a reorganization committee. The re-
organization committee, composed mostly of Northerners, called for the
establishment of a steering committee representative of all sections
in the country. The most controversial aspect of the plan was that
the chairman of the steering committee, who would be elected by the
committee, .would be the Democratic floor leader. In other words, the
Minority Leader would no longer be elected by the membership at large
^^NYT, Nov. 13, 1918, p. 5.
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Blum, p. 168, for both quotations in paragraph.
^^NYT, Jan. 27, 1919, p. 8.
but by the representatives on the steering coBn^ittee. The real goal
of the reorganization conimittee was to depose Clark as the Democratic
leader and to replace him with Rainey of Illinois', who was close to
both Wilson and Bryan and the second ranking Democrat on Ways and
Means. It was widely believed in the party and the press that the
concept of a steering committee was a device to broaden the insurgents'
base of support beyond those who wanted to oust Clark because of his
reputed opposition to the League of Nations in its original form and
, . 90nis past opposition to the draft.
Clark and his friends were not fooled by the smokescreen of a
steering committee and attacked the reorganization committee for try-
ing to undermine Clark's national reputation. There may be a grain
of truth to this charge because the reorganization committee appeared
one week after Clark announced that he would be willing to accept the
Democratic Presidential nomination in 1920. Clark's camp also argued
that Clark deserved to be the Minority Leader because of his seniority
or what they called seniority succession.
After two days of recruiting, Jared Sanders of Louisiana, the
chairman of the reorganization committee, said that sixty- four out of
the eighty-seven Democrats needed to control the caucus had joined the
movement to create a steering committee but denied that there was any
agreement to install Rainey as the next Minority Leader. Cordell Hull
of Tennessee was also reported to be under consideration as the steer-
ing committee chairman.
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The reorganization committee had strong ties to several cabinet
officers, especially Postmaster General Burleson. Both sides acknowl-
edge Burleson as the chief instigator. Secretary of Labor William
Wilson and Attorney General A. M. Palmer also participated. Josephus
Daniels, the Secretary of Navy, was believed ready to become involved
if his influence was needed. Burleson's support was considered es-
sential because of the lack of enthusiasm for a steering committee in
the Texas, Georgia, and Alabama delegations, which were large and in-
fluential in the Democratic caucus. The dissidents hoped that
Burleson would be able to convince a sizeable portion of the Texas
delegation to back the idea.
During the latter half of March, 1919, the reorganizers seemed
to be picking up votes, despite Clark's estimate of only twenty-five
likely insurgents. Asbury Lever of South Carolina sided with the re-
organization committee because he thought the Minority Leader must
support the President. Richard Whaley also of South Carolina en-
dorsed the steering committee and attacked Clark for giving comfort
to the Republican party by not fully supporting the President. Rainey
said a pro-administration Minority Leader was needed and that a steer-
ing committee could help offset the identification of the Democratic
92
party with the South.
^•'•NYT, Mar. 5, 1919, p. 9; Mar. 7, 1919, p. 12; Mar. 10, 1919, p. 22
^^Ibid. , Mar. 17, 1919, p. 15; Mar. 19, 1919, p. 10; Mar. 21, 1919,
p. 12; Mar. 31, 1919, p. 7; Robert A. Waller, "Congressman Henry T.
Rainey of Illinois: His Rise to the Speakership, 1903-1934," (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois, 1963), p. 205.
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But by May, 1919, it was clear that Wilson would have to exert
pressure to defeat Clark. This pressure was not forthcoming. As
much as Tumulty would have liked to change leaders in the House, he
recognized that a fight would be futile. In the last election the
Northern wing of the party .had lost heavily to the Republicans while
the South 's strength had reniained intact. Tumulty knew that the votes
to beat Clark were simply not there. when James McClintic of Okla-
homa, the secretary of the reorganization committee, "requested
Tumulty to help
.
. .
prevent the election of Clark as minority
leader" the "request was ignored"^^ and the fight collapsed. At
the caucus Clark was unanimously re-elected.
For Congressional Democrats, the Harding landslide was disas-
'
trous. In the party's worst defeat since 1894, only 131 Democrats won
election to the House. Even Clark lost his seat. In this atmosphere
Kitchin quickly emerged as the consensus choice for the new Minority
Leader and was unanimously elected to the leadership post. Kitchin
announced that Garrett of Tennessee would do "most of the floor work"^^
for the Democratic side and that William Oldfield of Arkansas would be
the Whip, the first one appointed since 1913.
During the session, Kitchin became seriously ill and had to leave
Washington to recuperate. Before going, he called a special caucus
^^Blum, p. 187.
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to appoint Garrett acting Minority Leader in his absence. This move
greatly upset Garner, who had expected to get the nod because he was
the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means, directly behind
Kitchin. Garner's biographers attribute Garrett's selection to
Kitchin's resentment over the role Garner played during World War I
as Wilson's liaison. Another reason is that Kitchin was bothered
that the Democrats were drifting with the conservative tide of the
Harding era. Kitchin tried to unite the Democrats behind a low tariff
position as a means of opposing Harding's first revenue bill, but had
failed because Garner convinced a majority of the Democrats on the
Ways and Means Committee to adopt the Republicans' protectionist
stance. Since Garrett was more of a free trader than Garner, policy
considerations may also have entered into Kitchin's decision to name
96
Garrett.
Following the Democrats' comeback in the 1922 election, there
were reports that the Democrats would replace Kitchin, who was
critically ill, with Garrett. A few days later the news stories were
predicting that Kitchin would retire and that a lively contest was
shaping up between Garrett and Garner, but two days later Kitchin
announced he planned to continue as Minority Leader. Despite the
uncertainty surrounding Kitchin, Garner decided to press ahead with
his campaign for Minority Leader. His strategy was to line up the
new members by promising them good commitcee assignments. (Garner
by virtue of his position on the Ways and Means Committee was on the
Timraons, pp. 87-88; Arnett, pp. 298-99.
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Co^nittee on Co^ittees.) After a spurt of letter writing, Garner's
allies claimed to be finding support in all sections of the country.^^
At this stage Garrett was not pursuing votes as actively or as
publicly as Garner. He was not without friends, however, as both
Hull, the Democratic National Chair^n and newly re-elected Congress-
from Tennessee, and Arthur Rouse of Kentucky were ready to begin
campaigning for him whenever he wanted. After Kitchin's death in
May, 1923, Garrett became the frontrunner in the contest. Arguments
made in Garrett's behalf were 1) that he was entitled to the job be-
cause of his service as acting Minority Leader; 2) he was the Demo-
crats' ablest parliamentarian; and 3) he voted more regularly with
the party than Garner. Garner, in turn, tried to rebut the idea
that Garrett ought to be promoted because he was the acting Minority
Leader by stressing his own legitimate claim on the office. He •
argued that he should be the successor because he was now the ranking
Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee. Garrett replied that his
o\m position as ranking Democrat on the Rules Committee carried
99greater weight.
When Garner saw that he could not win, he pulled out of the race
by saying.
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p. 4; Jan. 9, 1923, p. 3; Tom Connolly, My Name is Tom Connolly
,(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1954), p. 139.
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In the interest of party harmony, I do not expectto become a candidate for the minority floorleadership in the Sixty-Eighty Congress. loS
Even after his later triumphs. Garner felt bitter about Kitchin's de-
cision to appoint Garrett acting Minority Leader. He remained con-
vinced that Kitchin's action had cost him the Minority Leadership in
1923. In his opinion, the only way he could have circumvented
Kitchin's succession design would have been to push the contest to a
caucus vote. Garner thought an open fight would have been too costly
to his long range leadership ambitions for he would have gained the
enmity of the Garrett faction, but by helping restore harmony he won
over Garrett's allies for a future bid. At a harmonious caucus
Garrett was elected Minority Leader and Oldfield was re-appointed Whip.
In 1925 and 1927 the Democrats again unanimously elected Garrett,
and Oldfield continued as Whip. During this time span there were no
public signs of leadership discord although in private Garner's
friends were urging him to challenge Garrett. Garner, however, made
no move. "He had felt that Garrett would eventually seek the Tennessee
Senatorship and he preferred to wait for that instead of causing a
breach in the Democratic ranks. "^^^ During the summer of 1927 Garrett
announced that at the end of his term he would retire from the House
to run for the Senate. Speculation immediately focused on Garner as
the prime contender for the Minority Leadership, but nothing was
definite since the election was over twenty months away.
Tiinmons, p. 102.
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In December, 1928, Oldfield died and was replaced as Whip by
John C. Box of Texas, whose appointment was understood to be an in-
teri. one. The reasoning was that Garner would be chosen Minority
Leader at the start of the next Congress and that it would be in-
appropriate for the two party leaders to come from the same state.
In an unusual departure, Garrett named John McDuffie of Alabama as-
sistant Whip, a new post.''"^^
In March, 1929, Garner was elected Minority Leader. He had no
real opponent. Rainey "had maneuvered to be in a position to succeed
103
Garrett" but there is no evidence that he took any concrete steps
to line up votes besides writing to Garrett. When Rainey realized
that he could not "successfully dispute John Garner's claim to the
104
post," he dropped any idea of engaging in a contest. Garner pro-
moted McDuffie to W-hip but declined to appoint another assistant Whip
Summary of the 1919 to 1931 Contests
Between 1919 and 1931 the Democrats again had a high rate of
leadership turnover, just as in the earlier minority period. Four
different men served as Minority Leader--Glark from 1919 to 1921,
Kitchin from 1921 to 1923, Garrett from 1923 to 1929, and Garner from
1929 to 1931. Serving as Whip were Oldfield for seven years, Box for
three months, and McDuffie for two years. The numerous vacancies
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^°\aller, p. 326,
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in the 1920 were „uch
.ore Ukely to resuU fro. election defeats
or deaths than from leaders voluntarily relinquishing their offices
for a job outside the House as in the 1895 to 1911 era. Only
Garrett followed the older ^rar^^^^,^„ ^-pcn io tradition of resigning as Minority Leader
to run for the Senate.
In contrast to the peaceful leadership changes of the majority
interval, the Democrats twice waged contests over the Minority
Leadership between 1919 and 1931. (See Table 14 for a suinmary.)
In 1919 the Wilsonians tried to prevent Clark from assuming the
Minority Leadership and in 1923 Garrett and Garner dueled over the
opening. Although the competition is reminiscent of the conflict
of the previous minority years, the fights did not occur as often"
(two in this twelve year span as compared with four in the earlier
sixteen year phase) and lacked the wide open, free-for-all style of
Some of the previous contests. For example, the 1919 and 1923 fights
were settled before the caucus met and involved only two contestants
whereas the leadership struggles between 1895 and 1911 had to a
large extent been ideological brawls that mobilized the competing
wings of the party. Although the 1919 fight is similar in that it
seems to be a last ditched effort by the Wilsonians to wrest control
of the Congressional leadership, the 1923 contest seems to more of
a fight revolving around the personal ambitions of the participants
than a real attempt to change the direction of the party.
The orderly set of steps to a top party leadership post that
characterizes the present day Democratic hierarchy was beginning to
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TABLE 14
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1919-1931
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1928
1929
' Minority Leader
Year status of Post what Happened
Vacant (Party
became Minority)
Vacant (Clark
defeated in 1920
election)
Vacant (Kitchin
died)
No vacancy
No vacancy
Vacant (Garrett
retired to run
for Senate)
Vacant (No Whip
named since 1913
)
Vacant
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
Vacancy (Old-
field died)
Vacancy (Box
interim appoint-
ment )
Contest--Reorganization
Committee formed to pre-
vent Speaker Clark from
assuming Minority
Leadership.
No contest
Contest between Garner
and Garrett; Garner
withdrew before caucus
No contest
No contest
No contest
Whip
No appointment
Kitchin appoints first
Whip since 1913-1915.
Status quo
Status quo
Status quo
Garrett makes interim
appointment; also
names assistant Whip
Garner appoints V/hip
Outcome
Clark elected
Kitchin elected
Garrett elected
Garrett re-elected
Garrett re-elected
Garner elected
Left vacant
Oldfield named
Oldfield renamed
Oldfield renamed
Oldfield renamed
Box named Whip;
McDuffie named
Assistant Wliip
McDuffie named
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to take shape in the 1920's. Clarlc was succeeded by Kitchin, who,
as the former Majority Leader, was the next highest ranking Democrat
in the party leadership hierarchy. He, in turn, was followed by
Garrett, who had served as Kitchin 's floor leader although with no
formal title and had then been designated acting Minority Leader.
Only Gamer's elevation does not fit the pattern since he had held
no party post independent of an influential committee assignment
before his election. Another difference with the present arrange-
ment is that the Whip still had not been built into the ladder.
Further evidence that leadership change in the Democratic party
was becoming more routinized is that for the first time candidates
began to contend that they had a special right to an office or were
an heir apparent.. Clark's claim to the Minority Leadership in 1919
was a solid one based not only on his long and continuous tenure as
the senior party leader dating back to 1908 but was also bolstered
by the Carlisle and Crisp precedents. Garner and Garrett's arguments
were much more tenuous since Garrett had only been briefly co-opted
into the leadership hierarchy and Garner wanted to expand the link
between the Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee to apply to the minority years as well.
A final indication that change was becoming more bureaucratized
with boundaries defining who was eligible to be a candidate is that
contestants seem to have been drawn from a much narrower stratum in
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the party than before. Between 1919 and 1931 only „e:^ers on the
Rules or Ways and Means Co™„ittees and with twenty years service In
the House ran for Minority Leader. Ko longer were young representa-
tives with service lifted to „inor co^ittees becoming candidates
or rising quickly to the top rungs of the leadership Udder as Bailey
had been able to do in 1897.
The shift to minority status did not stop members of the Wilson
administration from intervening in House contests. Burleson and pos-
sibly Tumulty initiated or at least encouraged the formation of the
reorganization committee and then when the votes could not be pro-
duced Tumulty halted the pro-administration forces by refusing to
intercede further himself or to pull Wilson directly into the fray.
After the Republicans recaptured the White House, there is no evi-
dence of pressure being exerted by outside sources on leadership
selection in the House. The only possible exception is Hull's ef-
forts to round up votes for Garrett in 1923 when he was the Democratic
National Committee Chairman. Hull, however, seems to have partici-
pated more as a returning Congressman or as a state colleague of
Garrett's than in his role as the National Committee Chairman.
Analysis of the Variables
,
1919 - 1931
.Majority-Minority status
. Minority status again coincides with
contested leadership change in the Democratic party. Unlike the 1895
to 1911 era, where the contests occurred fairly regularly throughout
the period, the leadership fights of this time span clustered at
the beginning of the minority interval. In the first four years.
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two of the three Minority Leadership vacancies were contested, but
after 1923 the only opening was settled peacefully and no revolts
n^teriali^ed. As for the size of the minority party, there is again
a tendency for fights to beco.e
.ore co™.on as the party increased
its ranks. As Table 15 shows, both fights developed when the Demo-
crats controlled over 40 per cent of the seats.
TABLE 15
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SIZE OF PAPvTY, 1919-1931
% of Democratic Seats # of Congresses # of fights
30 to 34.9
35 to 39.9
40 to 44.9
45 to 49.9
1
1
3
1
^^^^^^'^^ trends. The Democratic fights of 1919 and 1923 oc-
curred under contrasting conditions. As Table 16 indicates, the 1923
clash conforms to the earlier Democratic minority pattern of coming
after a victory but the 1919 battle developed after the off-year
losses of 1918. The Democrats lost twenty-six seats in 1918, which
is a slightly lower number than the thirty to fifty seat losses
Peabody found associated with the Republican upheavals of the 1950 's
and 1960 's, but the election represented a significant defeat for
the Democrats since it pushed them into minority status.
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TABLE 16
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND ELECTION RESULTS, 1919-1931
Year # of Seats Won Change from
Last Election
% of Democratic
Seats
19JL9 190
-26 43.9
1921 131
•
-59 try 1
1923 205 +74 47.6
1925 183
-22 41.8
1927 195 +12 44.8
1929 167
-28 37.5
indicates a contest
Leadership stability during the 1920 's tended to follow election
downturns, just as between 1895 and 1911. The relation is not perfect,
In 1927 no contest developed even though the party's fortunes had
improved in the 1926 election. However, the Democrats netted only
twelve additional seats for a 3 per cent gain, which was the smallest
change in the partisan division in the House during the 1920 's.
Membership change
.
The dual set of characteristics for contest
years, apparent for election returns, was also evident with membership
turnover. The 1923 contest between Garrett and Garner, again cor-
responding to the 1895 to 1911 Democratic mold, followed a massive
influx of new members into the party. As Table 17 shows, 46.3 per
cent of the Democrats in the House in 1923 had not served in the
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TABLE 17
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1919-1931
^^^"^ New Members % Incumbents
1919
19.2 80.1
1921 20.6 79.4
1923 46.3 53.7
1925 10.4 89.6
1927 14.4 85.5
1929 9.8 90.2
indicates a contest
jers
itnnaediately preceding Congress although many had been House membe
before the Harding landslide took its toll. The 1919 contest deviates
from the Democratic model by occurring in a year when the composition
of the House party was very stable with an 80.1 per cent incumbency
rate. Just as between 1895 and 1911, the four Congresses in the
1920's without conflict underwent little membership change, with
newcomers ranging from a low of 9.8 per cent in 1929 to a high of
20.6 per cent in 1921.
Hierarchy. The 1923 fight strongly resembles the battles between
1895 and 1911 as Table 18 illustrates because the proportion of fresh-
men was also over 30 per cent. The level of freshmen in 1919--17.8
per cent--is considerably lower than the 30.0 per cent figure typical
of the other contests, but, nevertheless, is higher than for any of
the Congresses without leadership conflict during this twelve year period,
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TABLE 18
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AM) SENIORITY, 1919-1931
Year
/o Freshman
7o Seniors
.
1919 17.8 24.1
1921 16.8 24.4
1923 35.3 19.8
1925 9.3 27.5
1927 11.8 31.3
1929 9.2 39.3
indicates a contest
The 1919 and 1923 fights developed during those Congresses with
the fewest senior members-
-24.1 per cent in 1919 and 19.8 per cent
in 1923. In the Congresses without conflict the body of senior
members ranged from 24.4 per cent in 1921 to 39.3 per cent in 1929.
One difference with the earlier minority years is that between 1895
and 1911 each time the Democrats picked up seats the proportion of
veterans decreased, but between 1919 and 1931, except for the 1922
election, the reservoir of senior representatives steadily increased
with each election regardless of whether the Democrats were winning
or losing. After 1923 the groT of senior members is dramatic.
Until 1915 freshmen had always OLitnumbered senior members, sometimes
by ratios of four to one and five to one, especially before the turn
of the century. In 1915, for the first time, senior Democrats were
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.ore n^erous than freshmen, although the difference was not over-
whelming. This trend lasted until 1923 when freshmen regained the
edge, but beginning with the 1924 election there is such a sharp de-
cline in freshmen and a steep rise in seniors that veterans exceeded
freshmen by three to one and four to one mrgins between 1925 and
1931. This major structural change occurs simultaneously with and
may well contribute to the leadership stability after 1923-the
longest period of stability in the Democratic party during either
minority interval.
Regional factionalism. As would be expected when the Democrats
are in the minority, the South was the dominant regional faction for
.
the entire twelve years. The North ordinarily held one-fourth to one-
third of the seats, except in 1921 when the Northern delegation shrank
to a tiny 15.3 per cent. Both fights, as Table 19 shows, developed
when Northern strength was at its peak-34.8 per cent in 1923 and
33.0 per cent in 1919. This pattern is somewhat different from the
earlier Democratic one. Between 1895 and 1911 the contests tended
to occur when the Northern faction was gaining seats whereas in this
time span the fights took place whenever the North won at least 33 per
cent of the House seats rather than correlating with shifts in the size
of regional groupings.
Ideological factions
. Between 1919 and 1931 the Democrats were
an uneasy coalition of Southerners, urban machine products, western
Bryanites, and Easterners "of the Grover Cleveland type, conservative
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TABLE 19
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND REGIONALISM, 1919-1931
Year % from South % from Border Statej % from North
1919 51.8 15.2 33.0
1921 73.3 11.5 15.3
1923 48.8 16.4 34.8
1925 55.5 15.9 28.6
1927 51.8 16.9 31.3
1929 58.9 11.0 30.1
indicates a contest
and respectable. "^^5 At the beginning of the decade the majority of
House Democrats were still faithful to the reform tradition and fre-
quently combined with progressive Republicans in a liberal alliance,
but by the late 1920' s few traces remained of the crusading spirit
of the Wilson years. The transformation occurs after the 1924 elec-
tion defeat when older Congressional Democrats blamed the loss on the
party's "flirtation with radicalism. Also contributing to the
party's shift in philosophy was that "many of the newer urban
^^^John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy
,
1921 - 1923
,
(New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 92.
•^^avid Burner, The Politics of Provincialism : The Democratic
Part^ in Transition
.
1918 -- 1932
,
(New York: Alfred A. KnopfTl968)
,
p. 161.
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Democrats had^no special attachment to the principles of the Republican
insurgents" and were as conservative as their rural counterparts.
On roll call votes, the Democrats were a moderately cohesive
party in the 1920's. The ideological divisions that did occur were
largely along regional lines with Northern Congressmen more ready to
dissent from the party's position than Southerners
. On foreign
policy, George L. Grassmuck has found that most Southerners were
hostile to foreign assistance and army expenditures but modestly sup-
portive of naval spending. Democrats from Border States and Mid-
western agricultural areas were usually allied with the Southerners
although rural Midwesterners took a more isolationist stand on the
navy. In contrast, Democrats from the Northeast and the industrial-
ized Midwest (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois) favored foreign
loans and money for both the army and the navy.^'^^ On domestic leg-
islation, sectional lines with the South and West combined against
the Northeast were most strongly drawn on the Volstead Act, Muscle
Shoals, and the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill.^^^ with ideology
Ibid
.
108^ ^Julius Turner, Party and Constituency
: Pressures on Congress
ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johnr'nopk
,
~T9 51)
'
pp. 21 and 173.
109G^eorge L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign
Policy, (B.Utimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), pp. 33, 36-37, 977 99, and
143-145.
Burner, p. 159.
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region Intertwined, it i. probably true that tbe 1919 and 1923
fiShts occurred
.ben tbe party's ideological differences were widest
sxnce in tbese Congresses tbe North's (and
.ost Northern Democrats
ca.e fro. New Vork. New Jersey. Massachusetts, Ohio, and Illinois)
strength was at its naxii^um in this ti=,e period.
££SS~. Aside fro. clarlc, all the Democratic leaders were
fro. the south. The prominence of tbe South in the party leadership
Mirrors the composition of tbe Democratic rank-and-file, which was
also dominated by Southerners. With ideology, leaders and followers
also matched closely. Clark and Kltchin, although perceived as near-
reactionaries by tbe Wilsonians. were probably the least conservative
Democratic leaders between 1919 and 1931. of the three Democratic
Minority Leaders who served under a Republican President, only
Kltchin tried to design alternate measures. After the 1924 election
as the membership grew more conservative, so did the leadership. In
1926, Garrett was blasted by William Green, president of the American
Federation of Labor, for losing no opportunity to antagonize working
people or labor unions. Garner, even during the early days of
the depression, insisted upon a balanced budget and was content to
follow Hoover's lead while McDuffie defended corporate interests."^
None of the Minority Leaders used his appointive powers to name
111
Ihid.
, p. 174.
112, JJordan A. Schwartz
,
The Interregnum of Despair : Hoover
Congress and the Depression
, (Urbana: University of IlllnSii—1970)
p. 67. '
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a Whip „ho would bring b^ance to the party leadership as Richardson
aad Wllliaras had done between 1901 and 1908. But then in the 1920's
there was nr. faction analogous to the Bryanite or agrarian refor.
wing that repeatedly challenged the leadership and tried to change
the direction of the party.
Summary of the Variables 1919 -1923
The two leadership fights of this period occurred under contrast-
ing circumstances. The 1919 battle to oust Clark followed the election
defeat that returned the Democrats to minority status; seniority was
rising; and the Southern wing was expanding. The 1923 contest between
Gamer and Garrett, instead, developed after the 1922 comeback victory,
which left the Democrats' ranks swollen with freshmen and former Con-
gressmen who had won back the seats they had lost in the 1920 Re-
publican landslide. The Northern bloc had increased considerably
"
also. Although no single, consistent set of traits characterized
the contests of this period, the 1923 fight occurred under the same
conditions as the 1897, 1899, 1903, and 1907 contests had erupted.
The stable Congresses during the 1920 's also strongly resembled the
stable Congresses before 1911 except that seniority was more extensive
in the 1920 's. In other words, the only Congress between 1919 and
1931 that does not fit the pattern identified for the previous minor-
ity Congresses is 1919 since a contest developed under conditions nor-
mally associated with stable leadership. Part of the explanation for
this deviation is that the 1919 revolt was a delayed reaction to the
membership changes and to the tense relations between the House
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leade..hip poeeneial and
.he prere,.lslee senio.U. to cHaUen.e
CXar. o. KUch.„. Ko.eove.. s.nce
.He elecUon Haa slven .he Kepu.-
lican. a clea. ^jo.i., i„ ,he House.
.He De..„a.3 no longer Had .o
presen. a ™Uea f.on.
.o ^in.aln control of .He House as Had been
necessa^ ,„
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^
divided, in in, 3i„ce
.Here was no possiHUi.,
.Ha. .He De^oc.a.s
could organize
.He House,
.He pressure for leadership Har:„o„y was
pas. and
.He soldering feuding be.ween factions could Ho brougH.
in.o
.he open. The 1919 revolt Is also
.He only example In el.her
minority interval of administration, If „o. Preslden.lal, in.er-
ven.ion. This finding lends suppor.
.o Joe Martin's con.en.ion
.ha.
'
Eisenhower's decision
.o let HallecU proceed with the revolt was one
of .he key conditions leading to Martin's ouster.
Conclusions
Between 1895 and 1931 five of the six Democratic leadership con-
tests occurred under identical conditions: 1) minority status; 2) an
election upturn; 3) high membership turnover; 4) a large freshman
class; and 5) increasing regional and probably ideological diversity.
In each Congress that these five variables occurred together, a con-
test developed over the Minority Leadership even when no vacancy ex-
isted. One interesting finding was that the 1907 revolt was not dis-
tinguishable from the fights over vacancies in terms of the variables-
the variables were not more exaggerated for that Congress. Another
point is .'at although a revolt was organized at the start of the
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60th congress, a pitched battle was avoided i„
.,e next session when
William resigned. Apparently, astute politicking can overcome the
tendency toT/ard conflict.
The sixth fight, the 1919 contest, developed under a con:pletely
different set of conditions: election defeat, low turnover, a s^oall
fresh^nan class, and declining Northern strength. The only constant
was minority status. One possible explanation for this deviation is
that 1919 is the only instance in either minority phase of Presidential
or at least administration intervention. Perhaps this influence was
enough to have initiated a fight that might not have developed if the
Congressmen had been left alone. Another is that 1919 may illustrate
Barbara Hinckley's hypothesis that there can be a time lag between
the membership change and the leadership change (or at least the at-
tempt to bring about leadership change), m 1913 the North did not
receive leadership posts proportional to its size possibly because
of its limited seniority, but by 1919 some Northern Wilsonians had
accumulated enough seniority to run for Minority Leader.
Conditions that tended to inhibit contested leadership change were
mjority status, election defeats, low turnover, few freshman, a growing
pool of senior members, rising Southern representation and probably in-
creasing ideological agreement. There are two prominent exceptions to
the above pattern-1911 a.nd 1913. No fights occurred in these two Con-
gresses despite the Democ :s' electoral success, high membership turn-
over, and massive Northern gains. These changes, however, built upon
and strengthened membership trends visible since 1907 that had already
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forced a leadership comproMise with the election of Minority Leader
Clark.
5e an im-
Thus, before 1931 loajorlty-mlnorlty status appeared to b<
portant determinant of conflict in the Der«,cratlc party, m 19U and
1913 .^jorlty status seemed to deflect conflict when all the other
indicators pointed to a fight and in 1919 minority status may have
contributed to the revolt when other conditions indicated stability.
Yet at this stage it is impossible to say for sure whether majority-
minority status is merely coincldentally present or is a cause of
conflict since alternate hypotheses can be offered to explain the
results.
Election defeats, contrary to Peabody's findings, were not con-
ducive to leadership fights. Election victories, on the other hand,
did appear to provide the rnean^ of producing the membership turnover
and regional.
-ideological change needed to bring pressure for leader-
ship change. A defeat, which meant that the party membership became
more strongly Southern, did not harm the incumbent leadership faction
since the leaders of the House Democratic party were usually from the
South. A victory, instead, was more likely to undercut the leaders
as many new members entered the House from the party's more competi-
tive districts in the North.
In sum, high membership turnover (along with its close ally a
large freshman class) and regional- ideological changes that weakened
the congruence between leaders and followers emerged as extremely
important conditions stimulating conflict. It is easy to see why the
introduction of more Northerners and Bryanites could create tension
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m a Democratic party dominated by Southern conservatives, it Is
so.etl..3 harder to see ho„
.e„*ership change could lead to unrest
The 1923 contest provides a clear illustration. The North's share
of seats increased but did not really alter the regional balance in
the party. „ew ,nen,bers. however, composed over 40 per cent ot the
rank-and-file. n,ls large bloc of new people gave Garner an op-
portunity to barter good co^nlttee assignments for pledges of sup-
port. He wanted to put together a coalition comprising the Texas
delegation, personal friend., and allies, and new members willing to
bargain for better committee appointments. More deals and more ways
>:o put together a winning coalition become possible when turnover is
extensive.
Although these regional and membership changes are important iu
predicting
.daether or not there will be a contest, they cannot fore-
cast who vrLll win or how far a contest will be pushed, urhich candi-
date is elected depends in part on the size of the factions but also
on the personality and age of the contenders. For example, in 189 7,
McMillan's abrasiveness was a handicap whereas Bailey's youthfulness
was an added attraction for the anti-Bryanites
. In 1907, if Clark
vitli his pleasant, easygoing manner had challenged Williams instead
of DeArmond, whose sarcasm embittered his colleagues, perhaps the
dissidents would have succeeded in ousting Williams. Tluis, the per-
sonal attributes of the participants seem to come into play when the
members m,ake their clioice for leader but are not important in pre-
dicting when a contest will develop.
CHAPTER III
CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895 to 1931
Leadership Contests
. 189S Tavi_
For Congressional Republicans 1894 rather than 1896 was the re-
aligning election. Between the Civil „ar and 1895 control of the House
of Representatives had alternated between Republicans and De^crats but
With the Democrats more often in co«^nd. m 1894, however, the Re-
publicans ^de ^ssive inroads into Democratic strongholds outside the
south. When these gains proved lasting. Republican control of the
House of Representatives was not permanently challenged again until the
early days of the New Deal.
As victorious Republican Congressmen headed 'toward Washington,
there was little doubt that they would select their Minority Leader,
Thomas B. Reed of Maine, to be the new Speaker. One of the most for-
midable House leaders of all tisae. Reed had served as both Speaker and
Minority Leader for the last twelve years. Although Reed had acquired
a reputation as an autocratic presiding officer during his last stint
as Speaker, there was almost universal acceptance of him for Speaker
in 1895. Besides his unquestioned ability, another reason for the
lack of opposition was that William McKinley, his strongest competitor
in past leadership battles, had been elected Governor of Ohio."^ Be-
cause Reed, McKinley, and Benjamin Harrison were all vying for the
New York Times (hereafter NYT)
, Oct. 24, 1894, p. 1- Nov 11
1894, p. 8; and November 22, 1894, p. 13. *
'
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1896 Republican Presidential nclnaUon. there was 3o.e speculation
that If Reed would not relinquish, subordinate, or defer'^^ his quest
for the presidency, then McKinley and „a.:rison might try to defeat
hi. for speaker. If Harrison and McKinley joined forces, the New
Vork Times thought that there might be enough disenchantment among
senior Republicans who could remember Reed's arbitrary manner of pre-
siding to topple him. The prevailing attitude of the thirty-one most
senior members was that:
Mr Reed will not have the Speakership broughtto hxm upon a silver platter. Quite a number
of them would rather see his head under a
charger
.
When no McKlnley-Harrlson combine developed, Reed was unanimously nom-
inated for the Speakership.
In 1895 the Majority Leadership had not yet been established as
an independent leadership post. The usual practice was for the Chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee to act as floor leader. Reed ap-
pointed Nelson Dingley, who also came from Maine. There was little
grumbling about two leaders from Maine because Dingley was widely con-
sulted on tariff technicalities and was regarded as the ablest choice
for the chairmanship.^
In 1897, following McKinley's election to the Presidency, Reed
2
Ibid., Nov. 23, 1894, p. 7.
^Ibid,
4
Edward N. Dingley, The Life and Times of Nelson Dingley
,
Jr.(Kalamazoo, Mich.: Ihling Brothers & Everard, 1902), pp. 3Q9-39l7'
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va. easU.
.e-eZec.. and M„,ie. co„«„.e.
.„
..al .ole as Ca...
-
wa.3 an. Means a„a Majori.,
.eade. Hee.
.e.an a new t.adu.on
by naming
.a„es Ta™ey of Minnesota to be the first «,lp. Before
la«ney.s appointment, the duties of whip had heen handled by volunt
«ho would assist the leadership in passing particular bills, ihe
reasons for Tawney's selection are unknown.^
in April. 1899. Reed announced he would resign fro. the House
before the start of the next Congress because he was at odds with
McKlnley-s expansionist policies and Mark Hanna's ^nage:nent of the
party. Before Reed announced his intentions, there had been talk of
replacing hl» with a Speaker who was less dictatorial and „ore in line.
With the administration and the Congressional party on foreign policy.
"Yet the Men who held such views did not try to persuade anyone to be-
come a candidate against Reed. No one felt sure he could beat Reed."
Moreover, no one was certain McKlnley would approve a revolt for
••McKinley was not Inclined to shoulder a contest if it could be
avoided.
After Reed's decision to resign, a contest quickly developed to
fill his vacancy. The early frontrunner was James Sherman of New York.
Sherman, like Champ Clark in 1908, had advance notice that Reed planned
c;^.^.^^'^^^^
B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United
LVI^ rs^n^^ fSL'^'^'^'^I?''" Politzical science Review,I (September, 1964), p. 562. "
6
Both quotations are from Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison toHarding, (2 vols.. New York; Putnam's, 1922), lT^8~
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to leave and had "lost no time
. . .
m coimminicating with neniers on
the Republican side." The early j.^ particularly useful for
securing pledges in the Midwest, which v.s expected to challenge the
East's near ^nopoly on House leadership posts, sher^n's chances
were also bolstered by the widespread belief that he was McKinley's
choice for Speaker.
Sherman, however, was undercut by the surprise candidacy of his
fellow New Yorker, Sereno Payne. Upon Dingley's death in January, 1899.
Reed had appointed Payne to the Chainnanship of Ways and Means and to
the Majority Leadership. Although Payne steadily ^intained he was
running for Speaker, Many observers thought he was really trying to
protect his own office in opposing Sherman. « Midwestern Republicans,
vhile accepting two leaders from Maine, would never agree to a Speaker
and Majority Leader from New York.
Illinois also had two contenders for the nomination: Joseph G.
Cannon and Albert Hopkins. Cannon was considered the Midwest's
strongest candidate. He had run for Speaker in 1881 and 1889, was
well liked by his colleagues, and was considered highly qualified by
seniority and by his service as Appropriations Chairman for the Speaker-
ship. Hopkins, less qualified and less popular, was equally ambitious
to advance to the Speakership.^ After hard campaigning by both Cannon
^NYT
,
May 25, 1899, p. 4.
g
Ibid.
,
April 19, 1899, p. 4; and April 26, 1899, p. 1.
9
Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives,(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967)
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and Hopkins. Che UUnois delegation unexpectedly endorsed HopUns.
In a rage Cannon told Hopkins:
jo^%-r ------- ---^^
TT ; /T^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ an election ofUnxted States Senator you have tried to get the endorse^ent of the Illinois delegation f^r'^L ^r-
•
.^^r,?^''^^^^ ^^^^ ^'^^ ^hile he was lying coldxn the hall of the House of Representati vp^got the Illinois delegation to^'endor ry:rf;.-a;aL°"man of the Ways and Means Committee Zt.rdidn't get the place. " * *
Now you've turned and twisted and got the en-dorsement of the Illinois delegation fo? Speaker butmark my words, Hopkins, you won't be Speaker, ^^u'veonly succeeded in beating me out of it! for i wouLbe elected if Illinois presented my nai^e.lO
With Cannon out of the race, the prospects brightened for the
other Midwestern candidates. The most prominent was David Henderson
of Iowa. Henderson was well liked by his colleagues and was a loyal
member of the Iowa machine headed by Senator William B. Allison. In
his campaign for the Speakership, Henderson's major asset proved to
be Allison, one of the "Famour Four" that ruled the Senate. When
Allison and Henderson appealed to the other top Senate leaders for
assistance, they agreed to help Henderson to ensure close cooperation
between the two houses of Congress. John C. Spooner lined up the
Wisconsin delegation and Orville H. Platr. encouraged Payne to continue
Dunn, I, pp. 310-311.
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his cndidac, in order to dra„ votes a.ay fro„ sher^„
Although Helson Aldrich also »r.ed on Henderson's behalf, he was less
influential since the Rhode Island delegation had so few votes."
in case any of the leading candidates faltered or the caucus dead-
locked. John Dalzell of Pennsylvania and Charles Grosvenor of Ohio
were standing In the wings. Dal.ell was familiar with House procedures
and folkways and was close to the McKlnley administration, but he was
handicapped by squabbling inside the Pennsylvania delegation over the
Quay ^chine.l2
^^^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^.^ opposition to civil
service, had been approached by several colleagues but hesitated to
run because Ohio was already prominently represented at the highest
levels of the party with McKlnley and Hanna."
Ontil early May the contest was a heated regional battle with
Sherman leading his Eastern rivals and with Henderson and Hopkins
'
splitting the Midwestern vote. By the middle of May. however, Sherman
had begun to fade because the East could not unite. Payne refused to
^Vt. Apr. 19, 1899, p. 4; Apr. 23, 1899. p. 4; Horace S andMarion G. Merrill, The Re£ubUcan Con^^ 1897-i913 (LeSnaL Dnn
iniS Tsi T ^^r^^^^ FTusT'LiisTd-i^sa er^;:?fu^m^|llison, A Stud^, in Practical Politics
, (Iowa City: state Historicllsociety of Iowa, 1956), p. 274l^Sr^rothy Ganfield Fowler, 5ohn ColtSpooner. (New York: University Publishers. 1961), p. 216.
l^Matthew Quay, the boss of the Quay machine, had recently been
re-elected to the Senate but might not be seated because of electionirregularities. He was sure to oppose Dalzell's advancement because
Dalzell belonged to the anti-Quay faction in Pennsylvania politics
that would be very happy to see Quay lose his seat.
E". April 15, 1899, p. 4; Apr. 26. 1899, p. 1; and Apr. 29,
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Withdraw and Henr, Bingha. of Pennsylvania, a Quay ^n, prepared to
run to chec. Dalzell. With the East split, the contest changed f.o.
an inter-r.sional dispute to a duel inside the Midwest. The Iowa
delegation sent out a letter urging Henderson's election and a Grand
Am^ of the Republic (GAR) spolces^n without official clearance called
for Henderson's election because he had voted for easing pension re-
quirements for veterans. Hopkins, in turn, was being aided by the
Illinois delegation and had received assurance fro. the GAR that the
organization would not for^lly endorse any candidate. Although some
of Shennan-s Midwestern support began to shift to Hopkins,
.ost ob-
servers rated Henderson ahead.
"'"^
In early June, the Ohio delegation, one of the most influential
on the Republican side on account of its size and the swing role it
played between the East and Midwest, voted for Henderson over Shennan
by a wide inargin. As soon as the Ohio vote became known, the contest
for Speaker was quickly concluded. Hopkins-under pressure from the
Illinois delegation-withdrew in favor of Henderson and Dalzell soon
followed suit. Nevertheless, Sherman maintained that Henderson was
still twenty votes short of a majority and vowed to fight on until
New York switched to another candidate. At this crucial point, Payne
consulted Piatt and then pulled out of the race to back Henderson.
This move was immediately interpreted in the press as a Platt-Payne
stratagem to hold onto the Ways and Means Committee Chairmanship
Ibid., May 18, 1899, p. 5; May 19, 1899, p. 7; May 21, 1899,
p. 3; May 23, 1899, p. 5; and May 25, 1899, p. 4.
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for New York. Finally, five days after Ohio caucused, Ne. Vor.
and selected sher^n to .e Its choice for Speaker. The p.o-sher^„
endorsement was probably a co^U.entary vote and pre-arranged since
Sher^n Wdlately withdrew and the delegation next voted to support
Henderson for Speaker.
,„„,^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
the Republican caucus ratified the decision reached in June through
'
back room bargaining.
Henderson treated the key components in his victory generously:
Payne remained as the Ways and Means Chairman and Majority Leader;
cannon (and Illinois) retained the Appropriations Connnittee Chairman-
ship; and Wisconsin, which Spooner had delivered to Henderson, was re-,
warded with the vacancy on the Rules Committee. Tawney, despite the
change in Speakers, was reappointed Whip.
In 1901 there were no leadership changes. Henderson was unani-
mously renominated for Speaker; Payne continued as Majority Leader;
and Tawney remained as Whip.
In 1903 the Republicans had to elect a new Speaker because Hender-
son abruptly announced his retirement in the middle of the 1902 elec-
tion campaign. The reasons for Henderson's decision have never been
fully understood although it was known that Henderson sharply dis-
agreed with a group of Iowa Republicans, led by Governor Albert B.
Cummins, who advocated using free trade to break the trusts. When
the Cummins' band dominated the Iowa State convention during the summer
Ibid., June 2, 1899, p. 8; June 3, 1899, p. 4; June 4, 1899,
p. 13; June 5, 1899, p. 8; June 6, 1899, p. 2; and June 7, 1899, p. 7.
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of 1902, Henderson ouit 4 a aq . A second undercurrent in Henderson's de-
cisionjas that during the last session "signs of revolt /had7 ^Iti-
Plled" against his leadership as Speaker. A bloc of young
.embers,
con^itted to changing the House rules, had overridden Henderson and
the House leadership on several occasions. Although the dissident
group had been .^klng lots of noise and "threatening to make itself
heard at the next caucus.""
anticipated a rebellion.
Despite pleas from Theodore Roosevelt to reconsider. Henderson did not
change his mind.
Early speculation about his successor focused mainly on Cannon.
ITieodore Burton of Ohio, the Chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Com-
mittee, and James Hemenway of Indiana, the third ranking Republican
on Appropriations, were also mentioned. Hemenway, however, had little
time for campaigning for Speaker because he faced a tough re-election
battle in Indiana and Burton might not be able to unite the Ohio dele-
gation over Hanna's opposition. The young insurgents were also ex-
pected to run a candidate of their own-possibly William Hepburn of
Iowa, an early champion of rules reform; Tawney of Minnesota, whom
Henderson had temporarily removed as Whip in 1902 because he disagreed
with the rest of the leadership on the question of Cuban reciprocity;
16
Sage, pp. 285-287.
17
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,
(New York- G. W
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MYT
.
Sept. 17, 1902. p. 1.
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or Charles Littlefield of M.lne. who was incliaad to take Independent
1 Q
positions.
Before the battle had a chance to heat up, Hepburn, the insurgents-
strongest candidate, withdrew. As much as he wanted the job, he did
not think Iowa could have two Speakers in a row. He also thought that
he would be unacceptable to the Old Guard because he favored rules re-
form and that Cannon had the Midwestern-Western votes, necessary for
Hepburn's success, already sewn up.^°
After the Noveinber election. Cannon appeared to be ahead although
he had several obstacles to overcome. As Chairman of the Appropria-
tions Committee, Cannon had cut so many items out of the budget that
he had made a number of enemies. He was also closely identified with
Henderson's management of the House and his campaign slogan of "stand
21by the status" did nothing to reassure the Young Turks. Finally',
Cannon was a protectionist and a defender of big business (one of
his staunchest allies in the contest was J, P. Morgan's legislative
assistant, George Perkins) while a number of other Midwestern Republi-
cans wanted to lower the tariff and favored Roosevelt's trust busting
22
approach.
19
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Also ca^algning hard for
.he Midwestern vote were Littlefleld
and
.oseph w. Bahooc. of Wisconsin, a ne„ entr. after the election
Littlefleld
.
s
independence had sone app.al for the dissidents hut
there was also concern that he had opposed McKinley and Roosevelt
too often to he a satisfactory Republican leader. The younger
.em-
bers, while hostile to the House leadership, admired Roosevelt and
.
attributed
.uch o£ the party's success In the 1902 election to his
popularity. Although anxious for refor-lng the rules, the insurgents
were equally desirous of electing a Speaker who would work closely
With the President. Consequently Babcock, who advocated revising the
tariff, became a rallying point for the reformers. As Chairman of the
1902 congressional Campaign Con^ttee, Babcock had many contacts with
the new, uncommitted members. One additional asset was that Hepburn
preferred Babcock for Speaker because he thought he would be a more
democratic leader than Cannon.
Vying for the Eastern vote were Sherman, Payne, and Dalzell-the
same three candidates as in 1899-but none of them was making much
headway.
To batter down resistance to Cannon, two Indiana Congressmen wrote
or wired every Republican member asking for support for Cannon.
Cannon's campaign managers were especially interested in receiving
pledges from freshmen, who were being advised to take a wait and see
^^NYT, Nov. 7, 1902, p. 5; Nov. 15, 1902, p. 8; Nov. 16, 1902,
p. 7; and Nov. 17, 1902, p. 3.
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attitude by the insurgent ca^p. Newly elected meters like George
Norris of Nebraska readily agreed to back Cannon. Moreover, over
Cannon's vigorous protests. Watson sent a telegram to Hepburn. Hep-
burn and cannon had clashed bitterly over the Panama Canal and Cannon
fully expected Hepburn-already publicly committed to Babcock-to
spurn any request from Cannon. But if Babcock should decide to pull
out, Hepburn agreed to help and was expected to carry weight in the
Iowa delegation.
In mid-November Babcock withdrew from the contest and called for
Cannon's election. Babcock decided not to run even though the Wisconsin
delegation endorsed his candidacy. Since five Congressmen from Wiscon-
sin were committee chairmen, Babcock's decision to pull out was widely
viewed as a prudent move to protect Wisconsin's power. The Babcock
withdrawal tipped the balance in Cannon's favor and the victory was
clinched two days later when Iowa declared for Cannon. After the Iowa
vote, state after state came out for Cannon. By the end of November,
Cannon had enough votes to win easily and was nominated without oppo-
25
sxtion at the caucus. Payne continued as Majority Leader and Tawney
remained as Whip.
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m 1905 cannon was renominated without opposition and Payne
stayed on as Majority leader. Tawney. however, was replaced as «hip
and reeved from the Ways and Means Co»ittee because he was
.'a half-
hearted protectionist.. lawney had opposed Cannon on the tariff
and had convinced some Republican meters on Ways and Means to adopt
his position. When Payne "began to wobble/." cannon appointed Tawney
to the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Co»ittee. James E. Watson
of Indiana, who had been onp nf rar.r,^r,«^o e ot Cannon s campaxgn managers in 1903,
was named the new Whip.
In 1907 the first hints of opposition to Cannon's leadership ap-
peared. The Washington
.
Post carried reports that Roosevelt wanted
cannon dumped for Burton of Ohio, who was more in accord with Roose-
velt's program. American Federation of Labor (AFL) President Samuel
Gompers and the Anti-Saloon League urged the Republicans to elect a
new Speaker but the Republican caucus unanimously re-elected Cannon.
Payne and Watson also stayed in their posts.
By 1909 the efforts to replace Cannon as Speaker had grown.
Even before the 1908 election, pressure to remove Cannon was mounting.
The Chicago Tribune, for example, was reluctant to endorse Cannon for
re-election to Congress if he intended to run for Speaker again.
William Howard Taft considered Cannon his greatest handicap in cam-
paigning for the Presidency and thought Cannon must go as Speaker
^^andall Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 29.
27
Thompson, p. 203.
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because he had opposed the planks on the tariff a.H i k •
28
c t nd labor in the 1908
platform.
When the 1908 election results enla.sed the sUe of the P.os.essLve
hand in the House, the Insurgents had high hopes of defeating Cannon
and changing the House tules with Taft-s help. The insurgents' first
problem „as finding a challenger that they could all agree upon.
Charles Fowler of New Jersey, a conservative who„ Cannon had removed
as Chairman of Banking and Currency in the last session, "was busily
wrlting^his friends in an effort to gain the speakership for hlM-
self." Edmund Hinshaw of Nebraska and Miles Poindexter of Washington
started a boon, for Burton whereas Edmond Madison of Kansas urged the
selection of Charles lownsend of Michigan. The Iowa insurgents, bol-
stered by a crop of freshmen progressives, "lay low and announced they
would support Walter Smith as a stalking horse against Cannon, at
least until the smoky haze cleared."'"'
Cannon's friends were also working hard to guarantee his re-
election. Confident he could win if incoming President Taft and out-
going President Roosevelt stayed out of the fight. Cannon dispatched
Vice President-elect Sherman and Tawney to neutralize Taft and Roose-
velt. Roosevelt and Elihu Root were quickly convinced that Cannon was
28Gvinn, p. 129 and pp. 153-155; and Henry F. Pringle, The Life
£H£ WUliain Howard Taft, (2 vols, , New York: Farrar~i^rd~Ri^e-hart, 1939), I, 404.
29Kenneth Hechler, Insurgency ; Personalities and Politics of the
Taft Era, (Reissued; New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964) ,"7. ~44.A Text of Fowler's letter is reprinted in Bolles, p. 171.
Hechler, p. 44.
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unbeatable but Taft vacillated. He was personally pleased that the
insurgents were going to challenge Cannon, but he feared that his
entire legislative program would be sabotaged if he participated in
a revolt that failed in the end to unseat Gannon.31 By early December,
1908, Taft ..decided to abandon his effort to defeat Cannon and assumed
an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Speaker. '.^^
Nevertheless, in December, 1908, twenty-five Republican insur-
gents, :nainly fro. the Midwest,
.et to discuss strategy. They decided
to concentrate on changing the rules for which they estnnated that they
could nzuster fifty to sixty votes rather than on trying to defeat
Cannon. Thus, by the end of December, a leadership revolt seemed
dead. Cannon apparently had reached the same conclusion for he turned
his attention to the rules and asked Asher Hinds, House parliamentarian,
to prepare a defense of the status quo.^^
In March, 1909, however, the threat of a revolt again loomed. Al-
though there were thirty solid votes for altering the rules, a smaller
group of insurgents hoped to overthrow Cannon by deadlocking the House
of Representatives. If twenty-four Republicans withheld their votes
from Cannon for Speaker, the Republicans would not be able to organize
31Gwinn, pp. 158-159; Bolles, p. 172; the Merrills, p. 282:
Pringle, I, 404-405; Mowry, p. 239.
32
Hechler, p. 44.
33
NYT, Dec. 2, 1908, p. 2; Dec. 8, 1908, p. 2; Dec. 12, 1908,
p. 2; and Pringle, I, 408.
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the House and a coalition of insurgent Republicans and Democrats could
elect a new Speaker. Victor Murdock of Kansas, one of the Progressive
leaders, said that "with the support of the Democrats the organization
for the session could be wrested from Cannon and his lieutenants."^"^
Cannon took the threat seriously enough to take Majority Leader Payne
and senator Aldrich to the White House to see Taft. Taft was warned
that if Cannon were toppled or the rules amended to diminish Cannon's
power by a Progressive-Democratic coalition, Taft's tariff program was
in jeopardy. If, instead, Taft sided with the regulars. Cannon, Payne,
and Aldrich promised to pass his reforms. Taft agreed to support the
regulars and rationalized that as the leader of his party he could not
stand with thirty Progressives against 190 regulars. In six months
Taft had moved from opposition to Cannon to neutrality to alignment
with the standpatters.
Taft tried to bring the warring factions together but he had little
success. A few votes were swayed from the insurgents when Taft and his
Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock threatened to withhold patronage
from the bolters. Taft wrung a promise out of the insurgents to con-
clude their organizational battle on the floor of the House in one
day in order not to delay work on the tariff bill, but Taft could not
head off a fight entirely. Many of the Midwestern Republicans were
committed to insurgency by their state platforms and they preferred
NYT
,
March 12, 1909, p. 2.
ur-
115
to reiBain loyal to their constituents rather than to Taft.^^
The week before the caucus net, the Cannon camp held an ''all day
secret session''^^ after erroneous reports circulated that Roosevelt
was about to aid the Progressives. Cannon decided that the tariff
was his best weapon to break the Democratic-Progressive Republican al-
liance. Accordingly, Billy Austin, a brewery lobbyist and the chair-
man of the Wisconsin Republican Committee, pressured the Wisconsin
delegation while Lucius Littauer, a wealthy New York glove manufact
er and former Republican Congressman, enlisted Henry H. Rogers of
Standard Oil to work on New York Democrats.^''
When the Republican caucus met, thirty insurgents on the advice
of Senator Robert LaFollette boycotted the meeting in order to main-
tain their independence on the floor of the House in the organization
battle. Without the most vocal dissidents present, Cannon was easily
renominated. However, his 162 vote total fell fifty-six votes short
of the Republican membership and thirty-three votes short of a House
majority. Not only had Cannon failed to receive the votes of the
35
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absent insurgents but twenty-five of fhncoc r t ose present voted for another
candidate. The opposition ballots were scattered a^ng six candidates
With S.ith of Iowa and Tawney of Minnesota drawing
.ost of the protest
ballots., considering that both S.ith and Tawney were allies of Cannon
and that the .ost vociferous dissidents were absent, the anti-Cannon
vote seeded to .ean that Cannon's support a.ong the regulars was be-
ginning to erode. Furthermore, the caucus declined to ^ke the vote
unanimous, a departure fro. custo..^« After the caucus one Old Guard
Republican said that Cannon's chances for retaining the Speakership
and for preventing changes in the rules "looked 'pretty bad.'"^^ when
Congress opened. Cannon was chosen Speaker with 204 votes. In the end
only a dozen insurgents defected to other candidates. The twelve Re-
publican holdouts. were all from the Midwest or West, with the largest
number of dissenters representing Wisconsin. Even on the battle over
the rules, Cannon triumphed. Although the insurgent bloc of thirty
expected votes held solid. Democratic defecters, swayed by promises
of tariff protection and good committee assignments, prevented any
major weakening of the Speaker's power.
Payne was reappointed Majority Leader and John Dwight of New
York, a regular, was appointed Whip to replace Watson, who had retired
38
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from the House.
In December, 1909, at the of t-u^ jy, dL n start of the second session of the 61st
Congress, Taft wrote:
Walter I. Smith is the man whom I would selectfor Speaker if we can only get Uncle Joe (Can-
non) out of the way--and I think we can.^I
In another letter he expressed the same sentiment when he wrote that
."There is now only one feature of the situation that I look forward to
with considerable concern, and that is the continuation in politics
_ 42
of Cannon." Although Murdock was ready to try again to oust Cannon,
most of the insurgents "were once more mystified and angered by the
President's devious course. "^^ No revolt was undertaken.
In March, 1910, the insurgent-Democratic alliance finally suc-
ceeded in amending the rules of the House to curtail the power of the
Speaker but Cannon remained in office. Cannon himself, on the advice
of his crony, former representative Watson, stated that the chair was
open to a motion to declare the Speakership vacant. Albert Burleson,
a Texas Democrat, so moved to the fury of Democratic leader Clark, who
knew the motion would never carry. Only a handful of Republicans sup-
ported the motion so in a round-about-way Cannon had received a vote
of confidence to finish out his term as Speaker. ^'^
^^aft's letter of Dec. 20, 1909 is quoted in Gwinn, p. 194.
42Taft's letter is quoted in Mowry, p. 111.
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S^SD: of the 1^ to 19n cor^^
Compared with the Democrat<? dnt-fr,^ •ocrats uring thxs same time period, the Re-
publican leadership in the House of Repr^^sentatw..K.epr_sentatives was more stable at
the highest levels with three Speakers-Reed from 1895 to 1899,
Henderson from 1899 to 1903, and Cannon from 1903 to 1911-and'two
Majority Leaders-Dingley for three years and Payne for thirteen
years. In contrast, five different Democrats served as Minority
Leader between 1895 and 1911. With the Whips the degree of turnover
was Similar in the two parties: there were three Republican Whips in
'
fourteen years-Tawney from 1897 to 1905, Watson from 1905 to 1909,
and Dwight from 1909 to 1911-as compared with three Democratic Whips
in eleven years. The Republicans' greater stability seemed to result
largely because their top leaders were less inclined to resign from
office than the Democratic Minority Leaders. For example, as Table 1
sunnnarizes, when the ranks of Speaker and 14ajority Leader are combined,
there were five vacancies on the Republican side. Two of these oc-
curred simply because the party had become the majority party; one was
caused by Dingley's death; and two followed the resignations of Reed
and Henderson, There were also five Minority Leader openings for the
Democrats, but four of these vacancies occurred when the leader vol-
untarily resigned or retired and only one resulted from the party's
shift to minority status.
Although there was less leadership turnover and fewer vacancies
in the Republican party, the Republicans waged almost as many leader-
ship contests as the Democrats. Between 1895 and 1911, the Republicans
was
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battled over the Speakership three tl.,es-l„ 1899. 1903, and 1909.
The first two contests were fought over vacancies but the third
the revolt to depose Cannon and to curb the power of the Speaker
Besides the futile atte.pt to overthrow Cannon, the threat of a revolt
had figured in the background of both Reed and Henderson's resigna-
tions although all sources agree that the priory motive for bowing
out in each case was disagreement over policy rather than the fear of
a fight. In comparison, during the 1895 to 19U era, the Democrats
had engaged in four leadership struggles over the Minority Leadership.
Three of these had been fights to fill vacancies while one was an un-
successful revolt.
There is no evidence of a formal pattern of succession in the
Republican hierarchy except possibly in the case
-of the Minority
Leader rising to the Speakership. The ebb and flow of Reed's career
in serving as both Minority Leader and Speaker for sixteen years paral-
leled Crisp's career on the Democratic side. As with Crisp, Reed's
hold on the leadership hardened over time. In 1889 when he first
sought the Speakership he had to fight for it"^^ despite his six years
service as Mnority Leader but in 1895 Reed resumed the Speakership
without dissent. Thus, by the turn of the century the highest party
leader in both parties seemed to be able to move easily back and forth
between the Minority Leadership and Speakership. Aside from Reed, the
For a description of this early leadership battle, see William
A. Robinson's Thomas R. Reed: Parliamentarian
, (New York: Dodd Mead
and Co., 1930), pp. 197-199.
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iir
^ger
son ^.e
..ns.Uen ^.o.
.He co^u.ee a„a Ca™o„
the Chair^„..ip of Appropriation. Co„i..ee.*^ «one of the.
rivals, including Majority Leader Payne, appeared to have a stron,
clai. to the Office and
.one ar^ed that his co-ittee as.i^ent or
leadership post gave hi. a greater right to be advanced.
Each leadership office was filled and held independently fro„ the
other leadership posts rather than forcing a leadership ladder,
.or
exa^le, Payne's long reign as Majority leader and chairman of the
ways and Means Co^ittee was not interrupted even though the Speaker-
ship Changed hands twice (and the Speaker appointed the Majority
Leader and co^ittee chairmen). lawney also remained as Whip even
after Henderson and Cannon succeeded Reed, who had originally appoint-
ed hin>. The long tenures of Payne and Tawney-undisturhed by the •
leadership changes swirling around the. and yet not willing or able
to be promoted themselves-bring to mind Leslie Arends who was wedded
to the post of Whip from 1943 to 1975 regardless of Republican elec-
tion fortunes or the number of revolts and resignations bringing
change to the other leadership posts.
In contrast to the Democratic minority, the Republican leadership
contests between 1895 and 1911 attracted a great deal of attention and
pressure firom outside the House of Representatives. Taft's role in
the 1909 br^Kl is the most dramatic example of Presidential inter-
vention in this period although rumors abounded about McKinley and
46See the Consressional Directory for the 55th and 57th Congresses.
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Roosevelt's intentions in earlier years bui- .hm, .^j-ie ut without specific docu-
mentation about the nature or extent of their involvement. Presi-
dential interest in House leadership struggles is not unique to the
Republican party. Recall Cleveland's warnings to Speaker Crisp in
1893 and Wilson's yearnings to change the Democratic leadership between
1915 and 1919. What does differ from the Democratic pattern is the
widespread involvement of Republican Senators and a host of pressure
groups and business interests. The clearest case of direct Senate
intervention was in 1899 when the four most powerful Senate leaders
helped Henderson win the Speakership, but Senators of varying ideo-
logical persuasions and regions wielded influence in more subtle ways
in House contests. For example, the disapproval of a Hanna or a Quay
inside a state delegation could make a difference in who competed for
office in the House and La Follette was active behind the scenes in
advising the Progressives on tactics in 1909. Most of the interest
group participation in Republican contests for Speaker consisted
simply of calls for leadership change or mild expressions of support
for individual candidates. The activities of the AFL, GAR, and the
Anti-Saloon League would fall into this category and had little im-
pact on the outcomes of the contests. The active role, however,
played by J. P. Morgan's legislative aide in electing Cannon to the
Speakership in 1903 and by Standard Oil and glove manufacturer Littauer
in 1909 in maintaining Cannon in power m^y well have made a difference
in who won. Cannon felt he owed his re-election in 1909 to Littauer
and had the duty on gloves raised to $4 per dozen. When Taft realized
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that the high tariff on slove. .as a parent to Mttauer, he backed
the senate's version^of the hill, which reduced the tariff on gloves
to 51.12 per dozen. cannon also "arranged for increased duties on
petroleum products."
The Democrats between 1911 and 1919 were not subjected to such
intense corporate and lobbyist pressure when choosing leaders although
research by Mary Follett suggests that before 1895 Democratic Speaker-
ship contests were characterized by such behavior also. The 1910 re-
volt against Cannonism significantly weakened the power of the Speaker.
Before 1910 the Speaker was a powerful officer. By appointing con.it-
tees and controlling debate, the Speaker was able to determine to a
large degree which bills became law and which ones withered. Conse-
quently, "special interests anxious to obtain government subsidies in
aid of some commercial enterprise"^^ were vitally interested in Speaker-
ship fights "because their very fortunes depended upon the result.
After the 1910 revolt the Speaker no longer made such a critical dif-
ference in the legislative process and the involvement of business
groups in leadership selection dropped off.
^^Barfield, p. 40.
The Merrills, p. 282.
49
V ^f"^'
^ ^°ll^tt, The Speaker of the House of Representative s.(New York: L igmans. Green and Co., 1896), p. 36.
^
Ibid.
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Year
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1895
TABLE 1
REPUBLICAN LEMERSHIP SELECTION 1895-1911
Status of Post
Vacancy
(Party became
majority)
No Vacancy
Vacancy
No Vacancy
Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
What Happened
Vacancy
(Party became
majority)
Speaker
No Contest
No Contest
Contest
-numerous
candidates, active
campaigning; all
but one withdrew
before caucus.
No Contest
Contest-several
candidates; all
but one withdrew
before caucus.
No Contest
No Contest
Contest-scattered
opposition and ab-
sentees in caucus;
Progressives moved
to deadlock voting
on House floor for
Speaker and to unite
with Democrats to
try to amend rules.
Majority Leader
Speaker made ap-
pointment.
Outcome
Reed elected
Reed re-elected
Henderson
elected
Henderson re-
elected
Cannon elected
Cannon re-elected
Cannon re-elected
Cannon re-elected
Minor revision
of the rules.
Dingley named
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Year
1897
Jan,
1899
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
TABLE 1 continued
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION 1895-1911
Status of Post
No Vacancy
Vacancy
(Dingley dies)
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
Vacancy
(office created)
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
What Happened
No Vacancy
Vacancy
(Watson retired)
Majority Leader
Speaker made
appointment.
Speaker made
appointment
New Speaker made
appointment.
No change
New Speaker made
appointment.
No Change
No Change
No Change
Whip
Reed appointed
first Whip.
New Speaker made
appointment
.
No Change
New Speaker made
appointment
.
Cannon replaced
Whip to ensure
party regularity
on Ways and Means
Committee
.
No Change
Speaker made
appointment
.
Outcome
Dingley named
Payne re
-named
Payne re
-named
Payne re-named
Payne re
-named
Pa3me re-named
Payne re-named
Payne re-named
Tawney named
Tawney re
-named
Tawney re-named
Tawney re-named
Watson named
Watson re -named
Dwight named
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^^^i^iZsis of the Variables 1895-1911
1895 ana 1911. ehe aep..Uea..
„ere co^atlve. «shtln, eH.ee Speaker-
ship contests, including one unsuccessful revoU. The fights „e.e
fairly evenly distributed over the sixteen year period with one oc-
curri^ in the first half of the „.Jority phase and one at
.id-point
while the attempted revolt fell m the last two years. The size of
the party, as with the Democrats, seeded relevant in predicting leader-
ship conflict. AS Table 2 demonstrates, there were no contests when
the Republicans held over 60 per cen^ nf th^ ut ol. the House seats but the
TABLE 2
REPIJBLICM CONTESTS AND PARTY SIZE, 1895-1911
X of Republican Seats # of Congresses # of Contests
50 to 54,9% 2
55 to 59.9% 4
60% and over 2
2
1
0
chances for a leadership fight increased as the Republicans approached
50 per cent. This pattern is interesting because in the Democratic
party before 1931 most clashes occurred when the Democrats controlled
between 40 and 49.9 per cent of the seats in the House, and this
tendency became more pronounced when the Democrats commanded more
than 45 per cent of the seats. These figures suggest that a fairly
narrow numerical band--clustering on either side of the 50 per cent
-les were
Lec-
:ern
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mark
— is the most condun'vo ^^.-^
-i jcx e for leadership con^etition in both parties
Lopsided Republican majorities and t^^^J txL my Democratic minority
less vulnerable to conflict than
.ore evenly divided parties.
Il-Won trends. AH three Republican contests followed el.
tion losses, which is in sharp contrast to the Democratic patt,
whore fights usually followed election upswings, but is co^atible
with the post-world War n Republican pattern. However, unlike the
recent tendency for Republican fights to coincide with ^Jor defeats,
the Republican contests in this early period took place after small
downturns ranging fro» three to eighteen seat losses, when the Re-
publicans suffered their worst setbacks in the 1895 to 1911 era-the
loss of thirty-nine seats in 1896 and twenty-nine seats in 1906. no
contest developed. (See Table 3). On the other .hand, when the Re-
publicans inproved their margin, there was also no leadership con-
flict. In sum, leadership stability was associated with both victories
and sizeable defeats while contests followed modest electoral down-
swings
.
MembershiH tur^^^ As Table 4 shows, except for 1895, each
time the proportion of new men^bers was on the rise, a leadership strug-
gle followed and whenever the percentage of new members dropped below
the level of the last Congress, no contest took place. However, 1895
is a major exception. With the Republican ranks swollen with freshmen
elected in the 1894 landslide, only 40.5 per cent of the Republican
me^i' ership had served in the preceding Congress. Yet despite the huge
turnover. Reed easily won the Speakership. At the other extreme, in
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Year
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903*
1905
1907
1909
TABLE 3
REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS, 1895-1911
242
203
185
198
205 (190)
250
221
218
Change from Pre-
vious Election
+114
- 39
- 18
+ 13
+ 7 (-8)
+ 45
- 29
- 3
% of GOP Seats
When Congress Opened
68.0
56.9
51.8
55.5
53,6
64.5
56.5
55.9
indicates contest
The size of the House was undergoing rapid change.The figures xn parentheses are adjusted using theprevious House size as base.
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TABLE 4
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AM, MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1895-1911
Year
/o New Members
°k Incumbents
1895
59.5
1897
25.6
1899
29.7
1901
25.3
1903
30.9
1905
27.3
1907
17.6
1909
19.7
40.5
74.4
70.3
74.7
69.1
72.7
82.4
80.3
indicates a contest
1909, when there was comparatively little
. change in the composition
of the party in the House, rebellion reared its head. Therefore, Re-
publican leadership conflict tended to correlate with increased mem-
bership turnover but was not necessarily related to large scale
changes in the composition of the party as was true for the Democrats
whose fights tended to occur when less than two-thirds of the old
members returned to the new Congress.
Hierarchy. AH three Republican contests occurred in Congresses
in which the percentage of freshman Congressmen was higher than in the
old Congress. When the proportion of freshmen in the party was falling,
no fight developed. As with membership turnover, the only exception
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to this pa.ce„ „as 18,5 when the RepuhUcans
.a„a,e. a t.an,uU
..an-
s.tion f.o.
.inorlt,
.o ^jority status despite the Infl.. of a huge
freshman class. (See Table ^^ »<^b 5). Moreover, it should be noted that
fro. 1897 until 1907 the level of f.esh.en in the Republican party
was nearly constant, ranging f.o. a low of 23.2 per cent in 1897 to
a high of 28.5 per cent in IQn-^P m 1903, so the contests correlate with rather
small gains in the size of the freshman class.
TABLE 5
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1895-1911
1 ear
7o Freshmen % Sophomores % Seniors
1895 55.8 23.6 5.8
1897 23.2 41.4 10.8
1899 25.9 24.3 12.4
1901 24.2 21.7 10.1
1903 28.5 17.9 15.0
1905 24.9 23.2 19.7
1907 16.7 20,8 24.4
1909 17.4 14.7 27.5
indicates a contest
The relationship between growing junior classes and increased
leadersh ip competition disappears when freshmen and sophomores are
combined
,
which was also true of the Democrats. When sophomores alone
are examined, the relationship with leadership contests is a random one,
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There were only two Coneresse.,
-fn •gre ses m this majority interval in
1901..a„. in „eUh.r instance was ehe.e an, leadership confUct. i„
the six Congresses in which the percentage of , •Fu senior members was
rising, there was a 50 nerp cent chance for a contest to develop.
Another way of examining this relan^^.t, •g n tionship is to compare Congresses
With relatively high and low levels of seniority. Between 1893 and
1903 veteran Republicans consistently composed under 15 per cent of
the party membership and in those four Congresses there was only one
fight. From 1903 until 1911, when senior members held between 15.0
and 27.5 per cent of the seats, two contests developed. Democratic
conflict, instead, had tended ^n ^i
,
a to take place when the proportion of
senior
.e.bers was declining. Thus, Republican contests were charac-
terized by increasing numbers of both freshmen and senior members..
It is easy to understand why large freshmen classes might provide
the impetus for a leadership struggle in an age where the Speaker had
the sole power to make cotnnittee assignments. As Follett pointed out:
There is a tremendous incentive for the new
members to elect their Speaker: if they do
not, they stand at the end of the line for
committee places, and thus lose their only
chance of getting any part of the work or
the spoils of the House. 51
It is harder to unravel why in the Republican party a large pool of
senior members did not inhibit contests. One possible explanation
is that Republican fights, unlike most Democratic battles, more often
^^Ibid.
, p. 119.
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revolved around the concentration of leader.h
•
s ip power. Senior Repub-
licans were clearly troubled by this issue in 1895 when th^oyj ey were thelea.t enc.us.as.l.
..pp„..„ o.
.esto..,, Hee. . tHe Speakership
Before
.he I,OI-Xno rehelUon.
.here . so.e ev.ence
.ha. ve.eran
RepuhUeans were heco.i„, res.less
.t.h Cannon's arhl.rarln.s as he
axe. conserva.lves such as
.ovier and M.ar. s. Henr. of Connec.icu.
from comml.cee chairmanships.'^ Alth™,oh rPs. oug few senior members actually
participated in the fish.s aft^r fh= , ^g e the turn of the century, which is
unaerstandahle since they had the most to lose in a confrontation with
the speaker, they also may not have exerted themselves behind the
scenes to head off a clash. On the Democratic side, the 1907 melee
also concerned the concentration of leadership power for John sharp
Williams had disciplined mavericks by stripping them of desirable
co^ittee assignments." Not only did the 1907 revolt resemble the
Republican brawls on issues but it was the only Democratic contest
^^^-^^^3^"-^^,, , j,^ p^^p^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
excxu!!ve^^?:::tL°e":£%hnj::L\''''ca""™\= "^^"^^
Of his cro^y, Us^^tso^^fi^d' a'ia,' o^^d'^rsharp" ^^^''tmake Democratic committee assignments betweefIMS and JJos im-and Cannon were friends and Watson predicted r gh .rtha «llla' tassignments would soon lead to increased bickerLg ind Ught L wUhin
ceLorcha'L'rr^'^- f ^= friendly\ .th Wifl ams' suesse , Champ Clark, and did not share his appoint
-nt privlleae withthe Democratic Minority Leader after 1908.
i g
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to leadership stability but the struggles before 1910 support an
alternate hypothesis: leadership contests to decentralize „u c i power tend
to need a band of disgruntled veterans to spark the conflict.
MSi£nal factionalism. Ihe two Speakership fights over vacancies
occurred when Midwestern strength in the party was at its peak, m
1899 and 1903 the Midwest co^anded 49.2 per cent and 47.8 per cent
respectively of the Republican seats as Table 6 Indicates, when
TABLE 6
REPUBLICAN CONTEST AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1895-1911
Year 7o Midwest % East % West 7o South-Border
States
1895 44.2 37.1 5.8 12.8
1897 41,4 43.8 2.5 12.3
1899 49.2 35.1 5.9 9.7
1901 44.9 38.9 6.6 9.6
1903 47.8 38.2 7.7 6.3
1905 46.2 36.5 8.0 9,2
1907 45.2 36.7 9.0 9.0
1909 40.4 39.4 7.8 12.4
indicates a contest
Western Congressmen are added to the figure, the trend continues with
Midwestern-Western power at its height in both of these Congresses with
55.1 per cent of the Republican seats in 1899 and 55.5 per cent in
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occu„e.
.en „..„es.e.. 3.e„,.H was „ea.e. a.
....„e. Wester-
Hid„esee„
.epresen.aUon a.oppea
.elo„ 30 pe. cen.
.o. onl, seco..
time during this period.
MMoalcal jacucnaus..
„.„.er of
.Us«e.t Repu.Uean Con-
Sress.en slowl, cU..e. f.o. a
.anaful a.
.He of the eentu.,
.0
between two ana th.ee ao.en in 1909. As Tahle 7 demonstrates. In 1907
ana 1909 not only were the insurgents saining adherents, hut the size
Of the Republican membership in the House was shrinUing. which gave
the aissiaents a bigger voice inside the party. Moreover, in 1903
ana 1909-both contest years-the insurgents had enough votes to aead-
lock the House or to organize the House in combination with the
Democrats.
Thus, Republican conflict seems strongly dependent on the regional
ana iaeological cleavages splitting the party, m the early years of
this period regional factions seemea more important, but auring the
latter half of the perloa iaeological fissures overroae the regional
pss, (Boston: Little, Bro™ ana Company, T9707r5^2^eftKT
'
beginning in the House of Representatives as 1903. Rus ^1 B L in
f^/t, "
S:2Siesslve Politics: A Historical study of Its Or^Ilns|Hi Deve cpment
, 1|70-1958, (East LaSST^iT^hii^fsilt"nlSy
fSnf',, ; V ^' ^' "^^^ P"g«=sive insurgency began in1906 when Robert LaFoUette of Wisconsin was first elecLd to theSenate ana startea to organize ana influence the Wisconsin aele^ationm the House Charles Thompson, on the other hana, in Party Lea^aersof the Time (citea before), p. 154, contends that insurii^ first
~
appearea when young Midwestern members battled Henaerson and theHouse machine over rules and policy. But whatever starting date
one uses, it is clear there were only a few Miawestern insurgentsin the House at the turn of the century.
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TABLE 7
REPUBLICA^J CONTESTS THE GROWTH
OF THE PROGRESSIVES, 1901-1911
Year # of Pro- % of Pro # of Re .a .
' ~~
gressives gressives publican! ^ cratr"
^^^^'^^^^^
racs fections necessary
to cause deadlock
between two
parties
1901 8 4.0 198 153 23
1903 16 7.7 207 176 16
1905 20 8.0 249 137 56
1907 24 10.9 221 167 27im 31 14.2 218 171 24
indicates a contest
divisions with 1903 marking the turning point. The issues involved i„
the leadership struggles buttress this the.e: in 1899 the fight was over
Eastern domination of the House leadership; in 1903 the regional identi-
fication of the candidates continued to be stressed but their views on
the tariff and their capacity to be a fair presiding officer were also
weighed; and by 1909 the debate focused almost exclusively on rules and
tariff reform.
Congruence
.
Until 1899 the East dominated the Republican leader-
ship in the House as the Speaker and both Majority Leaders represented
New York or Maine. The only Midwesterner recruited into the party
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leadership circle before 1899 was Tawney of Minnesota, who. Reed ap-
pointed Whip in 1897. The East's prominence coincided with the
regional alignments on the Republican sxde. Before 1899 the East
was either the largest faction as in 1897 or when combined with the
South and Border States controlled half of the Republican seats as
in 1895. In 1899 the Midwest replaced the East as the strongest
•
region and with its Western allies held over a majority of the seats
until 1909. The leadership reflected this shift in regional suprem-
acy: from 1899 to 1911 the Speaker was a Midwesterner with an Eastern
Majority Leader. H.e Whips were also from the Midwest until 1909 when
Midwestern strength began to wane and Cannon appointed Dwight of New
York to replace Watson. Although the Republicans responded quickly
to changes in regional factions, the leadership did not accommodate
ideological diversity. AH the leaders between 1895 and 1911 belonged
to the regular, conservative, standpat wing of the party although
Tawney had a reputation for independence. However, when he strayed
too far from the regular viewpoint, he was relieved of his duties as
Whip- temporarily in 1902 by Henderson and permanently in 1905 by
Cannon
.
Summary of the Variables 1895 - 1911
All three contests in this period occurred under similar con-
ditions: when the Republicans were the Majority party but held under
56 per cent of the seats in the House; after an election loss; when
the composition of the party as measured by the percentage of fresh-
men and the rate of returning members was less stable than in the
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P-cedln, Co„s.ess, „hen the
.e^e.ship
..s
.eco.l^s
.ore senic; a„a
when either the Midwest or the insurgents, share of seats „as highest
in determining which conditions were .ost responsible for the con-
fllct. two variables can be discounted or downgraded. Majority status
hypothesised as Inhibiting competition, did not have the expected im-
pact since the Republicans fought over the leadership almost as fre-
quently as the minority Democrats. Election defeats can also be
eliminated. Although the battles followed election losses as Peabody
predicted, the fights did not coincide with the biggest Republican
defeats. Instead, the contests of this period seemed strongly re-
lated to the factional alignments in the party-to the competition
between East and Midwest until 1903 and to differences after 1903
between Progressives and regulars. The size of the party also seemed
important, for in a House with closely divided parties the insurgents
gained leverage and bargaining power over the dominant wing. In ad-
dition, the Inflow of larger freshman classes appeared to encourage
competition, especially in 1399 and 1903. In those years the com-
bination of a vacant Speakership with no obvious heir apparent and a
sizeable body of freshmen uncommitted to any particular leader may
well have spurred the large number of candidacies. Finally, the grow-
ing contingent of veterans, wary about the Speaker's ability to dis-
rupt their careers, seemed to contribute particularly to the formation
of the 1909 revolt. The Republican leaders tried to minimize the con-
flict by carefully balancing the leadership geographically and by re-
warding orthodoxy in handing out committee assignments and party
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posts-a practice that likely prevented Republicans fro. J„ini„,
the insurgency but also fueled the insurgents' determination to bring
about change.
Leadership Contests
, 1911 to 1919
With the party divided into regular and Progressive factions, the
Republicans lost control of the House of Representatives for the first
ti^e since 1894. The Republicans were left in a quandary about the
leadership. During the campaign, Cannon had repeatedly declared that
the charges of czarism and "Cannonism" were trumped up by nruckraker
n^-agazines and that he would run again for Speaker. Yet by election
day the Nev; York Tijnes could count eighty Republican Congressmen who
-
had announced that they could no longer support him. The most sig-
nificant defection had come from Nicholas Longworth, the regular
Republican from Ohio, who had close political ties to the Tafts, but
was also Roosevelt's son-in-law. Because Longworth had never par-
ticipated in the anti-Cannon movements before and because he issued
his statement from Taffs summer White House, his statement was re-
garded as an important signal by other regular Republicans that Cannon
could be beaten. Republican members with leadership aspirations began
to emerge. Edgar Crumpacker of Indiana had already been endorsed by
the Indiana delegation for Speaker. Others who made their interest
known were Tawney, the former Whip; Smith of Iowa, "who .had a large
personal following; "^^ Hinds, the former House parliamentarian, who
TO, Aug. 19, 1910, p. 3.
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had recently
.een nominate, to .u„ Congress fro. ^.l.e; a.. „.rU.
01-ted Of Pennsylvania.
,a. conducted s„cH a fair Investlsatlon
of naval scandals that evpnn e the Progressives were impressed, what
was noteworthy about these five potential contenders was that they
vere all
..regulars of the deepest dye, men who have stood for every-
thing the speaker has eniodied...^^
„hen the Republicans actually
lost control of the House, the campaign issue had been resolved in a
sense because Cannon would no longer be Speaker. Most Republicans
hoped Cannon would also decline to run for Minority Leader so that
they would not have to repudiate his leadership further. Defeat gave
cannon a graceful way to retire. Saying he would not want to be
Minority Leader after having served for so ^ny years as Speaker.
Cannon stepped down.^^
After cannon's retire:nent, attention turned to Ja^.es R. Mann- of
Illinois. Mann was considered a "hard worker," one of the "best
parliamentarians in the House, "^^ and an effective debater. The
greatest obstacle to Mann's selection was the insurgent bloc, which
had mixed feelings about Mann. Norris in describing the atmosphere
in the House when the Cannon rules" were overthrown in 1910 remembered
that "from /Ihe? beginning to /FheJ end of the battle between the in-
surgents and the Speaker.
. . . Mann of Chicago had been Republican
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., Nov. 9, 1910, p. 4 and Aug. 19, 1910, p. 3; Gwinn,
II' iQ?n ^f.
252-253; and LflFpIlf-ttC ' P WecKJbL ^a^a^, Julyju, lyiu, p. 12.
Both quotes are from Lowitt, p. 208.
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floor manager. The controversies on the floor had been very bitter,
and he had displayed no inclination to be lenient. On the other
hand, Mann had voted against the Payne-Aldrich tariff, which La-
FoUette and the Progressives had vehemently attacked, shortly be-
fore the Republican caucus convened, the insurgents met separately.
A majority of the forty-one insurgents agreed to support Mann since
they thought it was useless to present their own challenger at a
caucus dominated by the regulars, but a minority of seventeen members
decided to fight Mann's election with another candidate. The pro-
Mann insurgents attended the Republican caucus where Mann was nom-
inated by Cannon and unaniinously chosen. The anti-Mann faction, com-
posed mainly of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Pacific Coast Progressives,
boycotted the caucus and on the floor of the House voted for Henry
Cooper of Wisconsin.
Dwight of New York continued as Whip.
To pacify the insurgents and bring them back into the party,
Mann abandoned Cannon's policy of treating dissidents harshly and
instead gave the bolters favorable committee assignments. For ex-
ample, Murdock was placed on Post Offices and Post Roads, the very
committee from which he had been banished by Cannon, and Irvine
Lenroot, a Wisconsin Progressive, was appointed to the Rules Commit-
60
tee. Mann s considerate treatment, however, was overwhelmed by
^^Norris, p. 131,
N^T, Apr. 4, 1911, p. 1; April 5, 1911, p. 2; April 12, 1911,
p. 2; Gwinn, pp. 223-229; Congressional Record, XLVII, Part 1, p. 6.
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the Taft-Roosevelt breach that shattered the party m 191^
By 1913 there were three sets of Kep.hUcans in the House-the
regulars; the Bull Moose Progressives,
.ho were especially stron, i„
Pennsylvania and on the West Coast; and the rest of the Progressives
Whose stronghold was the Midwest. The BuZl Moose contingent decided'
to organize as a third party and present their own candidate for
speaker rather than try to work with the regular RepuhXicans. In-
vitations to the Bull Moose caucus were sent to forty-four insurgents
but a group led hy Lenroot. Sydney Anderson of Minnesota, and Willi..
Kent of California declined to attend. The absence of ^ny of these
insurgents fron, the Bull Moose conference can probably be CKplained
by their close ties to LaFollette. Lenroot had served as LaFoUette's
floor leader in the Wisconsin legislature .^ ^j-egisiat and along with Kent had
been a charter member of the Nation;:.! Pt-^^>-^ •X n n tional Progressive League, founded at
LaFollette 's home in 1911. m 1912 LaFollette had campaigned hard
for the Republican presidential nomination but his chances of winning
had been severely undercut by Roosevelt's late entry into the campaign.
Roosevelt's tactics had soured the LaFollette camp, which felt that
Roosevelt had deliberately used LaFollette as his stalking horse so
LaFollette 's friends wanted no part of a Bull Moose caucus.
The eighteen Bull Moosers went ahead with their own caucus and
nominated Murdock for Speaker, allegedly Roosevelt's personal choice.
The Progressives who had decided to continue their uneasy alliance
with the Republican party attended the regular caucus amidst flurries
of rumors that they might run their own candidate against Mann in the
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spa.ea
.
_.e...,e
...
^^^^
^^^^
Nelson of Wisconsin.
Charles Burke of South Dakota, assistant in.- .Wliip for several Con-
gresses, was appointed Whip to replace Pt.7^a^.^ ^y Bwight of New York, who had
re«.e. f.o. the House. Bu^.e'. advance^enc f.o„ assis... wh.p to
Whip is one Of the fe. instances of a Republican leadership ladder
By 1915 the Progressives had started to fade as a significant
force Within the Republican party and the Bull Moosers had returned
"
to the party fold. At the „„st fully attended Republican caucus
Since 1907. Mann was renominated by acclamation and on the floor of
the House only two California Progressives voted "present" rather
than vote for Mann in a mild show of displeasure tt, ,n,- .u b i o . The whip changed
as Charles Hanilton of New York replaced Burke, who had left the
House to run for the Senate.
In 1917, with the two parties equally divided, the Republicans
had an excellent chance to recapture the House of Representatives if
they could induce three independents to side with them and if they
P S-'^h flVA' l\V ''''' 2; March 27, 1913
J.vr.^^.l /o' ^' ^^^^^ ^' Fola LaFollette Robert M|2F2ll£tte, (2 vols.; New York: MacMillan Co., 1953) I sfl^ "MIett75 Wee^ February 4 1911 dd 7 Q- . i n ^" •
al Record, LrPirt17^63-64. ' ' ^""^ Congression-
Congressional Record, LIII, Part 1, pp. 5-6.
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Mann
could unite behind a single choice for Speaker H„„ ,o K . opes for party
har^ny nearly collapsed shortly after the election «hen Woodrow
Wilson asked the belligerents to state their peace ten., when
._.
"unexpectedly arose in defense nf u-n .a r o Wxlson as a peacemaker and urged
bipartisan support for his endeavor."" the interventionists in the
P-ty, sy^oli.ed by Roosevelt, decided to challenge Mann. After
consulting with Roosevelt, Augustus Gardner of Massachusetts an-
nounced he would back Lenroot of Wisconsin for leader because Mann
was pro-Ger^n. Soon after. Tho^s Schall of Minnesota, one of the
last Bull Moose Progressives left in the House, was also invited to
confer with Roosevelt. Roosevelt's Interest in the leadership fight
steo^ed fro„ his desire to run for President again in 1920. He wanted
a Speaker congenial to his candidacy and to win .the first test for
control of the party ^chinery. If an alignment of Republicans and
independents could be forged, Mann might have to be bypassed as the
Republican nominee for Speaker. The insurgents were determined to
block Mann's advancement to the Speakership even at the price of let-
ting the Democrats organize the House because they feared a resurgence
of "Cannonisra" if Mann became Speaker.^*
To head off the brewing Mann-Lenroot dispute. William Greene of
63
fi, „ ^T^^"^^
Llvermore, Politics is Adiourned . Woodrow Wilson and
iSsififstfff*if^"— (""-ii^^^^^ssr—weniTsruS^ifr
26, wfe.^n: P- 3; and Dec.
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Massachusetts, the chair^n of the Republican caucus, appointed a
co^ittee composed of both Progressives and regulars to work out a
Plan acceptable to both wings for organising the new House. The
coonittee's
.ost popular proposal was for the Progressives to vote
for Mann for Speaker in return for regular votes to elect Lenroot
Majority Leader. Another possibility was to unite behind a =o„pro.ise
choice such as Frederick GiUett of Massachusetts or J. Hampton Moore
of Pennsylvania. A final alternative, whose chief proponent was Hann.
called for a bipartisan organisation of the House with Speaker Clark
and floor leader Kitchin sharing the leadership responsibilities with
Mann as the Republican floor leader and Lenroot as the chairman of
the Rules ConMlttee. The Dei»ocrats were never enthusiastic about
Mann's plan and Lenroot was hostile to the idea even though Mann of-
fered to withdraw from the leadership fight if a bipartisan approach
were adopted.
In March, 1917, Mann was renominated. The most vocal dissenter
to his re-election was Gardner, who announced that he intended to
vote for Lenroot on the House floor and moved that the caucus decision
not be made binding on those present. When this motion was tabled by
a vote of 127 to 47, Gardner walked out, declaring that the Old Guard
was still in command. After Gardner's departure, a couple of other
members indicated that they would also bolt to another candidate when
^^I'iil" Feb. 8, 1917, p. 13; Feb. 16, 1917, p. 5; Feb. 18, 1917,
I, p. 14; March 10, 1917, p. 1; March 27, 1917, p. 10; March 30,
1917, p. 5; and Livermore, pp. 13-14.
1A4
congress opened. No fo^x candidate was entered again.e >^nn at
the caucus, but Mann had to accept two changes that weakened his
power-apparently Woofs price for dropping out of the race. He
lost the power to ^Ue Republican co™ittee assignments. In the
future this duty would be shared by a co^ittee of seventeen with
Mann presiding. Furthermore, the caucus created an advisory co™it-
tee of six, with Mann as chainnan. to set party policy.
When Congress convened, a handful of Republicans did not vote
for Mann. Schall, in fact, supported Clark for Speaker because he
thought Wilson deserved a Speaker fro™ his own party with the country
on the verge of war. Most of the bolters were Easterners who had not
been pro=,inent in earlier leadership battles and were generally per-
ceived as Roosevelt loyalists.^*
Hamilton was re-appointed Whip.
Sunmar;^ of the 1911 to 1919 Contests
Ihe 1911 to 1919 minority interlude was a storey period for the
Republican leadership, m four Congresses, there were three contests
over the Minority Leadership: in 1911 the Republicans wrangled over
the Minority Leader vacancy created by the shift to minority status
and by Cannon's decision to step down; and in 1913 and 1917 the Pro-
gressives led protests against Mann's leadership. See Table 8 for a
March 31, 1917, p. 4; Richard Boiling. Power in the House-
A Historjr of the Leadership of the House of RepreseM^Uv'^
.-J^e"^York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 99; LTverr;;oVe. p. 14 and p. 251-and Congressional Record. LV, Part 1, pp. 107-108.
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1911
1913
1915
1917
TABLE 8
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1911-1919
Status of Post What Happened Outcome
Vacancy
(Party became
Minority)
No Vacancy
Minority Leader
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
Contest-17 insurgents
boycotted caucus and
presented rival candi-
date on floor of House.
Contest-Bull Moose
Progressives held sep-
arate caucus and pre-
sented own candidate
for Speaker on House
floor.
No Contest.
Contest-rival candi-
date did not permit
name to be entered
at caucus
.
Mann elected
Insurgents
won better
committee
assignments.
Mann re-
elected
.
Mann re-
elected
.
Mann re-elected;
Steering Commit-
tee and Committee
on Committees es-
tablished to de-
centralize leader's
power
.
1911
1913
1915
No Vacancy
Vacancy
(Dwight retired)
Vacancy
(Burke retired)
New Minority Leader
made appointment.
Minority Leader pro-
moted Assistant Whip.
Minority Leader made
appointment
.
Dwight re-named,
Burke named.
Hamilton named.
1917 No Vacancy No Change Hamilton re-named.
146
.-.r,.
^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
as Minoru,
.ea.e..
..e co„nic. „o„ conoeaslons fo. .He
Afte.
.He I,U con.e...
.He. deceive. He«e. co^U.ee assi.^en.s
and
.He 1,17 Ha..le succeeded i„ u„i.,„,
..^^^^^^^^
power to appoint co»lttees and to .ake policy. The struggles of
this period see™ to be a continuation of the revolt against "Cannon-
is." for rules revision and a wider distribution of influence within
the Republican party appeared to be as important to the insurgents as
leadership change. Because the insurgents were so obviously out-
numbered in the Republican party, the contests were conducted dif-
ferently fro. the typical Democratic fight. Democratic clashes were
wrapped up before the caucus or settled at the caucus; but the Pro-
gressives, knowing they could seldom win in the- caucus, tended to
carry their quarrels to the House floor in order to publicize their
demands and force concessions.
Although Mann was the only Minority Leader, turnover was high
among the Whips. Dwight, Burke and Hamilton all served as Whip during
this short interval. Voluntary retirements from the House, not re-
moval for poor performance in office, accounted for this mobility.
Evidence of a routinized method of recruiting leaders is very
slender. Mann, before his selection as Minority Leader, had served
as Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. He
seemed to be picked for his competence and attachment to standpat
policies rather than for any previous post he had held. With the
Whips, Burke was selected after an apprenticeship as Assistant Whip
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but neither Bwlght nor Hamilton had acted In such a capacity hefore
being appointed.
Finally, the Involvement of individuals outside the House of
Representatives continued to be an Important factor in Republican
contests, m the previous Majority phase. Senators had frequently
Played a leading role but between 1911 and 1919. except for LaFoIUtte
their influence had diminished. Corporate and special interest group
participation had also declined but Taft. Roosevelt, and LaFoUette.
each closely identified with a ^Jor bloc within the fragmented party,
were all active in the Republican battles. In 1911, Taft, through
Longworth, seems to have tried to rally support to overthrow Cannon;
in 1913 Roosevelt was behind the Bull Moose decision to organize as
a third party and picked Murdock, while LaFoUette's feelings of be-
trayal by Roosevelt In 1912 were probably responsible for diluting
Progressive cohesion; and in 1917 Roosevelt was orchestrating the
opposition to Mann.
^Mlysifi of the Variables
, 1911 -1919
^^St22lllZ-m^^2ll^ £tatus. Minority status was associated with
more frequent leadership conflict in the Republican party, m the
eight year minority interlude, three fights occurred in comparison
with three skirmishes in the preceding sixteen year majority period.
Moreover, two of the three contests between 1911 and 1919 were direct-
ed against the incumbent leader whereas in the previous interval only
the 1909 revolt challenged an incumbent. Fights developed regardless
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of the size of the nart-v tup ty. There was a battle i. 1917 when the Repub-
licans were verv cln<3<3 ^ • .y ose to a .najority as well as in 1913 when the
party had been reduced to a tiny minority. Consequently, as Table 9
demonstrates, the tendency noted before for „ost leadership fl.hts
to Cluster near the 50 per cent ^r, disappeared between 1911 and 1,19,
TABLE 9
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND PARTY SIZE, 1911-1919
% of Republican Seats # of Congresses
Under 40%
40 to 44.97o
45 to 50.0%
1
1
2
# of Contests
1
1
1
Election trends
.
Two of the three Republican struggles followed
election disasters, in 1910, for instance, the Republicans dropped
fifty-eight seats and lost control of the House of Representatives and
in 1912 they lost an additional thirty-four seats and the Presidency.
(See Table 10). These findings are compatible with Peabody's study,
which indicated that leadership quarrels were more likely to occur
after a major defeat, but differed from the earlier Republican pat-
tern where conflict coincided with minor election losses rather than
the biggest downturns. Hie 1917 contest deviated from both patterns
in that for the first time since 1895 a Republican battle was as-
sociated with a modest election upswing that netted the party fourteen
new seats rather than a defeat of any size.
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Year # of House
Seats won
Change from Pre-
vious Election
% of GOP Seats When
Congress Opened
1911 161
-58 41.3
1913* 127 (114)
-34 (-47) 33.3
1915 196
+69 46.9
1917 210
+14 49.4
indicates a contest
The House was expanding rapidly in size. Thefigures in parentheses are adjusted uslno thesx« of the previous Congress as the base.
Me2bershi£ turnover. There was no clear relationship between
the extent of
.e^ershlp turnover and the tl.lng of leadership con-
tests between 1911 and 1919. Although the 1911 and 1913 fights
correlated with Increased membership change, this pattern broke down
m 1915 and 1917, as Table 11 indicates. In 1915 no contest de-
veloped even though nearly half the Republican Congressn„.n had not
served in the last Congress and in 1917, despite a holdover rate
among Republicans of nearly 30.0 per cent, there was a nK,ve to oust
Mann.
Hierarchy_. The 1911 and 1913 contests followed a rise in fresh-
men members, but as with membership turnover the relationship became
fuzzy beginning with the 64th Congress. An expanding freshman class
in 1915 coincided with the only example of leadership stability in
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TABLE 11
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND ME^ffiERSHIP CHANGE, iyii-iyi9
Year
/o u£ iNew Members
°L Incumbents
1911
26.7 73.3
1913
37.9 62.1
1915
48.0 52.0
1917
21.4 78.6
indicates a contest
the minority period and a substantial drop in the proportion of
freshmen in 1917 was associated with renewed conflict over the
Minority Leadership as Table 12 illustrates.
TABLE 12
REPUBLICAN COOTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1911-1919
Year % Freshmen % Seniors
1911 26.1 25.5
1913 37.2 20.0
1915 39.2 18,1
1917 18.6 19.5
indicates a contest
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W.th senior
.embers the sa„e type of ett.tic pattern existed
»U ana a.hts eorreUte.
.ith lo^er proportion, of veteran
Republicans whereas the 1917 contest followed a slight increase in
senior „e^ers. furthermore, when the percentage of senior Kepuh-
licans was loveat-lS.S per cent in 1915-there was harmony The
absence of strong relationships between leadership challenges and
membership change or age groups in the Republican party between
1911 and 1919 was also characteristic of fh„ n^- t e Democratic party during
the Wilson era.
Factionalism. All three contests developed when the Midwest was
the largest regional bloc in the House as Table 13 demonstrates, when
Midwestern and Western delegates are counted together, they held over
a
..Jority of the seats on the Republican side .f the aisle in ever^
contest year, m 1915, the only Congress in this minority period.in
which there was no contest, the East was the largest regional faction
and in conxbination with Southern and Border State representatives
controlled the same number of seats as the Midwest and West.
The ideological fragmentation of the Republican party continued
to play an important role in the development of the leadership
clashes. As Table 14 indicates, the fights occurred under two dif-
ferent sets of circumstances-when the Progressives composed at
least one-fourth of the Republican membership as in 1911 and 1913.
or when Progressive votes were necessary for the Republicans to or-
ganize the House as in 1917. Between 1903 and 1911 Republican con-
tests had taken place under almost identical conditions
-when the
TABLE 13
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Year % Midwest
7o East % West
1911 43.5 37.9 in c
1913 40.0 35.9 15.2
1915 39.7 43.1 10.3
1917 43.3 41.4 8.8
indicates a contest
"U South and Border
States
8.1
9.0
6.9
6.5
Year
1911
1913
1915
1917
TABLE 14
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONS, 1911-1919
# of Pro-
gressives
% of Pro
gressives
# of Re-
publicans
# of Seats GOP
needed to con-
trol House
41
44
33
36
25.5%
34.1%
16.9%
16.7%
161
129
195
215
34
89
23
3
indicates a contest
Progressive band was at its height in sl.c or when they heW the
balance of power between Democrats and Rep^iblicans
. The 1917 case
is slightly different in that the Republicans needed the Progressives
plus some independent votes. Nevertheless, the pattern remains:
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the
whenever the Progressives held their be,^ xst bargaining position,
Chances
.or a leadership bra„i increased dra.aticail,
m short, both regional and ideological factio
be associated with the f
-^-naUs. appeared
forn^tion of Republican contests. These
variables were intertwined because
.ost of the Progre •
,
^^ ssives wereMidwesterners. The onlv
' '^-^ a Sizable groupof Eastern Progressives was in 191, X „Roosevelt's coattails hadpuiied a number of rflnri-;^ovcandidates running on the Bull Moose label to
victory in Pennsylvania and New York Yet „x . one suspects that the
xdeological split in the party superseded the regional 1Ln alignments
-
-iSSering the contests of this period since the issues involved
in the disputes concerned the decentralisation of power inside the
"
party and increased opportunities for the Progressive wing to in-
nuence policy. Additionally. Mann was a Midwesterner so the Mid-
west had no need to fi-ht for -fi-o t,-^^onc t Its share of the spoils.
This minority interlude makes an interesting comparison with
the Republicans in the
.id-l^SO's and ISeo's. Peabody Hypothesised
that a deeply fragmented party showed less conflict than a party with
fewer internal cleavages. He based his theory on the way the two
parties behaved between 1955 and 1966 when the Republicans were a
homogeneous but conflict riddled group. data fro. the heyday
of the Progressives n^vement in the Republican party, however, sug-
gest that deep divisions in Republican ranks were strongly conducive
to frequent leadership battles.
Qons^mm^. Just as between 1895 and 1911. the leadership care-
fully reflected the strength of the largest regions. A Midwesterner
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was Minority Leader fr>T- t-u^ r i-.y lueaae tor the full minority interval t-tH-j^ky xau i, which correspond*
to .he Midwest's do.inan. posiUo„ fo. six of
.he eish. ,e„s. Hx-
'
cepe fo. ln3 to 1915. .he Congress 1. which the Mi.we.t „as st.ons-
est, Mann had an Easterner for whip. „hlch neatly balanced the
leadership geographically. The Republicans continued to reward
orthodoxy in distributing leadership posts. The only Congress fro„
1895 to 1919 in which the Republicans even talked about placing an
insurgent in a party office was in 1917 when to entice Progressive
votes to elect a Republican Speaker, the old guard considered ^Uing
Lenroot Majority Leader.
Siimmary of the Variables
The 1911 and 1913 contests occurred when the Republican party
was undergoing tremendous strains. The party had suffered two .ajor
defeats in the House, lost the Presidency, and been left battered by
the Taft-Roosevelt donnybrook. m the House the composition of the
party was very unstable with a high rate of turnover, large freshmen
classes, and a dwindling reservoir of experienced members. The 1917
contest, in contrast, formed when the Republicans were regaining
their lost seats and when the House membership was becoming more
settled and more senior. The conditions that tie these three con-
tests together and also separate them from the one Congress in which
no challenge was undertaken were 1) that the Midwest was the largest
regional faction and 2) the Progressive wing had improved its stra-
tegic position either by increasing in size or by holding the votes
necessary for the Republicans to organize the chamber. The only
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other va.,aMe tUa.
^^^^^^^^^
is Minority status fnr nJ- ou uufa, ro the Democrats werp alcr, x^^^<:ii.i, e so more prone to fight
during the minority years.
Just how critical the factlonalls. was in fostering the dis-
tuptions can be illustrated by the one Congress without leadership
conflict. In 1915 several of the variable, • .n s theorized as contributing
to fights were present: only 52 per cent of the Republicans had
served in the last Congress; nearly 40 per cent were freshmen; and
veterans composed the s^Uest proportion of the party
.e^ershlp
since 1903. Yet no contest developed, largely because the Midwest
and more importantly the Progressives had lost ground.
Thus, between 1911 and 1919 Republican leadership struggles in
the House of Representatives appeared to be an outgrowth of the con-
flict raging at all levels of the party between conservatives and
Progressives. In the House the battles tended to be three way com-
petitions rather than strictly Taft-Roosevelt or standpat-Bull
Moose divisions. LaFollette's camp or at least politicians sharing
his more agrarian brand of Progressivlsm as opposed to Roosevelt's
more urban outlook" did not join easily with either of the other
factions and added to the splintering of the party.
Leadership Contests
, 1919 to 1931
After eight years as the minority, the Republicans were victor-
ious in 1918 and regained control of the House of Representatives.
Nye, p. 184.
inois
,
e
as a
e Mann
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A struggle over the SoeakprcK,-sp kership
„as underway i„edlately. The leading
contenders were GinPt-^ ^-fCUlett of Massachusetts. Martin Madden of Ill
and Simeon Fess of nhir.O xo. Minority Leader Mann „as discounted 1„ thbeginning because of poor health. GlUett brieflv^j-i-iecc, y mentioned ^
speakership possibility In l,n. Had acted as floor leader
.hU
was 111 and „as second ranking a„ong House Republicans In seniority
Also Important was that CUlett had a „ore passive personality than
either Cannon or Mann and
.as expected to be a less forceful Speaker
Madden would be a candidate only If Mann could not run. „e was con/
sWered antl-buslness by so.e urban Republicans but he was popular
in Midwestern agriculture circles Fess » f„,'«-' t , a former president of
Antloch college, was the chairman of the Republican Congressional '
campaign Co„ittee and had been endorsed by Prohibitionist groups
for the speakership. Although a conservative, Pess had so„e progressive
tendencies, which ^de hi™ acceptable to Midwestern and Pacific Coast
Republicans who were threatening to fight any leader Identified with
or responsible for Cannonis,„ and the conservative policies that tore
the party apart in 1912, m the early stages of the contest Fess
seemed to be the likeliest choice.
All predictions went awry in December. 1918. when Mann announced
that he was well enough to compete for the Speakership. Coinciding
With Mann's declaration. Madden withdrew so that Mann could have a
united Illinois delegation behind him. with Mann definitely in the
68 " ~"~
Ml, Nov. 24. 1918, p. 10- Dec 19 191R „ i/ j „ • ,
Part^ Leaders
, p. 99. ' ? ^"'^
Rlpley,
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contes... pu«„, Ha„„ cUle«. „ann not o„I,
.^^^.^
by the Progressives,
.ut his refusal to support Mils that „l,ht em-
barrass president Wilson while at the Peace Conference ha. earned
hin, the entity of the Roosevelt stalwarts and several powerful sen-
ators, including Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. GiUett. run-
ning as a liberal, argued that Mann would bring back Cannonis„ to
the House, especially the Speaker's exclusive perogative to appoint
co^ittees GiUett further claimed that he was noo per cent
A.erican,"^° a slogan designed to draw attention to Mann's support
for Wilson's peace overtures.
In early January, 1919, Longworth entered the Speakership race
as a co.pro.ise choice. Longworth was respected in the Midwest, but
he was also strong among younger members, particularly in key states
like Pennsylvania and New York. In spite of a conservative record.
Longworth also attracted m.oderate votes by leading the fight to
abolish seniority as a hard and fast rule for selecting committee
chairmen and for making committee assignments.
Toward the end of January, will Hays as Chairman of the Re-
publican National Committee canvassed the party's Congressional
membership and found strong opposition to Mann, chiefly from a group
of prominent conservative senators led by Lodge, Reed Smoot of Utah
_NYT, Dec. 19, 1918, p. 14.
^
^Ibid
. , Jan. 20, 1919, p. 7.
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these:
" POUC, ..e
v"io. eo .He Sp.Ue.3H.p
„ouXa
.He p.HU.
.He
.^p.ess.on
.e.o.e.. CCa„„o„ one o. Ka.n.s ca„p..,„
the Se..e
.ea.e„
.e.e ae.e™...
.Ha.
.He pa..,
'
to ae.ea.
...0 on acco.n. ano.He. a.HU.a., Kep„.u.„
^pea.e.
Ihe Se„a.ors „e.e also
.is.u..ea H,
.epc...
.Ha. Mann Ha. accep.e.
^
Slf.s of beefs.eau fro. s«if..s Mea.pae.ins Co„pan..
.UHou^H
.Hese
<ilsclosu.es ,U no.
.nle Mann ou. co.ple.el,. f„. one „as cHa.sln,
tha.
.he presen.^ Had influenced His official HeHavio.,
.He scandal
Old provide a convenien. excuse for
.an. House RepuHlicans
.Ho Had
vo.ed for Mann for Minori.y
.eader Hu. were reluc.an.
.0 bac. Hi.
for Speaker.
In February, a deal seemed to be under wpva ay: Longworth would side
Vi.h Gillet. in re.ur„ for rules refor.. iHis ru.or gained s.reng.H
when New VorU, Pennsylvania, and Indiana Congressmen leaning
.oward
Longworth declared for Gille... Because Mann was believed
.0 be
n-aking li..le headway and Fess Had wi.Hdrawn in the interes. of
party solidari.y/1
.He con.est seemed set.led. A. .His poin. Philip
Cawpbell of Kansas suddenly announced His candidacy. Campbell had
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originally backed Mann but in exnlainina u um p g why he was entering the con-
test, he said:
the opinion of cons'uLe^s-^LtSp^o^^.lJjj^^,
because^he opposed prohibition and'Lman s"!
But Campbell's effort „a. too late and too sectional to block
Gillett.
With GlUetfs victory certain, the demand for rules revision
faded, some of the senior members supporting Gillett were not keen
about ending seniority in making co™ittee assignments. At the
caucus the Fess. Longworth. and Gillett contingents combined to
"
elect Gillett with 138 votes to sixty-nine for Mann, thirteen for
Campbell, four for John Esch of Wisconsin, and one for Frank Mondell
of Wyoming. but part of Gilletfs band united with the Mann camp
to defeat the amendments to the rules and to pass Mann's resolution
that the Comrcittee on Committees be composed of one member from each
state delegation.'* The outcome was that Gillett won the Speakership,
"im, Feb. 26, 1919, p., 1.
™= adopted, proposed that each state witha Republican delegation elect one member to cast the state's voteControl was thus concentrated in the four largest Republican stat^s-
^tlo ti
P«"nsyl™nla. Illinois, and Ohio-all regular bastions InI9ibi. The Gillett plan or at least the scheme presented by Gillett's
campaign manager proposed a seventeen man Committee on CommitteesThe proposal listed the seventeen members. Presumably, the plan
'
gave the moderates and the Progressives more influence than the Mann
substitute. See NYT, Feb. 28. 1919, p. 1.
ramittee
so
Virginia
161
but Mann ana a co.e.le
„. old ^ar. Xeade.s dominated the Co
on Co^ueees, ^l.H not only ^de co^Utee as.l^ents
... al
nominated the Majority Leader and Whip.
The Co^letee on Co^U.ees promptly voted
.0 o«er the Majority
Leadership to Mann.
^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^
Mondell although Ohio. Indiana. Idaho.
.e„
.ersey, and West V
abstained and Samuel Wlnslow of Massachusetts (clUett's campaign
-naser) cast Massachusetts' twelve votes "against Mann." After
Mann, who had cast lUlnols. flfty.four votes for himself, refused
to serve-prohahly hecause he was angry at losing the Speakership
Mondell was picked with 160 votes. Seventy-sl. ballots were either
passed or cast against Mondell. Harold Knutson of Minnesota was
chosen W,lp with 118 votes over Clifton McArthur. of Oregon with
forty-one votes and Albert Ve<;ti1 nf t,,^,-o • ,e v s al o Indiana with twenty-three votes
Since Mondell was "classified as an extreme reactionary" and Knutson
was considered "a Cannon pupil," ,he anti-Mann wing was Incensed
with the results. Longworth, who had lobbied hard behind the scenes
for the^Majority Leadership, labeled the votes as "out Cannoning
cannon"" and the Progressive bloc hoped to overturn the nominations
at the caucus if public opinion could be aroused. No source follows
the contest beyond this point so it is probably safe to assume that
no revolt materialized.
graph"^!; fbr? f'b i"'^ quotations in this para-aph For a ie ut informative account of Longworth's leadershn'r,ambitions, see Alice Roosevelt Longworth's Crowded°Hours. me! Vn" 'Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1933), p. 282. ^, vwew York.
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After the Harding landslide thc.^^, ere was great consternation about
the Republican Congressional leadership Lindc. pu n . say Rogers noted in
the American Ppj^^
The New York Times bemoaned the state of • .Ln leadership in the Republican
party in Congress and wondered if ut •the public would blame Harding for
the lackluster Congressional performance.'^ A contest seemed possible
for rank and file Republicans were also expressing dissatisfaction
with the quality of leadership. GiUett and Mondell took the threat
of a revolt seriously enough to acknowledge that some changes might
be necessary to revitalize the leadership. The likeliest scapegoat
appeared to be Knutson the Whip, since he had been absent on a
critical vote on railroad legislation, no outburst was anticipated
if he were dropped. Nevertheless, despite all the talk. GiUett
and Mondell were re-elected without opposition and Knutson was re-
» J .78earned as Whip.
The 1922 election reinforced the Progressives and the farm bloc,
a group of representatives organized in the 67th Congress to combat
the depression in farming communities in the Midwest. During the
1920)!^p!''76!^ Ainerican Polity XIV (Feb.,
^""nyT, Feb. 8, 1921, p. 10.
^^2^^ p-^^^-f;'
^' 1920, p. 8; Feb. 14. 1921, p. 2; and March 1,
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sxmraer of 1921, approximately one hundrpd ky e members of what John D
problems. AUhougH KonaeU had los. his sea. i„ 1922 elecUon,
a contest was expected nv^^-r v,-,-^ove his vacancy and a revolt against Speaker
Glllett seemed conceivable too.
in the early weeks there was much confusion over who would run
for What Office but by late November. 1922. the contests had begun
to sort the^elves out. Glllett would be unopposed for Speaker even
though some party pros thought Mann could upset hl„. For Majority
Leader Longworth would run with the blessings of the old guard
against far™ bloc candidate WxUiam Graham of Illinois.
Longworth, already strong In the East, tried to ^ke his candi-
dacy .ore palata.le to the antl-ad.inistratlon wing by having friends
clai. that he shared Roosevelt's viewpoint. Even the Nen York Tl^
admitted that it was hard to find
..ny traces of this similarity.
An additional Longworth strategcn, was to dangle the office of wl.ip
in front of farm bloc meniers such as Jasper Tincher of Kansas. «°
Graham, on the other hand, campaigned hard among the freshmen on the
theme that he could bring more balance to the leadership than Long-
worth. When Longworth demanded to know how a Massachusetts-Illinois
ticket was more geographically balanced than a Massachusetts-Ohio
79John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy. 1921-1933 CNewYnrk-Harper and Brothers, 1960). p. 8 8'! i iiii.
Yor .
80
1923. p^: P- Jan. 18,
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Slate. Ho.„ no., of Kansas explained
.ha. since
.o.h aiUet. and
^o„, e^e fro„ p.ospero.s. industrial districts, they Had
little firsthand
.ncwledge of the depression in Midwestern farming
towns, craha™, instead, represented an agricultural constituency in
of farm problems to the business oriented leadership.
The Progressives, meanwhile, had decided not to back either
Graham or Longworth in order to devote themselves to policy and
further liberalisation of the rules. The practical consequences of
the Progressives- aloofness was to aid Longworth. Yet the Progres-
sives were not unduly disturbed by this development because they
thought LaPollette's chances for the Presidency in 1924 would benefit
if Longworth prevented the passage of needed reform.
In November, 1923, Graham presented the conditions under which
he «,uld pull out of the race and thus ensure Longw^rth's victory.
To offset the domination of New England (a major issue after Calvin
Coolidge became President). Graham demanded that three of the four
Steering Committee vacancies go to the Midwest. Always the pragma-
tist, Longworth quickly pledged to recommend Graham's proposal to
the Committee on Committees and soon had a commitment from the leader-
ship to increase farm bloc strength on the Steering Committee.
Graham then withdrew saying he was satisfied that a Midwestern agri-
culture majority on the Steering Committee would balance the
Ibid.. Nov. 24, 1923, p. 15 and Nov. 25, 1923, p. 4.
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leadership. Graham's withdrawal caused widespread JubUation^^ in
the Republican party for no ^re organization problems were expected,
but the party had reckoned without considering the trap the Progres-
sives were setting.
The Progressives,
.ho had been conferring with LaFollette, wanted
to reorganize several influential co^ittees, particularly the Inter-
state and Foreign Conferee Con^ittee and the Ways and Means Con^ittee,
in order to have a greater voice on taxes, the tariff, and the adjust-
ment of railroad rates. A second den^nd was to reduce the power of
the Rules CoHHuittee to gag the membership. The specific complaint
was that in the last Congress the Rules Committee had refused to re-
port at least thirty measures. One reform the Progressives did not
want was to tamper with seniority because some of them were in line
to become committee chairman in the near future. To gain their ends
the Progressives were prepared to deadlock the House by voting for
their own candidate for Speaker until the Republican leadership
83
agreed to their demands.
At the caucus, Gillett was renominated over token opposition:
Cooper polled fifteen votes. Madden eight, and Edward Little of
82
Ibid., Jan 22, 1923, p. 4; Feb. 12, 1923, p. 15; Aug. 18,
1923, p. 3; Nov. 18, 1923, p. 9; Nov. 23, 1923, p. 19; and Nov. 29,
1923, p. 6,
83
Ibid., Nov. 15, 1923, p. 21; Nov. 19, 1923, p. 1; Nov. 22,
1923, p. 21; Nov. 25, 1923, p. 4; Dec. 1, 1923, pp. 1-2; the La-
Follettes, II, pp. 1066-1067; Hicks, p. 89; Chiu, p. 271; and
Clarence A. Berdahl, "Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress,"
American Political Science Review
,
XLIII (April, 1949), pp.°320-321.
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Kansas one. The ballots for- rr cooper, which were cast by Wisconsin
and Minnesota
.embers, were interpreted as "out a HH tiuea - nd-out anti-Gillett"
voces ^u.
..e H.a.e„
...es .ere eons.e.e.
.^e. e.a.cee..-
With four or five cprt^^^ ^ •
'° C°°P« votes on the House
floor. Longworth was elected hv •by voxce vote with one or two no votes
recorded. When Nelson asked if th.x e caucus vote for Speaker was bind-ing, caucus chairman Anderson rule, tb.h is hat only a special nu^tion would
^ke it so. None was offered wb-fri.t , hich cleared the path for the Pro-
gressive protest on the House floor.
For two days and eight ba^^n^cn llots, twenty-two Republicans steadily
voted for Cooper or Madden fn^ q^^^ior Speaker and successfully stalled the -
election of Cillett as Speaker. Nelson told Longworth that the Pro-
Sressives were willing to drop their demand for better co^^ittee as-
signments if they could be sure thp^ ^b •o at their rule changes would be
voted upon. Longworth refused to budge / arguing that the country
would tire of the Progressives' t.ctics. Kinally, „hen the Pro-
gressives showed no signs of disintegrating, Longworth yielded. The
rules that were adopted set the number of signatures needed on a dls-
charge petition at 150 and Nelson was plaeed, on the Rules Co™ittee.«=
Dec. 2. 1923. p. 1, for both quotations I^his paragraph
Dec
f-^o"" the footnotes, pp. 33-34; NYT, Dee. 4. 1923 p 1-
|en£. (New York: MacMillan Co
.
.T967) ,^7^17 anTio?fi|.~UO-
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Knutson, who voted for Cooper at t-h.u he caucus and on each of the
eight ballots on the flno-r *.u ,oo of the House, was replaced as Whip, ^e
because o. his
.efecUon
.o rhe Progressive ca^ or he have
.e-
-tson
.as first chosen to .e ^Ip he .as ver. conservative,
.url.
the 1930.S his conservatism
.as again apparent
.hen he
.as one of thl
Republicans- ^st articulate opponents of the Ne. Oeal.^^ purther
evidence
.hlch suggests that Knutson's dismissal preceded his all,n-
-nt .1th the Progressives
.ould he that
.ons.orth ,ulte openl. tried
to entice Key far. bloc
.embers to his side by talking about their
fitness to be Whip, and that Knutson had almost lost the office In
1921. Vestal of Indiana replaced Knutson.
in May, 1,24, GUlett announced he planned to run for the Senate
A contest to fill the open Speakership Wdlately began
.1th the
Illinois delegation endorsing Madden for the position. Madden
.as
the Chairman of the Appropriations Co„ittee and a strict fiscal con-
servative. His Chief rival .as Majority Leader Long.orth. Because
Longworth "thre. the .eight of his support to Mr. GlUett, thus con-
tributing in a measure to Che selection of the Massachusetts veteran,""
Long.orth
.as expected to have GlUetfs help,
.hlch in turn .ould
probably bring Coolldge's blessings.
86„
ni„™,bl li ^f""!"'
'"^^ Republicans In a Minority Role, 1933-1938 "(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, state University of Lwa, i960), p 3M.
87
E£L> Nov. 6, 1924, p. 11.
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Ma....
^^^^^^^
CooX.ase „o.Z. neu..: 3.„ce K..
.o„„.,o.H an.
.a..e„ „e.e
ular Republicans with no bleirish on -h.- 88l L
.heir party records"^^ and had
stood by Coolidge on key roll mTicall votes in the last Congress. He
also argued that Madden 's zpaI -r,,e l xn protecting the treasury from raids
by spendthrift Congressmen would guarantee harmony between the House
and the White House. Although Coolidge never publicly e^ressed a
preference, he did work quietly to round up votes for Longworth
-e Martin, then a fresh:.n, for example, recalled voting for Long-
worth at Coolidge 's request.^'
As the caucus approached, the fight hec»,e
.ore bruising as both
Sides tried to win Pennsylvania. The first hint that Pennsylvania
"
was the icey to the outcoMe ca.e when Britt..,,. blasted Senator David
Reed of Pennsylvania for trying to assume
-the
..ntle of Boles
Penrose and the political dictatorship of Pennsylvania. Reed
had convinced two Madden Congressmen in the Pennsylvania delegation
to switch to Longworth. m addition. Senator George Pepper and
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon-both powerful in the Penn-
sylvania Republican party-were working for Longworth while Repre-
sentative WiUian. Vare fought on behalf of Madden. (The real issue
88
Ibid., Nov. 9, 1924, p. 22.
89
McGra„.Sli?l96S).^.^^ ^^"^ ^ ^ii^i^s , (New York:
'W, Feb. 14, 1925, p. 3.
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fiefdo., and the PMla.elpMa crsan.aUon. Va.e's
.o„e
.ase. Va.e
was
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^
ing Reed for
.He Sena.e in
„„,er pressure fro. ^.a.e„
Mellon aeniea cha. He favored Lo„s.or.H and praised Madden's „r.
as Appropriations Chairs as
...ideal....'!
,uho.gH both sides
clai^d to He ^.in, ,.eat inroads into Pennsylvania.
.ong^ortH's
Victory seeded certain „Hen He released
..one of His pledged votes/.^
«ho was under intense pressure from Vare.
While tHe speakership contest was being waged. Jockeying for
the Majority Leadership was occurring si„„ltaneously. Bertrand
Snell of New VorU and John Tilson of Conaecticuf were the leading
contenders. Snell was the Chair^n of the Rules Co^ittee and had
been endorsed by New York for Majority Leader. An early Longworth
supporter. Snell had
..become inactive', and there was gossip He '.had
gone over to the Madden ca^p because of the failure of the Longworth
leaders to slate Hi. for next House leader..." xilson. who was Long-
worth's choice for Majority Leader, was on the Ways and Means Com-
mittee and had briefly aspired to be Speaker. No data exist of a
deal between Longworth and lilson. but it would have been advantageous
to Longvorth to head off Tilson Til^nn tt^„i^l j-b . i iso would have split Longworth's
91
Ibid., Feb. 26, 1925, p. 3.
92
Ibid., Feb. 27, 1925, p. 3.
^^Ibid., Feb. 27, 1925, p. 3, for both quotations about Snell.
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.a.te.„ .upp.„.
^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^
Midwest. ehe caucus
.on^..,
Txlson was unanimously picked for Majority Leader. Vestal con-
, 94txnued as Whip
one voice uncharacterististictly
,uiet in the struggle „as the
Progressives'. Ihe 1924 election had cut sharply into their strength
but the .re l^ortant reason was that Longworth, with Coolidge's
approval, had decided to punish the Progressives who had campaigned
for LaPollette for President in 1924. The Wisconsin delegation of
ten plus Fiorello LaGuardia of New York, Ja.es Sinclair of North
Dakota, and Oscar Keller of Minnesota did not receive invitations
to the Republican caucus that nominated Longworth. Moreover, two
'
tests of party orthodoxy were devised. Unless these thirteen In-
surgents voted for Longworth for Speaker on the House floor and voted
to undo the rules changes they had forced through the House in 1923,
they would be stripped of their conMittee seniority. The Progres-
sives' answer was to vote for Cooper instead of Longworth and to op-
pose the tousher discharge petition Longworth advocated. On the
vote to raise the number of signatures needed for a discharge pe-
tition from 150 to 218, twelve other insurgents Joined the La-
Follette bolters but forty-three Republicans who had voted fc- lib-
eralization in 1923 switched sides in 1925. Longworth ouste Nelson
and James Frear of Wisconsin from the Rules and Ways and Means
p. 306.
94
Ibid-. Feb- 10, 1925, p. 3; Feb. 28. 1925, p. 1; and Chiu,
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ments.
in 1927 fa.„
.^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^
^eir „aJor s.tpe „as
.^.a.
.he SCeerlng Co^Ueee's po„er
.o set
legislative priorities had heen ".surped the 'Bi, Pou.-'^ eon
sistin, o^
.onsworth. Tilson. Snell. an.
.a„es Bess o. Ohio,
.ho was
Longvorth.s campaign
..nager for the Speakership. Although the dis-
sldents never threatened a revolt against Long>.rth. they did favor
postponing the election of the Majority Leader fro. the end of the
dying congress to the start of the new Congress. Ihey hoped the
extra nine months would give the. enough ti.e to organize a
.ove.ent
to depose Tilson. Nevertheless, the eaucus took place as scheduled
'
and Longworth and Tilson were both renominated without opposition,
vestal regained as Whip. On the floor of the House, five Republicans
voted "present" and eighteen were absent in protest of Longworth 's
re-election and his disciplining of the Progressives in the last
Congress,
In 1929 there were some rumors that Tilson' s friends planned to
try to duMp Longworth. but these stories were forcefully scotched
when Tilson said:
gress i^ScL ioU? \. °" ^'^'^ Men^ership in Con-
PP 499 Ifi—^-—^ ^^i^ S^™, XLIII (June, 1949),
ZrJffnl^'\ ""tl ^"^^^If instead votedpresent. Nevertheless, he was disciplined too
96
NYT' Feb. 22, 1927, p. 21.
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vhicVrdo^^ot'"? tTl?'°' speakership.
At the caucus both Longworth and Til,-.S" Uson were again unanimously re-
elected and Vestal continued as Whip.
SUTESEZ °£ the 1919 to 1931 Contests
-e 1919 to 1931
.Jorit. period
.as anoLer tumultous era for
House
^epuhlicans. Xn twelve
.ears the Kepuhlicans
.aged si. Uader-
sh.p contests. (Xahle 15 su™.ri.es the conflict.) Xn 1919 the
.e-
publicans engaged in a major stru..»l„ -ugg e
.or control of the Hons,
Minority Leader and „ithin the Co^ittee on Co...ittees. there
.ere
fierce battles over the Maion>v t^.^ i •n m jority Leadership and Whip, 1923 the
Republicans re-elected OiUett over to.en opposition in the caucus
and a two day deadlock on the floor of the House, in the sa.e year
Longworth
.on the ^,aJority Leadership'^ after the far. bloc gained
control Of the Steering Co,™ittee. and Vestal replaced Knutson a,
"hip. Finally, in 1925. there was a contest over the vacant Speaker-
Ship and some squabbling over the Majority Leadership. I„ 1,21 and
1927 there
.ere threats of revolts but no contests took place.
3e ma-
;e as
Ibid., Feb. 23, 1929, p.
98,
ed direcafbv'^hr' ''''' Republican Majority Leader to be Plect-a rectiy y the caucus. Between 1919 And f-u ^ • ^-^ecc
Conimittees had picked the Maioritv tI!; tl Committee on
overrule their choice The iJ^^n ^
although the caucus could
by the Con^ittee^^^^c"JtteS^Snt^rLl^^ ^^^^^^^
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TABLE 15
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1919-1931
Year
1919
1921
1923
Status of Post
Vacancy
(Party became
Majority)
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
What Happened
1925 Vacancy
1927
1929
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
Speaker
Contest-settled by
caucus vote.
No Contest
Contest-minor op-
position in caucus;
Progressives dead-'
locked Speakership
vote for 2 days and
8 ballots on House
floor.
Contest-2 candi-
dates; settled by
caucus vote; 12
Progressives voted
for another candi-
date on House floor.
No Contest
No Contest
Majority Leader
Outcome
Gillett elected.
Gillett re-
elected.
Gillett re-
elected; Liberal
discharge pe-
tition adopted
and some Progres-
sives got. better
committee assign-
ments
.
Longworth elected;
Discharge peti-
tion made harder
to use; Progres-
sives disciplined.
Long^^orth re-
elected
.
Longworth re-
elected.
1919
1921
Vacancy Contest-in Commit- Mondell elected,
tee on Committees; 2
ballots, split vote
No Vacancy No Contest Mondell re-elected.
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1923
1925
1927
1929
1919
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
TABLE 15 (continued)
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1919-1931
^-joritv Leader
Vacancy
(Mondell defeated
in 1922 election).
Vacancy
(Longworth elect-
ed Speaker)
.
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy
Contest-all but one
candidate withdrew
before caucus.
No Contest-Snell
was interested but
mounted no real cam-
paign after re-
ceiving N.Y. endorse-
ment.
No Contest-talk of
revolt but no action.
No Contest
Longworth elect-
ed; Farm bloc
gained repre-
sentation on
Steering Committee.
Tilson elected.
Whit
Contest in Commit-
tee on Committees
between three can-
didates.
No Contest-talk of
dropping incumbent,
but no action.
Whip replaced
No Contest
No Contest
No Contest
Tilson re-
elected.
Tilson re-elected,
Knutson elected.
Knutson re-
elected.
Vestal elected.
Vestal re-elected.
Vestal re-electedc
Vestal re-elected.
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Despite the number of conte«^» ^sts, turnover was not exceptional
with t.o speakers, three Hajorit. headers, an. two *ips. however
the turnover was uneven!, aiviaed with all the leadership changes'
^onsworth. lilson. and Vestal held office. The onl, leadership
chan.es that resulted fro. the contests were Mann's displace^nt as
leader and possihl, Knutson-s removal as .Mp.
.iUett voluntarily
relinquished the Speakership to run for the Senate; Mondell lost hi.
seat in the 1922 election; and Longworth advanced fro. Majority
Leader to Speaker.
The early outlines of the De„«>crats- carefully notched leader-
ship ladder were beginning to evolve in the 1920.s. but exao^les of
Republicans advancing routinely fro. lower to higher party posts
were scarce in this period. Only Longworth
..naged to cli.b fro.
Majority Leader to Speaker and his advancement was hotly contested.
Minority Leader Mann failed in his bid to secure the Speakership
even though Reed had been able to .»ke the Jump twice-in 1889 and
1895. Between 1919 and 1931 the Republicans preferred to recruit
their Speaker and Majority Leader from influential House committees
rather than use a series of apprenticeships in lower party offices.
GiUett and Mondell. for example, were both members of the Appropria-
tions Comiaittee when they were elected Speaker and Majority Leader
in 1919 whereas Longworth and Tilson had both served on the Ways
and Means Committee before being tapped to be Majority Leader. The
Whips, in contrast, were recruited from minor committees. Knutson
,
prior to his election, had been a member of the Immigration and
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Natu„U.a«o„ Co™,....
^^^^^^
as ehe C.a.™a„
^^^^^^^^
-e. NeUHe. w.,p
..3 eve. ^„«o.ed as a possible ca„.«ate fc.
higher office «hen a vacancy arose. Possiblv th»r sitiiy e great gap In ex-
perience and seniority between the highest partv 1 hl a c y leaders and the
Whips precluded their advancement.
intervention fro. other Republican leaders again typified Re-
publican contests. U the Presidential level. Coolidge lined up votes
for Longworth for Speaker and his Secretary of the Treasury. Mellon
seems to have participated in the fight on Longworth's behalf also
senate participation, after declining in the Minority years, again
was common: in 1919 kf>v Qomo*-^ t -li'iy ey Senate leacers along with the Republican
National Co^ittee Chairman helped Gillett beat Mann; in 1923 La-
FoUette coordinated Progressive protests in the Senate and the
House; and in 1925 Pennsylvania Senators pressured Congressmen from
their state to back Longworth. The New York Tte. claims that Sena-
tors from New York and Ohio were also responsible for bringing votes
to the Longworth cause, but the Times does not provide any specifics."
One difference with the former Majority interval is that although or-
ganizations like the Prohibitionists continued to make their opinions
kno™ about competing leadership candidates, lobbyists for corpora-
tions and other major business interests no longer seemed to partici-
pate In the armtwisting and bargaining involved in the contests.
99
Congressional Director: for the 65th. 66th, and 67th Congresses.
^°°NYI, March 3, 1925, p. 16.
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^SSteis of the Variables
, 1919 to 1931
Majoritv-Mlaorj>,, status MAinr-jf-„ .^ 2_£ . ajority status again coincided with
frequent contests in the Republican DarLv r ' ^P J-ica p ty. Compared with the minority
interlude, the total number of fipht-c •" o t ghts increased from three to six
but because the contests of the 191, .o 1931 era clustered into three
congresses, the rate of conflict dropped. Between 1911 and 1919 con-
tests flared in 75 per cent of the Congresses but between 1919 and
1931 contests erupted in only 50 per cent of f-h= r3 ^ t the Congresses, a figure
so^what higher than the 37.5 rate for 1895-1911 ^jority Congresses.
The si.e of the n^jority party again was relevant in forecasting
fights, conflict tended to be .ore coM.on as the size of the party
neared 50 per cent. As Table 16 shows, there were no fights when
the Republicans held 60 per cent or more of the House seats, one
fight when the party held between 55 and 59.9 per cent of the seats,
and two fights when the Republicans had their lowest ratio of seats.
TABLE 16
REPUBLICAN COmESTS AND PARTY SIZE, 1919-1931
Z of Republican Seats # of Congresses # of Contests
60% or over 9^
0
55% to 59.9 1
^
50% to 54.9 3
^
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returns. The rel.u„„,Mp
.ee„een election returns
and con^etUlon in this period
... Inconclusive. The 1919 and 1923
contests folWd election victories of moderate proportions (al-
tHoush the 1919 victor, „as Important
.e.ond the raw nu^ers because
the Republicans were restored to
.^jority status), but the 1923
fight developed after the Republicans suffered their biggest set
bac. Of the era. (See Table 17). The conflict-free Congresses fol-
lowed a slMlar pattern with 1921 and 1929 coinciding with upswings
with a minor loss of scats.
TABLE 17
REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS, 1919-1931
Year # of House
Seats Won
Change from Pre-
vious Election
% of Republican Seats
When Congress Opened
1919 240 +30 54.7
1921 303 +63 69.2
1923 225
-78 51.7
1925 247 +22 56.3
1927 237
-10 54.5
1929 267 +30 61.4
indicates a contest
re-
Membersh ip change. Membership change also showed no clear
lationship with leadership conflict in the Republican party between
1919 and 1931. As Table 18 indicates, the 1919 and 1925 contests
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TABLE 18
REPUBLICS CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1919-1931
Year
% New Members
7o Incumbents
.1919
29.0 71.0
1921
69.1
1923
20.0 80.0
1925 24.1 75.9
1927 13.5 86.5
1929 21.0 79.0
indicates a contest
occurred when turnover was rising but the 1923 brawl took place even
though 80 per cent of the Republican members had been re-elected to
the House. The Congresses without leadership disputes, however,
showed the identical pattern. In two of these Congresses-1921 and
1929-the composition of the party was undergoing increased changes,
but in 1927 the turnover rate of 13.5 per cent was the lowest in
this period.
Hierarchy. The 1919 and 1925 contests coincided with larger
freshman classes, which were also characteristic of Republican con-
flict between 1895 and 1911. The 1923 fight, however, was associated
with a sizeable drop in the percentage of freshman members. Con-
gresses marked by the absence of leadership fights continued to show
the same profile as the contest years: in 1921 and 1929 there were
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f.esh„e„ than m .he p.ecedi.s Congresses,
.ue In 1,27 fresh-
men were very scarce. See Table 19 for the details.
TABLE 19
REPUBLICS CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1919-1931
Year
/o rresnmen % Seniors
1919
26.1 14.7
1921
26.9 13,6
1923
18.6 20.0
1925
20.4 24.5
1927 11.4 29.5
1929
17.2 32.5
indicates a contest.
With seniority, the lack of a relationship continued, m two
of the contest Congresses, 1923 and 1925, veteran Republicans were
expanding, reminiscent of Republican struggles before 1911, but the
1919 fight occurred when the proportion of senior members was declin-
ing, a trait common in Democratic clashes. However, when the stable
Congresses are checked, two-1927 and 1929-were also characterized
by growing ranks of senior Republicans while in 1921, after the
Harding sweep, the percentage of veteran Republicans had declined.
factionalism. Regional factionalism again seemed rele-
vant in predicting Republican combat. The fights tended to occur
when the Midwest picked up seats. For example, as Table 20 demonstrates,
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TABLE 20
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND REGIONAL FACTIONS. 1919-1931
Year % Midwest 7o East 7o West 7o South and Border
.1919 45.4 36.6 9.2
i)caces
8.8
1921 41.2 35.9 9.6 13.3
1923 44.9 36.9 10.7 7.6
1925 42.4 37.9 10.2 9.4
1927 43.5 38.0 11.0 7.6
1929 41.6 34.5 10.5 13.5
,
indicates a contest
in 1919, after the Midwestern delegation rose from 43.3 per cent to
45.4 per cent and in 1923 after a 3.7 per cent increase, contests
followed. The 1925 battles, however, deviated from this pattern for
it followed a slight drop in Midwestern seats. Stability, in turn,
tended to coincide with declining Midwestern power although 1927 was
an exception.
Ideological factionalism
. Ideological cleavages in the Repub-
lican party also continued to be valuable in explaining the leader-
ship conflict. As Table 21 illustrates, although the Progressives
were losing ground in the Republican paity in the 1920 's, they held
the balance of power in the House between the Democratic minority
and the Republican majority in 1919, 1923, and 1927. Except for
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TABLE 21
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND THE PROGRESSIVES, 1919-1931
Year # of Pro-
gressives
% of Pro-
gressives publicans
# of GOP de-
fections needed
for a deadlock
1919 24 10.1 238 24
1921 29 Q C
301 85
1923 32 14.2 225 9
1925 27 11.0 245 32
1927 29 12.2 237 21
1929 30 11.2 267 55
indicates a contest
1927, there was a leadership contest at the start of the other two
Congresses. In 1927, for the first time in a quarter of a century,
there was no fracas even though the Progressives had enough votes to
deadlock the House. Why 1927 should vary from the general trend is
an intriguing question. Part of the answer perhaps lies with Long-
worth's decision to discontinue the Mann and Gillett policy of treat-
ing dissidents leniently in order to entice them back to party regu-
larity. Longworth's decision to use the stick rather than the carrot
to gain party unity may have temporarily cooled the Progressives'
ardor for revolt. A second factor was that for the Progressives to
win concessions from the Republican leadership on revising the rules
or passing more liberal legislation, they needed the cooperation of
183
;
— :,07 u„.n
^He .e.oc..;...
S.nUat.onal sUUIs. Ho.se Progressives Have si^l, Xac.ed the
incentive to mobillEe themselves.
in addition to tHe Progressives-regular split, the Republicans
were deeply divided alona a rural „vk,x g -urban or an agriculture-business
Cleavage during roost of the 1920's as the for^tlon of the farm bloc
indicates. From its organization in Hay. 1921. until 1929. the farm
bloc was the largest dissident group within the Republican party
Estl^tes of its Size range as High as one hundred votes^"! although
"
on organizational matters a more realistic count is probably seventy
to eighty members. The far. bloc was a significant faction at the
start of three Congressea-1923. 1925. and 1927^°^.and in two of
these congresses leadership fights erupted with the far., bloc play-
ing at least a supporting role. In 1923 the farm bloc ran Graham
for Majority Leader and in 1925 Madden, although not sponsored by the
T^or estimates of farm bloc streneth for rh^ «7n, ^
iofC ; Congress, see NYI, Nov. 18, 1923 d 9- for th«69th Congress see the roll call vSt^s on the McNary-Haig!; Srm re-lief bills and commentary In Ripley, Majoritv Party LeadSshiu incongress, pp. 114 and 116; and for thrlStlSt ^e^fsfi^if^the
Ir'Lsur" 'of CO* f '"""^ and Cog:t tu n v :
102,
Jones, pp. 118 and 120.
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bloc.
..e„
..e „aJo.i., o. His ei,..,.,..e
identical nu^er of vote, as the eighty Oraha™ „as expected to dra„
he Had p..sued His candidac. to tHe caucus) f.o. UHnoU. Kansas
Nebraska, Minnesota, South Dakota .r.^ t ^ •
]^Q3
, and Indiana, the heart of the
farmland. iqo7 ^i.In 1927 the farm bloc considered contesting lilson's
re-election as Majority Leader hut was possihly deterred fro. push-
ing ahead with the rebellion by Longworth's punitive action against
the Progressives in the last Congress.
in short, between 1919 and 1931. in three of the four cases in
«I.ich the far. bloc was a ^jor force within the Republican ™e:*er-
ship in the House and/or when the Progressives had enough votes to
delay the regulars' organization of the House, a contest developed
over the Republican leadership, m contrast. In 1921 and 1929, when
the Republicans had such huge ^jorities that they were invulnerable
to Progressive sniping and enjoyed greater party unity-Julius Turner
calculates Republican cohesion for 1921 as 74.4"Aand Hoover took
the steam out of far,
,
bloc demands in 1929 by presenting His own farm
103, ,
~
^°"SW°'''h released very accurate state by state estimates ofhis support. When the actual New York and Pennsylvania votr^whichLongworth underestlnated) are added to Longworth's estij^es thefigure comes very close to the 140 votes cist at the c^us fofLongworth. The geographical distribution of Madden's support caneasily be calculated from the Longworth count. See NYT, Lb! 8
p. 2 for LongwortH's tabulations and NYT. Nov "23 1923 d 19
tZ ""f^ °^ Graham's strength prior —his withdrawal fromne iy^j contest.
10^urner, p. 21.
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105relief measures t j , .no leadership fights occurred.
SSaa-nce. M:en GiUett. an Easterner.
„as Speaker, the
Majority Leader and >*ip „ere f.o. the Midwest or West. In 1925
When Longworth
.ecan. speaker, the Majority Leadership vent to an
Easterner with a Midwestemer as >*ip. before, the Kepnhlican
leadership showed careful geographical balance between the dominant
regions. But the Republicans continued to exclude dissidents-aether
Progressives or far. bloc me^ers-fro™ the for^l leadership posts
Although GiUett campaigned as a liberal and Longworth advocated re-
forming the rules in 1919. neither can be classified by any stretch
of the i^gination as an insurgent. At
..st, Gillett was a moderate,
which was more a consequence of his personality and position on pro-
'
cedural questions than on substantive policy issues. Longworth was
a conservative, whose willingness to revoke the Progressives' com-
mittee seniority underlines his attitude toward strict party regular-
ity. The only question mark Is Knutson who sided «Lth the Progres-
sives in 1923 and 1925. Tl,e only two references that pinpoint his
ideological views, though widely separated in time, are consistent
in calling Knutson a conservative. Knutson inay have voted with the
Progressives on organizational matters merely because he resented
being dropped as Whip rather than because of any real sympathy for
the Progressives' goal.
Jones, p. 121.
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21 the Variables . 1919 to 1931
only Chree variables correlated „leh the leadership contest
this tl.e period: the size of the party, regional factions.
Ideological Cleavages. Mghts tended to occur when the Republicans
held only a slight edge over the Democrats. *e„ Midwestern repre-
mentation was Increasing, and when the ideological fragmentation in
the party was „„st severe. T^ese three variables are strongly Inter-
connected. Most Of the dissidents were fro. the Midwest and the tiny
Progressive band deliberately chose to compete when the Republicans
had their s:^llest majorities in order to :„axi.l.e their Influence.
Thus, It was no accident that the contests developed when the Repub-
licans held less than 55 per cent of the House seats. The variable.
"
however, that seemed most important in producing the conflict was
the deep and persistent disunity over domestic issues. As in the
1911 to 1919 period, the Ideological splintering appeared vastly
more Important than the regional competitiveness in causing the bat-
ties. The Midwest was too fragmented by economics to act as a bloc
on organizational matters In the 1920 's. The eastern areas of the
Midwest, especially Ohio and Michigan which were toportant manu-
facturing centers, tended to side with the business-oriented East
In leadership quarrels wiiereas Wisconsin Republicans, although
sharing the concern of the farm bloc on the plight of agriculture,
took much more radical stands on Issues such as the public owner-
ship of Muscle Shoals and the reduction of the tariff and went their
own way on leadership disputes. Rather than work out compromises
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and Share the leadership posts-perhaps the various segments of the
party were too far apart for concillatlon-the competing Republican
factions preferred to engage in bitter fights for control of the
party. Before 1925 the insurgents gained so,„e important victories
although they were never strong enough to elect one of their own,
but beginning with 1925 the regulars under Long>,orth's firm and
skillful leadership reasserted their dominance in the House of
Representatives.
SumniarY 1895-1931
Between 1895 and 1931 the Republicans skirmished over the leader-
ship in nine out of eighteen Congresses. The pace of internal con-
flict stepped up during the minority years, with clashes in 75 per
cent of the Congresses as compared with fights in slightly over
40 per cent of the Congresses during the majority intervals. Com-
parison with the Democrats in the same time period reveals that the
Republicans were more prone to conflict as both a majority and a
minority party than the Democrats. All six of the Democratic up-
heavals occurred during the minority years, which means that the
Democrats as a minority fought in the identical nuiaber of Congres-
ses as the Republican majority, which had been expected to be less
combative, Thus, before the New Deal, party was a more important
determinant of leadership conflict than majority or minority status,
but V7ithin each party, leadership struggles were more common during
the minority years.
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The conditions that correlated with the Republican conflict
and account for the fre.uent battles were: 1) an election loss-
2) less than 55 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives;
3) increased .e.bership turnover; 4) an expanding fresh^nan class;
5) a growing body of senior ne:nbers; 6) a rise in Midwestern repre-
sentation; and 7) a large dissident bloc (at least 25 per cent of
the Republican mei^ership in the House) or an i^roven^ent in the
dissidents' strategic position. Although each of these traits char-
acteri.ed at least six of the clashes, no swingle condition was present
in ever^ fi^. However, when the regional and ideological variables
are conjoined, factionalism does appear to be a necessary correlate
of the conflict in this era. Table 22 first lists the Congresses
"
characterized by increased Midwestern representation, then those in
vhich the Progressives had enough votes to block the regulars' or-
ganization of the House, and finally those Congresses in which at
least one-fourth of the Republicans belonged to the farm bloc or
were Progressives. The ten Congresses in which one or more of these
three measures of factionalism was present included every contest
year plus 1927, when a challenge to Majority Leader Tilson was con-
templated but not pursued by the farm bloc. In other words, when
either the Midwest was gaining seats or the dissident faction was
large or capable of disrupting the organization of the House, there
was a 90 cent chance of a contest in the Republican party. When
none of these conditions occurred, no contest developed betv/een
1895 and 1931.
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TABLE 22
FACTIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP CONFLICT
IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1931
Rising Midwestern
Representation
Progressives Had the
Votes to Deadlock
the House
Progressives or Farm
Bloc COTrmncorl OK"/
More of Party
1899
1903 1903
1909
1911
1911
1913
1917 1917
1919 1919
1923 1923 1923
1925
1927 1927 1927
indicates a contest
As for the other conditions that correlated with the Republican
contests, some of these variables may have exerted an independent
iinpact in particular cases. For example, as noted earlier, the
growing number of veterans angry about having their careers wrecked
by Cannon's committee reassignment s or about having their bills
pigeonholed by the Rules Committee likely encouraged the battles of
1909 and 1923. Most of the time, however, variables such as election
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defeats o. larger frestaan classes helpe. produce ^he conflict
bringing a.out changes In the relative positions of the regional
and Ideological factions. An election downsUde. for Instance.
usually increased the Midwest's strength .'n ry.c m the party because of
the ^ny safe districts In that region, m 1899. a large m
Midwestern seats encouraged the Midwest to challenge the East's long
hold on the leadership, m other years, a rise In Midwestern repre-
sentatlon au^ented the Insurgent wing of the party as well. One
striking difference with the Democratic party is the role of
.ember-
ship change in the Republican contests, m the Democratic party
before 1931 the typical clash was preceded by a massive influx of
new r^ers. Because the party was so strongly skewed in a Southern,"
conservative direction as a minority, large scale changes seemed
necessary to produce conflict, m the Republican party, although
more freshmen and higher turnover were usually attributes of the
contests, the amount of membership change was not as dramatic as in
the Democratic party. Smaller shifts in the Republican membership
seemed to be sufficient to alter the factional alignments.
In sum. the Republicans were a deeply fragmented and very com-
petitive party before 1931. As Peabody noted, after World War II
the Democrats, despite the gulf separating Northerners and South-
erners, have been able to overcome the severe cleavage by picking
moderate leaders. The Republicans, during their long majority
years, however, were not able to reach such an accomnBdation. Al-
though the Republicans were very sensitive to regional divisions
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in the pa«y and suc.eeOea i„ heading off
.e.ietl,
.egional
.^wls
after ea.efuU.
.alanc.., Uade.sh.p slates „.tH Basterne.
and Mid„esten>ers. they did
.ot forge a. equally satisfactory co.-
pro^se for dealing with the ideological factionalisn.. possibly
because there were so few ^derates in the Rep.hlican party who
could genuinely act as brokers between the disputing wings. Con-
se,ue„tly, in congress after Congress, al^st without interruption
fro. 1909 through 1925. House Republicans were torn apart by leader-
ship contests that reflected the ideological strife.
CHAPTER IV
LEADERSHIP CHAKGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1931-1955
Leadership Conflict
. 1931-1941
As the depression worsened. Democratic fortunes began to rebound
starting with the 1930 Congressional elections. Running well in
Border States that had defected to Hoover in 1928 and in the Midwest,
the Democrats picked up fifty-six seats in the House of Representa-
tives and eight seats in the Senate. By the time the new Congress
convened, the Democrats had won enough additional seats in special
elections to have wrested control of the House of Representatives
away from the Republicans for the first time since 1919.
As the new majority party, the Democrats had a Speaker and a
Majority Leader to elect. The two principal candidates for Speaker
were Minority Leader John Nance Garner of Texas and Henry T. Rainey
of Illinois, the most senior Northern Democrat. With Rainey's con-
sent, Senator-elect James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois began seeking
votes for Rainey among Western liberals and the Tammany organization.
The Texas delegation, in turn, recognized Rainey as Garner's chief
threat and urged him to back Garner for the Speakership. Although
there is no record of the negotiations between Garner and Rainey, by
mid
-March, 1931, an accord seems to have been reached in which Rainey
relinquished his bid for the Speakership in return for Garner's help
in becoming Majority Leader.
Robert A. Waller, "Congressman Henry T. Rainey of Illinois- His
Rise to the Speakership, 1903-1934," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Illinois, 1963), pp. 326-28.
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In spite of Garner's support for Rainey, there were a host of
other candidates for Majority Leader. Other Northerners who were in-
terested included John O'Connor of New York and William A. Ayres of
Kansas. Among the Southerners campaigning hard were John McDuffie of
Alabama, the^Whip; Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee; and John Rankin of
Mississippi. McDuffie and O'Connor were Rainey's most formidable
rivals. McDuffie was the candidate of the Garner clique if not of
Garner himself and O'Connor's candidacy was a bargaining gambit for
the New York delegation, which was demanding more recognition and
threatening to boycott the vote on Speaker. Without New York's votes,
the Democrats would not be able to organize the new House.
^
To assure his own election and to keep faith with Rainey, Garner
began to wheel and deal. First, he met with Tammany boss John Curry
and promised Ne^v York better committee assignments, including an ad-
ditional seat on Ways and Means and the Chairmanship of the Immi-
gration Committee. Curry agreed that New York would vote against the
creation of a Steering Committee, (an idea advocated by Rainey and
Ayres) and presumably pledged that he would try to discourage O'Connor's
4
candidacy. Next, Garner turned his attention to the Southerners.
2
New York Times (hereafter NYT ) , Nov. 14, p. 2; Nov. 21, 1931
p. 5. '
'
3
Waller, pp. 329-330; Richard Boiling, Power iji the House , A
History of the Leadership of the House of Representatives
, (New York-
E. P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 146; NYT, Nov. 16, 1931, p. 6.
^NYT
, Nov. 22, 1931, p. 1.
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Arguing that the Notth was entitled to «.e leadership posts, Garner
persuaded MeBuffle to re^ln as whip rather than pursue the Majority
Leadership, m ,uick succession, he convinced Byrns to withdraw
fro™ the Majority Leadership contest in return for the Chalr^nship
of the Appropriations Con^ittee and talked Rankin into bowing out of
the race by offering him the Veterans Co^lttee Chairmanship.
^
•
Charles Crisp of Georgia resented Garner's tactics and insistence
on a Northern Majority Leader. He considered entering the race hi.-
self because
The South has always backed the Democratic Presi-dential nominee, but it is only seldom that theNorth does. Wlien the Republicans are in control,the South does not have a chance. Vny should theDemocrats hand over part of their leadership tothe North when in power? The Northerners neverhand anything over to the South.
^
Nevertheless, after Crisp conferred with Garner and other Southern
leaders, he decided not to run. At, the caucus. Garner and Rainey
were elected without opposition and McDuffie was reappointed Whip.
Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory, Garner's election to
the Vice Presidency, and the enormous infusion of freshman Democrats
set the stage for a wild leadership battle in 1933. Tlie earliest
contender for the Speakership was McDuffie, who in the summer of 1932
began gathering endorsements from the Alabama legislature and press
in order to deter the possible candidacy of his Alabama colleague,
5
Ibid., Nov. 24, 1931, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1931, p. 5; Nov. 26, 1931,
p. 20.
'
^Ibid.
, Nov. 11, 1931, p. 5.
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Joh. Ba:*heaa. other Southern hopefuls were Byrns and Ran.ln., Ma-
jority Leader Rainey was the fore^st Northern candidate. The the»e
of Raws campaign was that since the election results had
.Iven
.he North a two-to-one edge over the South in the House, a Northerner
ought to he speaker. Moreover, as a llheral. Raine, argued that he
was compatible with Roosevelt, but at the sa„e ti.e his rural Mid-
western background would complement Roosevelt's urban. Eastern ties.
Finally, Rainey. who was slated to become «ays and Means Chairman,
thought he should be pronoted because of precedent.'
Four of the Democratic Speakers since the Forty-seventh Congress had been elevated from the post
,
of majority leader and a fifth from 'actlno'
majority leader, m all other cases without ex-ception, the Speaker had been selected from theranking member of the Ways and Means Committee
Precedent doubly favored the selection ofRamey.
Because of the North's overwhelming margin, the Southern candi-
dates needed to corral some Northern votes. McDuffie, a foe of estab-
lishing a Steering Coiiniittee in past battles, did an about-face and
favored the creation of one in 1933. Byrns advocated giving the North
better committee assignments and pointed out that he was no Johnny-
come-lately on the Steering Committee issue. In addition, both Byrns
and McDuffie trekked to New York to confer with Curry, who claimed he
1932,^p!^lr'
—
'
P- ^'
o
Waller, p. 359.
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was neutral
.ut also volunteered that He woula
.e .u^e. Ma,o.
Frank Hague of Jersey City.^
in the North. Ralney's
.ost serious obstacle was the New VorU
delegation. Both O'Connor and Iho^s CuUen were Interested m
leadership posts. 0-Connor had hacking In Massachusetts while CuUen
was put forward late in the i-ano k,. n, mrace by the Tannnany chieftains in case of
a caucus deadlock, xhe New York = ^strategy was to vote for CuUen until
the second or third ballot and then switch to the candidate offering
the best deal on patronage and leadership posts,
.ainey dispatched
Mayor Anton Cern^k of Chicago and Governor-elect Henry Horner of
Illinois to bargain on his behalf with the Ta™y leaders." To at-
tract southern support to his candidacy and particularly to undercut
'
McDuffle. Rainey's camp approached Bankhead to run for Majority Leader
on a Rainey-Bankhead ticket. Bankhead. however, refused because he
did not want to jeopardise McDuffie's chances for the Speakership in
11
any way.
In a counter:nove, the Southern candidates for Speaker encouraged
"favorite son" candidacies for Speaker araong Midwesterners to split
Rainey's potential votes. Arthur Greenwood of Indiana and Robert
Grosser of Ohio were prominent examples. There was also talk of a
^Ea.> Nov. 17, 1932, p. 11; Nov. 18, 1932, p. 3; Nov 28 1932
p. 2; Dec. 1, 1932, p. 2; Dec. 26, 1932, p. 1.
'
'
and F\'b!^^^:'l9'33''p: f^' '
'''''
'
'
''''
'
^' «^
Dec. 28, 1932, p. 2; Feb. 2, 1933, p. 2.
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Southern Speaker-Northern Majority Leader slate."
The biggest plum any contender could hope for in 1933 was
Roosevelt', personal endorsement. Rumors abounded that the adminis-
tratlon favored McDuffie, but both Roosevelt and Postmaster General
James Farley strenuously denied these stories. Garner was definitely
in McDuffie's corner, but his Impact was minimized by Roosevelt's
hands off policy. '^"^
Shortly before the caucus met, Rainey announced a complicated
deal in which he would be elected Speaker with help from B>.:ns,
Tammany, and the Texas delegation. Byrns, in turn, would be backed
by Rainey's adherents for Majority Leader. Byrns' advancement ap-
pealed to the Texas delegation because James P. Buchanan of Texas
would replace Byrns as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee.
Finally, Cullen of New York would be named Assistant Majority Leader,
a new office. Unstated but also part of the pact was that New York
would get more patronage. The McDuffie camp, stunned by the an-
nouncement, had only a few hours in which to regroup. Their main
hope was that the sheer number of trades would backfire.
At the caucus Rainey defeated McDuffie 166 votes to 112. Rankin
also polled twenty votes. McDuffie received support from Bankhead,
Sam Rayburn of Texas, and the Massachusetts delegation. In the
balloting for Majority Leader, Byrns was elected 151 to 140 votes
12
Ibid., Dec. 14, 1932, p. 13; Dec. 30, 1932, p. 3.
13
Waller, pp. 361-62; NYT, Dec. 1, 1932, p. 2; Mar. 1, 1933,
p. 2.
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over Bankhead. „ho. the McDuffie forces had decided to run after
Rainey
' s announcement
.
in the after^th, Greenwood replaced McDuffle as whip. :x.ri„,
the ca^algn. Greenwood had been contacted h, Rainey allies with the
-ssage that Rainey was favorably disposed toward Greenwood's leader,
ship ambitions. Greenwood had urged his followers to back Rainey
but Whether Greenwood had been promised the Whip specifically or given
a .ore vaguely worded pledge of good treatment Is unclear. Grosser,
the other favorite son who threatened Rainey's hold on Midwestern
support, was rewarded with the Chairmanship of the newly created
Steering Committee. "''^
In August, 1934, Rainey unexpectedly died. The Democrats de-
cided to postpone the election of the new Speaker until January, 1935,
«hen the next Congress opened. The .ost logical no„,inee was Majority
Leader Byrns, but his pronation was challenged by Bankhead and Ray-
burn, who picked up the n^ntle of the Garner coterie when McDuffie
deferred to Bankhead. There were several minor candidates also,
including Rankin. Byrns. like Rainey, argued that he should succeed
to the Speakership because of precedent. Moreover, many of the fresh-
men felt indebted to Byrns because of the hard work he had done as
Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Bankhead
privately said he would settle for Majority Leader if sectionalism
^W. Mar. 3. 1933. pp. 1 and 3; Waller, p. 364.
Ibid
. ,
Mar. 4, 1933, p. 4.
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-St deee^ine. co.petlto.. Raybu.„.3 greatest asset „as Gatnet
«ho ,u.etl. Helped
.o^d up votes
..t co,Ud
.ot ta.e a .ote pu.lL
role because of Roosevelt's neutrality."
The large, pivotal Pennsylvania delegation was the key to the
outcome, under pressure f.o. Senator-elect
.oseph P. Ou«ey and
David Lawrence, DeInocr3^^v o^-o^-^ u •
,
mocratic state chairman, the Pennsylvania delega-
tion caucused early, agreed to act as a unit to increase its lever-
age in the outcome, and decided to support Byrns for Speaker, with
Byrns assured of victory, Rayburn withdrew saying
•l am no longer a candidate for Speaker,
niere are no alibis. Under the circum-
stances I cannot be elected. '17
Following the Pennsylvania decision, attention switched to the
Majority Leader contest. Bankhead was the leading contender but the
list of hopefuls was long, ranging fro., John McCormack of Massachu-
setts to O'Connor and James Mead, also of New York. Many Democrats
preferred a Northerner for the post in order to emphasize the
national scope of the party, but several senior Northerners, who
were more Interested in legislative "results rather than sectional
18
considerations," spearheaded the drive for Bankhead. Claiming that
16
,
.ISii-' 22, 1934. p. 18; Aug. 24. 1934. p. 9; Aug. 25 1934
V/9 l93':,]'f: '''' 1"4 p.'"
'
17_ ^ .
^C. Dwight Borough, Mr. Sam, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 253.
18
NYT, Dec. 26, 1934, p. 10.
Bankheaa was pop.la.. a. able pania:„e„.aria„. an. a "suave paclfUr "
his backers argued that such sUiUs would be valuable for a leader
trying to unite the party behind Roosevelt's reform, slowly Ban,,
head began to put together a coalition of votes. His support 1„ the
south was nearly solid since his only Southern rival was Rankin, and
in the North, Ohio co^itted two-thirds of Us ballots to him,
Pennsylvania pledged half of Its votes, and a group of Congressmen
from Kansas. Nebraska, and Oklahoma asked freshmen to align with
200
19
20
Bankhead
.
At the caucus, Byrns was easily elected Speaker but two ballots
were required to decide the contest for Majority Leader. On the
first round, Bankhead ^.dth 140 votes had a wide lead over his six
rivals. The rest of the count showed O'Connor with fifty-four votes.
Rankin with thirty-three, Adolph Sabath of Illinois with thirty-three^
McCormack with twenty-one, Mead with twenty-one, and William Arnold
of Illinois with five. On the second ballot, Bankhead won.^^
Ibid.
20
NTT, Dec. 11, 1934, p. 5; Dec. 14, 1934, p. 8: Dec 16 1934
p. 31; Dec. 23, 1934, p. 2; Dec. 28, 1934, p. {3^ De^. 'o! 1934 p!'2.
21^,
H-^ r^^" ^' P- ^^^^ light of the contest thatdid not efrect the outcome of the fight was that Bankhead had a
severe heart attack before the caucus. Only a few close friends knewthe truth and were able to keep the information secret until after the
caucus. Bc.nkhead was in the hospital when the Democrats elected himMajority Leader. See Walter J. Heacock's, "William B. Bankhead and
the New Deal," Journaj. of Southern History. XXI, (August, 1955), pp.347-369, for an account.
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Patrick Bolana of Pennsylvania replaced Greenwood as Whip, ap-
parently a payoff to Cuffey for His crucial help in electing Byrns
to the Speakership.^^
in June, 1936, eighteen
.onths after Byrns won the Speakership
he suddenly died. Within twelve hours of his death, Bankhead was
unani^^usly pro^ted to the Speakership. The election of a new Ma-
jority Leader was delayed until the start of the next Congress and
during the intervening six :nonths a fight heated up. Rules Chainnan
O'Connor was the acting Majority Leader during the interi. and he was
eager to keep the post per^nently. m his bid for the job he had
two ^najor liabilities. First, he had difficulty uniting the New York
delegation behind his candidacy because Mead was also interested and
there were splits anx^ng the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan factions.
Second, although O'Connor had fought for the election of a liberal
to the House leadership in 1931 to balance Garner and McDuffie's
conservatism, by 1936 O'Connor hirnself had begun to move to the right.
Roosevelt and other New Dealers were concerned that the President's
program would be stymied if O'Connor became Majority Leader.
O'Connor's staunchest foe was Rayburn. Rayburn was expected
to do well with "the older House faction"^^ that had been the base
22
NYT., Jan. 5, 1935, p. 4; Randall Ripley, Party Leader s in theHouse of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: Bro^k^s-l^^ilTtuiio—
1967), p. 55.
23
J^ne 5, 1936, p. 2; June 6, 1936, p. 3; Nov. 15, 1936,
p. 28; Dorough, p. 253. > »
^^NYT, Aug. 1, 1936, p. 4.
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of Garner
-s power and his i^,.
^berals had l^roved after he
crushed a priory opponent put up hy private utility co^anies that
resented Rayburn's support of leeic;! af.'n. ^FP r gisl tion to curtail the monopolistic
practices of gas and electric holding companies. Furthermore
Roosevelt had been impressed with Rayburn's work as chair^^n of the
Speakers Bureau in the 1936 campaign.
The fourth candidate for Majority leader was Rankin, but he was
given little chance of success. As a New York Times editorial noted
in assessing Rankin's leadership ability,
Vinegar is not a seductive drink; and a majorityleader sure of the suUenness of tvo groups
can look forward to a heap of trouble. 2 6 ' '
'
Of the four contenders for Majority Leader, Rayburn seemed the
most organized and waged the least sectional ca^aign. While O'Connor
vacationed, Rayburn met with various party and administration leaders
to line up support. Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior, recalled
Rayburn asking him to sound out the Illinois delegation. Mead,
meanwhile, argued that a Northerner ought to be elected to offset the
South 's domination of committee chairmen and Rankin tried appealing
to Southern and Western representatives with his platform of cheap
n 1 ^/J^^"?*'
^^"^""^ Patterson, Congressional Conservati .^m and the New
ueai, (Lexington, Ky. : University of Kentucky, 1967), p. 5T.
^^NYT, Nov. 20, 1936, p. 22.
27
Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes
, (3 vols. , New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953-1954), II, 10.
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electricity and lower railroad rates but r.vK,i cites, D Rayburn wrote to every
Democrat In the nev House without regard to region.
Garner, v*o had without fanfare backed McBuffte for Speaker In
1933 and Rayburn In 1935, jumped right Into the middle of the fray
this time. In a public staten^nt he declared that he was '200 per
cent- for Rayburn and that he would
"'contribute all I can'"^' to
Rayburn's winning. O'Connor supporters promptly attacked Garner for
interfering in a House matter, but Rayburn welcomed Garner's open
proclamation of support as evidence that Roosevelt approved his
cand idacy
.
Once again the Pennsylvania delegation played a decisive role in
the outcome. Prodded by Senator Guffey, Pennsylvania backed Rayburn
by an eighteen to six margin. Rayburn was jubilant, saying Pennsyl-
vania's support
-would mean a lot in the final wind-up of this •
thing. Then the Rayburn camp released endorsements from the
mayors of Chicago and Jersey City, the Louisiana delegation, Boss
Crump of Memphis, and even Farley. The timing was meant to give the
appearance that Pennsylvania had started a band wagon movement toward
Rayburn, but actually the pledges of support had been secured much
, . 31
earlier.
28
NYT, Nov. 6, 1936, p. 3; Nov. 13, 1936, p. 4.
29
Ibid., Dec. 2, 1936, p. 11.
30
Ibid., Dec. 4, 1936, p. 10.
31
Dorough, p. 254.
204
Guffey's intervention did not sit well with the O'Connor forces.
Charles Faddis of Pennsylvania, one of O'Connor's six votes in the
Pennsylvania delegation, blasted Guffey for reneging on a deal with
O'Connor. Faddis recalled:
•Myself and some other Pennsylvania Democrats
obtained the support of Mr. O'Connor for theGuffey Coal Bill in the last Congress. It waspassed by a small majority and due, I think
to the effort of Mr. O'Connor. In return foxhis support we assured him that we would be
glad to be for him for leader. I feel obliged
to keep ray promise. '32
To try to balance Rayburn's inroads in the North, O'Connor ral-
lied his Southern allies. Franklin Hancock of North Carolina said
it would be "statesmanlike" for the Democrats to give the North an
expanded leadership role in the House and Robert Ramspeck of Georgia
urged his Southern colleagues "'not to insist '"^^ upon the election
of another Southerner.
Before the caucus met, Mead and Rankin withdrew from the contest,
At the caucus, Bankhead was nominated for Speaker by acclamation and
Rayburn bested O'Connor 184 votes to 127 votes with a scattering of
ballots for other members. The results had been expected when the
nominating speeches showed that O'Connor had not been able to heal
the split in the New York delegation. Cullen of Brooklyn and Bronx
Democrats belonging to Edward Flynn's organization backed Rayburn
whereas upstate, Manhattan, and the rest of the Bronx delegates
^^NYT, Dec. 5, 1936, p. 20.
Ibid., Dec. 13, 1936, p. 4 (for the Hancock quote) and Dec. 20,
1936, p. 6 (for the Ramspeck quote).
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Sided With O'Ccno.. other Northern votes for Rayhurn ca.e fro.
Clarence Lea of California, who would
.ove up to the chainnanship
of the interstate Co^erce Co^ttee with Rayburn's advancement ,^4
and McConnaC, who '-produced about ten votes in the New England dele-
gation to put Rayburn across. Boland, who had favored Rayburn at
the critical Pennsylvania caucus, was re-appointed Whip.
In 1939, for the first time since the Democrats had become the
-Jority party in 1931, there were no leadership vacancies and no con-
tests. Bankhead and Rayburn were re-elected and Boland stayed as
Whip. Roosevelt was unhappy with the House leadership and complained
to secretary Ickes that Bankhead was weak and "Rayburn was so anxious
to succeed to the Speakership that he feared to offend anyone.
Roosevelt, however, did not try to stir up a revolt.
In September. 1940, Bankhead died and Rayburn, who had been •
Speaker pro tempore during Bankhead 's extended sickness, was im-
mediately elevated to the Speakership. His advancement, of course,
left the Majority Leadership vacant and a contest began brewing as
a long line of potential contenders started jockeying for the post.
McCormack, Boland, Jere Cooper of Tennessee, Clifton Woodrum of
Virginia, Eugene Cox of Georgia, and Rankin were all interested.
34
Ibid. Dec. 9, 1936, p. 15; Jan. 4, 1937, pp. 1 and 14; Jan.
5, 1937, p. 15; Dorough, p. 255.
35
Richard Boiling, House out of Order, (New York: E. P Dutton
and Co., 1965), p. 73.
36James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 307.
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Mccor^c. and Woodru™, Ho.ever. ,uicKl, e^er.ed f.„„
.His field as the
two stronses. co^peUto.s. HcCor„.cU was close to
.ayhurn, havin, „o..
mated hi. for SpeaUe. when BanUhead died and having delivered New
England's votes in his successful tr, for the Majority Leadership in
1937. McCor.ac.. a staunch New Dealer, was also widely believed to be
Roosevelfs choice." „oodru., i„ contrast, was a conservative who had
opposed several administration measures that did not directly benefit
his own district. Nevertheless, he was able, respected, and likely to
carry the "entire Southern membership of more than 100"^^ if he should
run,
The most important issues in the fight were sectionalism and loyal-
ty to the New Deal. Northern Democrats were demanding a Northern leader
since the South had dominated the top party leadership positions since
Rainey's death and the liberals wanted a Majority Leader who would be
responsive to the President's legislative goals. Nonetheless, the
issues that were directly involved in the maneuvering were procedural
'
questions. McCormack's forces wanted to hold the election immediately
since McCormack seemed to be ahead while Woodrum and the other possible
contenders favored postponing the caucus in hopes that the 1940 election
might alter the House alignment sufficiently to improve their chances
for election. The second dispute was over using a secret ballot at the
caucus. McCormack favored open voting, but Woodrum was worried that
^W, Sept. 16, 1940, p. 10; Sept. 18, 1940, p. 16.
38
Ibid., Sept. 16, 1940, p. 10.
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see Of Ms suppo.ters who wanted
.o
.e.a.n Roosevelt's ,ood ,.aces
would bolt to Mccor^ck unless the voting was secret.^^
McCormack's friends rounded up thp f ? f ^ •a a e i ty signatures needed to call
an early caucus. When it met r^r-i v, Carl Vinson moved that the vote be de-
layed until the new House convened but M.-.-u a, this proposal lost 108 to 91,
possibly because there was a report that 1.Roosevelt wanted McCormack's
election "at this timp "'^^ a^:*- •After this vote, Cooper, Roland, and Rankin
withdrew from the contest, m open balloting, McCormack outpolled
Woodrum 141 to sixty-seven. As Woodrum had suspected, there were n.ny
southerners who switched to McCormack, including Cox, who was the in-
formal leader of the Southern conservative bloc.^^
Summary of the 1931-1941 Contests
The most striking aspect about the Democratic conflict in this
period was the high number of contests. Table 1 summarizes the fights.
The Democrats battled twice over the Speakership: in 1933 when Rainey,
McDuffie, and Byrns engaged in a spectacular brawl that involved all
three leadership offices in the trading and bargaining and in 1935 when
Byrns, Bankhead, and Rayburn vied to succeed Rainey. In addition, there
were five fights, one in each Congress, over the Majority Leadership.
In 1931, after contemplating challenging Garner for the Speakership,
39
1940, p^T-Ind'?:: ^-15; sept. 26.
Ibid., Sept. 26, 1940, pp. 1 and 14.
41
Boiling, Power in the House
, pp. 155-56.
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TABLE 1
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1931-1941
Year
1931
Status of Post
Vacant--Party became
inajority.
Vacant
--Garner elect-
ed Vice President.
Vacant--Rainey had
died.
Vacant--Byrns had
died.
_Speaker
What Happened
No contest--Rainey and
Garner struck deal;
Rainey ran for Majority
Leader instead of
Speaker
Contest--3 major candi-
dates; decided on 1st
ballot at caucus.
Contest--3 candidates;
all but one withdrew
before caucus.
No contest
Outcome
Vacant--Bankhead
had died.
No contest
No contest
No contest
Bankhead re-
elected
Bankhead re-
elected
Vacant
--Party
became majority.
Majority Leader
Vacant--Maj. Leader
chose to run for
Speaker
Contest--Garner 's
deals caused all
contenders except
one to withdraw be-
fore caucus
.
Contest--2 candi-
dates; decided on
1st ballot at
caucus
.
TABLE 1-
-Continued
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1931-1941
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Status of Post
Vacant-
-Maj
.
Leader ran for
Speaker.
Vacant-
-Ma j
Leader had be-
come Speaker.
No vacancy
Vacant-
-Ma j
.
Leader had be-
come Speaker.
Majority Leader
What Happened
Contest--? candidates;
decided on 2nd ballot
at caucus
.
Contest--4 candidates;
decided on 1st ballot
at caucus.
No contest
Contest--all candidates
but 2 withdrew before
caucus vote; decided on
1st ballot.
Outcome
Bankhead
elected
Rayburn
elected
Rayburn
elected
.
McCormack
elected
No vacancy
Vacant—Whip
chose to run
for Speaker.
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
Whip
No Change
Change-
-new Whip ap-
pointed as part of
deal that elected
Speaker
.
Change--new Whip as
part of Speakership
bargaining.
No change
No change
McDuffie re-
appointed
Greenwood
appointed
Boland
appointed
Boland re-
appointed
Boland re-
appointed
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Rainey beac a long list of opponents; in 1933 Byrns barely defeated
Banlchead In the intricate deal that swept B.ainey into the Speakership;
in 1935, Bankhead outlasted six rivals to win on the second ballot; in
1937, Raybnru bested O'Connor at the caucus; and in 1,40, HcCor^ack.
with adn>i„istration help, triumphed over Woodrum. Thus, in a single
decade, the Democrats waged seven leadership fights, which amounted
to one more contest than they had fought in the preceding thirty-six
years
.
Turnover in the leadership hierarchy was extensive, with five
Speakers, five Majority Leaders, and three l^ips. The Speakership
vacancies began when Garner was elected Vice President in 1932 but re-
sulted priinarily from the successive deaths of Speakers Rainey, Byrns,
and Bankhead, all of whom were in their sixties or seventies when orig-
inally elected to the Speakership. Furthermore, because the Democrats
consistently elevated their Majority Leaders to the Speakership, Ma-
jority Leadership openings were as plentiful as Speakership vacancies.
The Whips were appointed but that practice did not protect them from
the upheavals. The Whips changed almost as frequently as the Speakers
and the Majority Leaders because the office of Whip became valuable in
the bargaining that characterized the Speakership clashes. For example,
McDuffie remained as Whip in 1931 when he agreed to pull out of the con-
test for Majority Leader but was dumped in 1933 when he was on the losing
side of the Speakership battle. Greenwood, who replaced McDuffie, was
shunted aside in 1935 to make way for Boland, whose appointment apparent-
ly was part of the price Guffey extracted for his help in electing Byrns
to the Speakership.
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By the 1930-3, despite the number of challenges, the Minority Leader
or Majority Leader without fail advanced to the Speakership. One of the
recurring the.es in the contests was that the Majority Leader was the
rightful heir to the office because of precedent. However, no such
progression was visible for the position of Majority Leader, which may
account for the greater number of contests over that post. All three
Whips wanted to move up to the Majority Leadership, but none succeeded
in making the transition in this decade. McDuffie dropped out of the
race for Majority Leader in 1931 under pressure from Garner; Greenwood
was interested in running against Bankhead in 1935 but did not appear
to organize a campaign; and Boland withdrew from the Majority Leader
skirmish at the caucus rather than confront McCormack in 1940. Com-
mittee assignments do not reveal any alternate method for recruiting
Majority Leaders. Rainey was on the Ways and Means Committee, Byrns
was Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Bankhead was Chairman of
Rules, Rayburn was Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, and
McCormack was a member of the Ways and Means Committee when elected to
the Majority Leadership. Aside from general requirements like senior-
ity-the Majority Leaders in the 1930's averaged 21.2 years in the House
at the time of election—and an important committee assignment, there
seemed to be no particular position that conferred or guaranteed heir
apparent status.
Outside intervention was rampant in Democratic contests in this
period. Like Cleveland and Wilson, Roosevelt occasionally took part in
the contests. Rumors abounded in every fight about Roosevelt's choice,
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but in 1933 and 1935 he appeared to be genuinely neutral. By 1937, with
the conservatives gaining strength. Roosevelt „as ready to unleash
bers of his administration, like Garner. Ickes, and Farley, to rally
support for Rayburn. who was »,re congenial to the New Deal than
O'Connor. i„ 1,40. Roosevelt's reported preference for McCoroack seems
to have helped him win. Although no source unequivocally states that
Roosevelt intervened on McCormack's behalf, there were also no loud and
emphatic denials from the White House as had h«nr,wi iu nu n a been common m some of the
earlier battles when speculative stories had circulated.
A new element in the Democratic brawls was the widespread participa-
tion of Senators, Governors, Mayors, and local party bosses. The most
blatant examples of interference were Senator Guffey's involvement in
1935 and 1937 aad Tammany's negotiations for better committee treatment
in 1931 and 1933. Republican disputes had frequently attracted the in-
terest of leading senators also but what was completely different from
the Republican pattern was the active role of Democratic local leaders
like Mayor Cermak, Mayor Hague, and the Tammany chiefs. Although the
formal positions in the two parties differed, important Republican
senators, like the big city leaders in the Democratic party, often con-
trolled the nominating process in their home states for House seats.
This informal power made it possible for these two groups of outsiders
to influence the course of House leadership contests.
Interest group participation generally seemed absent from the Demo-
cratic fights in this decade. One exception was the interest expressed
A2
James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story : The Roosevelt Years
,
(New
York: McGraw-Hill, 19A8), p. 182.
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by l.bor and postal workers in behalf of Mead,
.ho was^he chalr„.n
of the Appropriations subcoMnittee handling the Post Office.
Anal^si^ of the Variables
. 1931-1941
MaiaEitZ-Mlnoria status. Majority status had appeared to deflect
leadership competition between 1911 and 1919, as hypothesized, but
between 1931 and 1941 the Democrats fought in every Congress despite
being the
..Jority party. il,e conflict probably reached its height in
1933 and 1935, when both the Speakership and the Majority Leadership
were battled over. By the end of the decade there were at least a
couple of signs that the quarreling was subsiding. Bankhead and Rayburn
assumed the Speakership autonu^tically and the Whip did not change hands '
after 1935.
The last time the Democrats had wi-angled so steadily over the
leadership was from 1897 to 1907, when as a minority party they had en-
gaged in four contests. What these two competitive decades have in com-
mon is that both coincide with a realigning election or era. The
earlier combat followed the 1896 election when Bryan re-oriented the
presidential party to the needs of the South and the West while the con-
flict of the 1930 's raged during, the realigning era of 1928 to 1936 when
urban, ethnic voters moved into the Democratic party. Consequently, the
timing of the Democratic battles in the House would suggest that a dur-
able change in party alignments may be more conducive to leadership up-
heavals than either majority or minority status.
As Table 2 indicates, the Democrats fought slightly more often when
they held overwhelming majorities in the House than when they had more
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TABLE 2
PARTY SIZE AND DEMOCRATIC CONELICT, 1931-1941
ox^.e or jrarcy # of Congresses # of Fights
50.0 to 54.9% 1 1
55.0 to 59.9% I 1
60.07o and over 3 5
modest leads over the Republicans. The Democrats controlled over two-
thirds of House seats in 60 per cent of the Congresses between 1931 and
1941, but fought over 70 per cent of their contests in these three Con-
gresses. This pattern is in sharp contrast to Republican majorities,
which were more inclined to fight when they had their narrowest major-
ities
.
^^^^^^^^ Success at the polls preceded most of the Demo-
crats
'
leadership altercations between 1931 and 1941. In fact, some of
the stormiest contests, such as the Rainey-McDuf f ie donnybrook in 1933
and Bankhead's fight for Majority Leader in 1935, coincided with some
of the Democrats' greatest victories. The only exception, as Table 3
shows, was the 1940 Woodrum-McCormack clash, which developed after the
Democrats lost sixty-nine seats in the 1938 election. Aside from the
1940 contest, these findings run contrary to Peabody's expectations.
Based on the Democrats' ability to side-step leadership conflict be-
tween 1955 and 19 66, Peabody theorized that a series of electoral
triumphs would tend to inhibit fights and promote stability and
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TABLE 3
DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RETURNS, 1931-1941
Year # of House Seat
1931
1933
1935
1937
1939
Won
219
310
322
329
260
43 Change from Pre-
vious Election
+56
+91
+12
+ 7
-69
7o of Democratic
Seats When Con-
gress Met
50.3
71,3
74.0
75.6
59.8
indicates contest
orderly change, but the results from the 1930 's suggest otherwise.
What is particularly noteworthy about the relationship between elec-
tion success and conflict in the 1930 's is that between 1895 and 1931
most Democratic skirmishes also followed election upsurges rather
downturns. In short, the evidence from nearly a half century indi-
cates that Democratic leadership clashes occasionally erupted after
the party lost ground, as in 1919 and 1939, but more often the Demo-
crats battled over the leadership after winning an election.
Membership turnover. During the 1930 's in 80 per cent of the Con-
gresses torn apart by leadership strife, membership turnover was fairly
43
The figures refer to the House line-up when Congress opened
rather than the November returns.
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hxgh With .e„
.embers co^osi.g between 22.2 and 41.9 pe. cent of the
Be.oc«tic „e^ership. On the other hand, turnover was low In the
76th congress, when McCo^ack captured the Majority Leadership See
Table 4 for the details. Before 1931 „ost Democratic contests had
also been characterized by high turnover. One difference with the
earlier period was that the extent of
.e^bership change in igso's had
declined froM the rates recorded between 1895 and 1931. when it was
co».on for over 37 per cent of the Democrats to be newcomers in con-
tested congresses. The drop in turnover probably could be predicted
TABLE 4
DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT AND ^ffiMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1931-1941
^^^^ % of New Members
7o Incumbents
1931 32.9 67.1
1933 41.9 58.1
1935 25.2 74.8
1937 22.2 77.8
1939
. 12.3 87.7
indicate^ a contest
in light of studies emphasizing the lengthening careers of Congressmen
after the t irn of the century. Nevertheless, when the amount of mem-
bership stability among House Democrats during the peaceful Congresses
of the late 1920' s is con^ared with the 1930 's, the degree of member-
ship change after 1930 was clearly rising, as Table 5 shows. Thus,
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TABLE 5
^
MEMERSHIP CHANGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1919-1941
Year
7o New Members # of Cases
1919
- 1931 (all Congresses) 20 2(contest Congresses) 33*1 J(stable Congresses) i3]8 7
1931
- 1941 (all contest Congresses) 26.9
4
at a less dramatic level, the pattern froxu the minority Congress re-
peatcd itself with leadership conflict
.ore likely to develop when the
membership was least stable.
Hieraxch^. m four of the five Congresses in which leadership
conflict flared between 1931 and 1941, freshmen composed a minimum
of 20 per cent of the Democratic membership. This figure is compara-
tively high since no freshman class on the Democratic side had ex-
ceeded 20 per cent since 1913 except for 1923, which had been the last
time the Democrats brawled before the wave of fights in the 1930 's.
Of the fights between 1931 and 1941, only the 1940 clash occurred
when a small freshman class was present, as Table 6 indicates. Be-
fore 1931 five of the six Democratic battles had also developed when
freshmen flowed into the party. As with membership change, the pro-
portion of freshman Democrats in the earlier contests was even higher,
usually over 30 per cent, than in the 1930's. Again the pattern from
the minority years persisted but with a somewhat reduced percentage
of freshmen.
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TABLE 6
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1931-1941
Year 7„ Freshmen % Members from 3
Youngest Classes
% Senior
1931 25.1 43.8 29.7
.1933 39.0 62.8 25.5
1935 24.2 66.4 21.1
1937 21.3 64.0 20.4
1939 11.5 50.8 23.1
indicates a contest
When second or third term Democrats, are examined independently,
they do not add to an understanding of the conditions facilitating'
leadership conflict but when first, second, and third term members
are combined, the youthfulness of the Democratic party in the mid-
1930 's is underscored. For example, in 1935 approximately two-
thirds of the Democrats in the House had been elected since the onset
of the depression and by 1937 nearly two-thirds had been elected at
the time of or after Roosevelt's 1932 triumph. Although the per-
centage of freshmen decreased after the 1932 landslide, the Democrats
continued to be a very junior and, in terms of personnel, a vastly
changed party from the 1920 's because of the large numbers of second
and third term representatives. Before 1931 there was no comparable
bloc of junior members associated with the leadership fights. One
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reason for this structural difference is that in the minority years
freshmen elected in off-years were swept out of office in the next
election as Republican Congressmen returned on the coattails of their
presidential candidates. In the 1930 's with the Democrats steadily
winning, freshmen got re-elected. The junior classes in the mid-
thirties may possibly have substituted for and played a role similar
to the very large freshman classes before 1931. in the formation of
leadership contests.
All the Democratic fights in this decade took place when the pro-
portion of senior Democrats was either declining, as from 1931 through
1939, or comparatively low, ranging from 20.4 to 23.1 per cent, as
from 1935 to 1941. To find other Democratic Congresses with equally
small pools of veterans, one must go back to the New Freedom Con-
gresses except for 1923. The association between falling seniority
and conflict was also evident in Democratic leadership struggles
before 1931.
Regional factionalism
. During the 1920 's the South dominated the
Congressional wing of the Democratic party, but beginning with the
1930 election Northerners started to pour into the party and soon sur-
passed the Southern contingent in size. The raw figures presented in
Table 7 illustrate how quickly the geographical base of the Democratic
party in the House shifted. Betv/een 1919 and 1931 the South usually
held one hundred seats. In the 1930 's the South 's number seats re-
mained constant, but the North's share increased dramatically from
eighty-two in 1931 to 167 in 1933 and to 186 by 1937 and then back to
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TABLE 7
REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS, 1931-1941
It-
If from
South
# from
North
7o South 7o North 7o Border
t-oeO LctL.€S
1931 101 82 46.1 37.4 16.4
1933 99 10/ 31.9 53.9 14.2
1935 100 181 31.1 56.2 12.7
1937 101 186 30.7 56.5 12.8
1939 99 122 38.1 46.9 15.0
indicates a contest
122 in 1939, This enormous growth in Northern representation coincided
with the great spurt in leadership conflict. In each Congress in which
the Democrats quarreled in this period, the Northern wing of the party
was either expanding, as from 1931 until 1939, or the largest regional
factional within the party, as from 1933 through 1941. Before 1931
when the Democrats were a minority, a rise in Northern strength often
signalled a leadership contest while a drop in Northern representation
and a complementary upswing in Southern seats usually forecast leader-
ship harmony. During the majority years of Wilson's Presidency, how-
ever, the large but shortlived Northern majorities had not led to
increased leadership hostility.
Ideological factionalism
. By the late 1920 's the Democrats had
turned into a conservative party, content to follow the lead of the
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business-oriented
.ep.Wican administrations
. With the depression the
De™,cratic party began to rediscover its reforming
.eal and the large.
Northern, urban influxes of the earlv iQ-^n* ."X cn y 1930 s transformed the party into
a predominantly liberal party. The very pervasiveness of the depres-
sion tended to unite the party behind Roosevelt's refor^ns between 1933
and 1935 although a conservative minority remained. By 1935 as the
New Deal switched its attention from emergency recovery measures to a
tnore fundamental restructuring of the economy, the conservatives,
r-stly but by no means exclusively Southerners, began to enlarge and
the unity began to disintegrate. By 1937-1939 the New Deal majorities
were crumbling and the conservative bloc had joined forces with the
Republicans to stop or at least slow down the pace of change. James
Patterson estimates the size of the conservative faction within the
Democratic party in the House as 12.9 per cent in 1933, 19.2 per cent
in 1935, 21.6 per cent in 1937, and 23.1 per cent in 1939,'^'^ j^ii^s
Turner's data indicate that the level of cohesion among Democrats in
1933 was 63.5-not very different from the scores registered in the
1920's, but by 1937 cohesion had fallen to 53.9, the lowest score
Turner recorded for either party in the Congresses he studied.
m
the 1920 's Northern Democrats had been more likely to stray from the
party position on roll call votes whereas in the 1930 's the Southern
wing, particularly Southerners from rural constituencies in Virginia,
^^Patterson, pp. 340-43.
45 , . ^Julius Turner, Party and Constituency ; Pressures on Congress
,
ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), p. 21.
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Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia, showed
.he least enthusiasm for the
New Deal.
The Widening gulf between conservatives and New Dealers after
1935 corresponded with the leadership tur.oil in the .id and late
1930's and early 1940's. The contests in those years reflected the
growing ideological cleavage. In 1937 Rayburn with administration
support battled O'Connor, who was on Roosevelt's purge list in 1938,
and Mccoro^ck, allegedly Roosevelt's favorite, defeated Woodru., thl
conservative candidate. The earlier contests in this decade had ideo-
logical overtones, but they had not been so clearly head-on confronta-
tions between pro and anti-New Deal candidates.
Con^n^. Regionally Democratic leaders and followers did not
n^atch well during the 1930's. Except for Rainey, the Speakers were
Southerners despite the North's lopsided inajorities. Two of the five
Majority Leaders were from the North, but between Rainey 's death in
1934 and McCormack's election in 1940 there was no Northerner in
either of the top two party leadership posts. Part of the explanation
for the dearth in Northern leaders was that fewer Northerners than
Southerners had accumulated extensive seniority during the long minor-
ity interval from 1919 to 1931, as Table 8 depicts. Consequently,
'
the North's circle of potential leaders was smaller than the South 's
pool although larger than in the New Freedom Congresses. Another
Patterson, pp. 340-43.
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TABLE 8
SENIOR DEMOCRATS CLASSIFIED BY REGION, 1931-1941
Year # of Senior* # from Qmn-v,
Democrats ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ # from North
1931 65 46 (5) 7 (1) 12 (3)
1933 79 44 (6) 10 (0) 25 (3)
1935 68 40 (11) 5 (0) 23 (2)
1937 67 33 (10) 12 (0) 22 (5)
1939 60 31 (10) 11 (1) 18 (6)
*
Senior is defined as a minimum of ten years
service in the House. The numbers in paren-
theses refer to those Democrats with at least
twenty years service in the House.
factor was that about half of the Northerners with the needed experi-
ence were from New York."^^ m spite of being the largest state dele-
gation on the Democratic side. New York was unable to capitalize on
its numerical superiority because of the friction inside the delega-
tion between the Mead, O'Connor, and Cullen factions. Another handi-
cap veterans like Edward Taylor of Colorado and Ayres of Kansas
labored under was that they were from small states and lacked a
power base from which to initiate a campaign. McCormack compensated
47
The number of senior representatives from New York in each Con-
gress are as follows: in 1931 four; in 1933 twelve; in 1935 eleven-
in 1937 eleven; in 1939 eight.
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for the sr^llness of the Massachusetts delegation inthe 1930's by
running as New England's candidate. Nonetheless, the North was not
completely excluded fro. the leadership even during the 1934-1940
period. All the Whips except for McDuffie were Northerners. Yet
the lack of a higher ranking Northern leader after 1934 see.ed to be
one of the elements stimulating McCormack's quick election in 1940.
Northern Democrats had lost heavily in the 1938 setback and were de-
termined to elect one of their own before the 1940 election in case
the results further eroded their strength.
In terms of ideology, the fit between rank and file and the
leadership seemed somewhat closer, m 1931 Garner and McDuffie's
conservatism was offset by Rainey's liberalism and in 1933 Rainey
was probably balanced by Byrns although it is hard to draw many
definite conclusions about Byrns since so little has been written
about him. After Rainey died, the leaders-regardless of regional
affiliation-were all loyal New Dealers and thus compatible with the
majority of House Democrats. However, with the exception of the Whip
Boland, the leaders were initially recruited from the more conserva-
48tivc wing of the party. Bankhead styled himself as a "states'
48
William E. Sullivan in "Criteria for Selecting Party Leader-
ship in Congress: An Empirical Test," American Politics Quarterly
III, (January, 1975), pp. 25-44, makes the interIiIili~i:oint that
Congressional leaders are not necessarily moderates or high party
scorers befo_re their selection as leaders but after becoming a leader
an individual's voting record moderates. Initially, Rayburn, Bank-head, and Byrns were identified with the conservative wing of the
party but all of them were loyal to the President even when they
personally found some of his proposals difficult to swallow.
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rights Democrat" and a
..'strict constructionist '-^^ Although Rayburn
was the more liberal candidate in his bid for Majority Leader in 1937,
he referred to himself as a conservative. The addition of McCor^c,
a staunch New Dealer with ties to labor and the urban ethnics, helped
link the ideological wings of the party more closely and also gave
tangible recognition to the North's strength in the House.
Summary o_f the Variables
. 1931 -1941
The leadership contests between 1931 and 1939 occurred under
strikingly sionilar conditions. The Democrats were the majority party,
they were trouncing the Republicans in election after election, and
expanding rapidly as freshmen flowed into the party. As the freshmen
'
won re-election, junior members began to outnumber veterans by margins
as high as three to one in some Congresses. But, above all, the in-
flux of freshmen in terms of region was highly uneven. Typically,
in the Congresses before 1939 sixteen of the freshmen were from the
South, but the number of non-Southern freshmen varied between thirty-
nine and 105. (See Table 9 for the specific figures.) As a result,
the Democratic party in the House was quickly transformed from a
Southern conservative party with a small Northern wing into a pre-
dominantly Northern, reformist party with a Southern minority. The
^^Heacock, p. 350.
'
^ayburn's voting record from the 1920 's would bear out such a
label. Rayburn voted against child labor, woman's suffrage but voted
in favor of selling Muscle Shoals to Henry Ford.
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TABLE 9
THE REGIO^IAL DISTRIBUTION OF FRESHMEN DEMOCRATS, 1931-1941
Year IF OX Freshmen # from South # from Border # from North
States
1931 55 16 9 30
1933 121 16 13 92
78 15 9 54
1937 70 16 5 49
1939 30 16 3 11
leadership battles in these Congresses seemed strongly related to the
changing regional and ideological alignments as the new, junior,
Northern wing competed with the older, Southern wing and as liberals
battled conservatives for a share of the leadership spoils.
The 1940 battle occurred under very different circumstances. By
1939 the great era of growth and change was over. The party I.ad suf-
fered its first loss since 1928 and had begun to become more stable
and senior in membership. Nevertheless, at a slightly diminished
level, the Democratic party retained its new configuration as a
Northern, liberal party. The leadership, however, did not fully re-
flect the changed factional alignments, particularly in terms of
region. This lag appears to have fueled the 1940 clash as the under-
represented Northern, reform faction fought for an increased leader-
ship role while the Southern conservatives tried to bloc this re-
distribution of power.
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Thus, the one characteristic that was con^on to all the conflict
in this decade was the shift in the regional and ideological structure
of the party. Although the alteration was produced by the series of
victories that caused the huge influx of Northerners, the impact of
these ^ssive personnel changes persisted after the membership became
more settled. Until the leadership accurately reflected the new
regional and ideological alignments, contests seemed likely to con-
tinue. Finally, fate or chance seemed to exacerbate the conflict.
Through the trading and swapping involved in the contests in the early
1930
-s the Democrats appeared to hammer out leadership compromises
that recognized the changing factional alignments, but the deaths of
three successive Speakers meant that the battles had to be refought
in each Congress. As the decade wore on, the Speakership fights died
away as the Majority Leaders began to assume the Speakership almost
automatically but no similar method of routine advancement had yet
been devised for the Majority Leadership so the conflict continued
at that level.
Leadership Conflict
,
1941 - 1955
The upheavals of the 1930 's were followed by an era of leader-
ship stability and peaceful changes. From 1941 until 1947 Rayburn
and McCormack were continually elected Speaker and Majority Leader
without opposition. The only leadership changes that had to be made
in this time span were the appointments of two new Whips. When
Boland died in June, 1942, Ramspeck of Georgia replaced him and when
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Ramspeck resigned in November 1945 m, iy^ , to become an executive with the
Air Transport Association of America Tnhr, q ,^erica, Jo n Sparkman of Alabama be-
came Whip.
In 1947, after a sixteen year reign as the ^jority party in the
House, the Democrats were forced to step down, shortly after the
election, Rayburn in a surprise announcement disclosed that he would
not be a candidate for Minority Leader. His reasoning was that for
the Democrats to regain control of the House, they would have to win
back the Northern voters who had switched to the Republicans in 1945.
He thought that a Northern leader would be more effective in attract-
ing these voters back to the Democratic fold. Consequently, Rayburn
telegraphed McCormack to endorse him for Minority Leader.^^
A fight immediately began brewing between Southern conservatives
and Truman Fair Dealers. Many Southerners considered McCormack too
liberal and preferred a conservative. Cox argued that if McCormack
were elected '"the rift within the rank of the House Democrats will
be wider than that between the Democrats and Republicans."'^^ Northern
Democrats, in turn, found Cox and Graham Barden of North Carolina, the
conservatives most frequently mentioned as Rayburn 's replacement, un-
acceptable. To head off the fight, the Texas delegation began a
^Vt, June 9, 1942, p. 43; Nov. 27, 1945, p. 1.
Doroagh, pp. 387-89.
^^obert A. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of
Sectionalism, 1941-1948, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Universit?
Press, 1974), pp. 204-05.
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draft Rayburn «=ve.e„.. SparU^n and other Southern moderates also
called upon Rayhurn to ren.l„ in hopes of avoidins a deeper split
within the southern contingents. A few days hefote the caucus was
scheduled to ^et, Rayburn was still refusing to lead, but he was
being bo„*arded with letters and telegrams. Tru^n reportedly asked
Rayburn to stay In order to hold the two wings of the party together,
and McCor^ck, who had concluded he could win only If he risked a
bitter, factional dispute, also appealed to Rayburn to return." At
last Rayburn agreed, saying he
-yielded like I figured a good
soldier should do.-" Rayburn appointed McCor^ck to bo the Minority
Whip to replace Sparkman, who had moved to the Senate.
In 1949 Rayburn and McCormack easily resumed their posts as
speaker and Majority Leader, and Percy Priest of Tennessee became the
new Majority Whip, m 1951. the trio of Rayburn. McConnack, and
Priest continued in office. When the Democrats lost control of the
House In 1953. the pattern established in 1947 was repeated without
dissent as Rayburn stepped down to Minority Leader and McCormack to
Whip.
n 9.^^r°"^f ^^'"f P- Nov. 17, 1946,p. y; Dec. 31, 1946, p. 8.
^^NYT, Jan. 3, 1947, pp. 1 and 4,
56
Borough, p. 389.
230
^=222 of the Leadershin changes
, 1941-1955
in contrast to the extensive leadership turnover In the 1930'
s
the Democratic hierarchy
„as exceedingly stable hetween 1941 and
1955. Rayburn and McCor^cU served as the two top leaders during
the entire period. Burlng the transitions to minority status and
hac. again to ^.orlty status, only their titles changed, otherwise.
the only leadership chan<^es worp .P n nc e e the appointments of new Majority
Whips in 1942, 1945, and 1949 Tahl^ inly^y. b e 10 summarizes the leadership
changes
.
The convenient coincidence of a Whip vacancy in 1947 apparently
gave birth to the practice of ranking the Democratic leaders as "l"
and "2" and moving them as a team during transitions, when the chance"
event of 1947 was deliberately repeated In 1953. although the Majority
Whip Priest had been re-elected to the House, the office of WlUp began
to be recognized as an important leadership post and an integral part
of the leadership ladder. Before 1955 the Majority whips did not ap-
pear to attach much importance to being Whip. Except for Boland who
died in office, the other Whips voluntarily surrendered their Jobs.
Ramspeck went into private industry. Sparkman was elected to the
senate, and Priest In 1955 preferred a co-mnittee chairmanship to
continuing as Whip. Beginning with Carl Albert, no Democrat Whip
has abandoned his post for another House position or for a career
elsewhere.
A second vivid difference with the 1930 's was that the Democrats
fought no leadership battles between 1941 and 1955 although a brawl
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TABLE 10
DEMOCEATIG LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955
Year
1941
1943
1945
1949
1951
1941
1943
1945
1949
1941
1942
1
1943
1945
1949
1951
Status of Post
Speaker
What Happened
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
Vacant-
-Party
became Majority
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
Vacant--Party
became Majority
1951 No vacancy
No vacancy
Vacant— Boland
died
No vacancy
a. No vacancy
b. Vacant—Ramspeck
resigned
Vacant--Party be-
came Majority
No vacancy
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
Majority Leader
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
Majority Whip
No change
New appointment
No change
No change.
New appointment
New appointment
No change
Outcome
Rayburn re-elected
Rayburn re-elected
Rayburn re-elected
Rayburn re-elected
Rayburn re-elected
McCormack re-elected
McCormack re-elected
McCormack re-elected
McCormack re-elected
McCormack re-elected
Boland re-named
Ramspeck named
Ramspeck named
Ramspeck named
Sparkman named
Priest named
Priest re-named
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TABLE 10
SaiOCRATIC I^ERSHIP SELECTION. 1941-1955-Contir.ued
Year Status of Post
Minority Leader
What Happened Outcome
1947 Vacant--Party be-
came Minority
No contest--fight
loomed until Ray- '
bum agreed to stay
Raybum elected
1953 Vacant-
-Party be-
came Minority
No contest
Minority Whi£
Rayburn elected
1947 Vacant--Party be-
came Minority and
Sparkman had been
elected to Senate
New Appointment McCormack named
1953 Vacant-
-Party be-
came Minority;
former Majority
Whip still in
House
New Appointment McCormack named
almost exploded in 1947. The only other time the Democrats had gone
so long without a leadership struggle was during the majority Con-
gresses from 1911 to 1919.
One continuing element in Democratic leadership disputes was the
alleged intervention of President Truman. Truman's decision to urge
Rayburn to stay on as leader had many precedents in Democratic poli-
tics since Cleveland, Wilson, and Roosevelt had also expressed leader-
ship preferences on occasion. Aside from Truman's interest, there is
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no evidence of outside pressure or participation fro. Senators, local
party bosses, or interest groups.
Analysis of the Variables
. 1941 -1955
Majorit^-Mi^io^ status. Fron. 1941 to 1955, the Democrats were
in the majority five times and in the minority twice. Regardless of
the party's status in the House, no leadership battle was waged al-
though a struggle almost erupted when the Democrats became the minor-
ity in 1947. This near-fight provides only slight support for the
hypothesis that minority status tends to produce leadership conflict.
Between 1931 and 1955, the Democrats fought seven contests and all of
them developed during majority Congresses. Before 1931 the Democrats
had competed six times and in each instance had been the minority
party. In short, neither majority nor minority status was an accurate
or useful index for predicting leadership fights.
The size of the party in this period did not seem to explain the
absence of conflict. As Table 11 shows, no battles formed when the
Democrats had a comfortable lead over the Republicans as in 1941 and
1949 or when the Democrats' share of seats in the House fell below
50 per cent as in 1947 and 1953.
Election returns
.
Peabody thought that election defeats trig-
gered leadership fights. In 1943 and 1947 the Democrats suffered
major losses, dropping forty-six and fifty-six seats respectively,
and in the early 1950 's lost enough seats in two successive setbacks
to lose control of the House in 1953, as Table 12 indicates. No
TABLE 11
SIZE OF PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS, 1941-1955
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7o of Democratic Members # of Contests # of Congres ses
Under 50
50.0 to 59.9
60.0 and over
0
0
0
TABLE 12
DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RETURNS, 1941-1955
Year 7/^ of Seats Won Change from Last % of Democratic
Election Seats
1941
1943
1945
1947
1949
1951
1953
268
222
243
187
262
235
211
+ 7
-46
+21
-56
+75
-27
-24
61.7
51.0
55.9
43.0
60.2
54.0
48.5
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fight occurred in any of these Congresses although a challenge seemed
likely in 1947 if Rayburn retired, m the past, Democratic skirmishes
usually followed election upsurges but in this time span even the
biggest victories such as the seventy-five seat rebound in 1948 were
associated with leadership stability.
^-^^^^^^P £1-I1S£. As Table 13 depicts, House Democrats were a
comparatively stable body between 1941 and 1955. The average per-
centage of incumbents in these Congresses was 80.5 per cent, up from
73.1 per cent in the 1930's. Only 1949 deviates noticeably from the
general trend, m 1949 38.2 per cent of the Democratic members had
not served in the Republican dominated 80th Congress. Before 1941
whenever such a large segment of the Democratic membership had been
new, a struggle had ensued. In 1949, however, the party was calm
as Rayburn and McCormack resumed the Speakership and Majority Leader-
ship.
What can account for the change in behavior? An analysis of the
1949 new members shows that eighty of the 100 newcomers were freshmen
whereas twenty were former Congressmen who had gone down to defeat in
the 1946 Republican comeback but were able to recover their seats in
1948. The four to one ratio between freshmen and former Congressmen
is unusual. Ordinarily, a much higher percentage of new members can
be classified as freshmen. Moreover, most of the new members--both
freshmen and former legislators--were Northerners, which strongly
suggests that 1948 was a re-instating election^'^ in the House. In
V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties
,
and Pressure Groups
.
(5th
ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 536.
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TABLE 13
DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1941-1955
1941 16.8 83.2
1943 18.5 81.5
1945 23.9 76.1
1947 15.5 84.5
1949 38.2 61.8
1951 8.5 91.5
1953 14.7 85.3
past examples a high rate of menibership change was an indicator that
the previous alignment of political forces in the House was under
pressure. In the 1940's the 1946 election, as later discussion will
more clearly illustrate, undercut the alignments that originally
elected Rayburn and McCormack while the 1948 election tended to re-
store the pre-1947 coalition.
Hierarchy. By 1941 the great flood of freshmen into the Demo-
cratic party had subsided. Freshman classes between 1941 and 1955
were small, as Table 14 shows, except for 1949 when freshmen com-
posed nearly one- third of the Democratic members in the House. Pre-
viously, in seven out of nine cases, such a large freshman class had
been a harbinger of leadership conflict but in 1949 the transition
to majority status was peaceful.
237
TABLE 14
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1941-1955
Year
"L Freshmen % Sophomores % Seniors
1941 12.3 15.3 26.1
1943 16.2 13.1 30.6
1945 20.2 14.0 30.0
1947 15.0 13.9 35.3
1949 30.5 16.0 26.0
1951 7.2 25.1 30.2
1953 13.7 10.4 33.6
Sophomore classes during most of this era were also small,
further evidence that the Democratic party was settling down after
the upheavals of the 1930's. The lone exception was in 1951, when a
large chunk of the 1949 freshman class was re-elected. Wi,en the three
youngest classes are checked, the Democrats leaned strc-jly in a
junior direction only between 1949 and 1953, when appro:.: [mately half
of the membership had served in the House for under six years. But
no fight occurred even in those Congresses. Thus, a party with a
sizeable body of junior members is not necessarily beset with leader-
ship conflict.
As would be expected from the data on freshmen and other junior
members, the Democrats were becoming a more senior party in the 1940 's
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and early 1950^. The only earlier Oonsresses In which the Be^crats
had had such a large pool of veterans occurred between 1925 and 1931,
v*en there were also no leadership strusgles. Yet the relationship
'
between rising seniority ani leadership harmony is not ,uite so
straightforward as the overall statistics suggest. The Congress in
which the proportion of senior Democrats was highest between 1941
and 1955 was in 1947 when Northern liberals and Southern conserva-
tlves were on the brink of a battle. The 1947 exaMple Indicates that
although a high percentage of senior laembers is often a correlate of
leadership stability, it alone does not prevent controversies from
arising.
R£gi2E^ factionalism. The regional structure of the party had
changed from the heyday of the New Deal. The North no longer nu-
merically dominated the party. Instead, between 1941 and 1955, the
North and South alternated as the largest geographical section in
the party. In 1941, 1945, and 1949-all Congresses elected in years
in wiiich the Democrats captured the Presidency—the North had the
upperhand whereas in 1943, 1947, 1951, and 1953 the South was the
stronger contingent. The only Congress, however, in which the South
actually had a majority was in 1947, as Table 15 indicates. Con-
sequently, 1947--more than any other Congress in this fourteen year
span-
-represented a significant shift in the regional underpinning
f the party. Historically, in the Democratic party, a major change
the regional composition of the membership has forecast increased
leadership conflict. For example, at the turn of the century a rise
o
in
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TABLE 15
REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT, 1941-1955
Year % from South % from Border States % from North
1941 37.3 14.6 48.1
1943 46.4 12.2 41.4
1945 42.8 13.2 44.0
1947 54.5 11.8 33.7
1949 39.3 14.1 46.6
1951 43.8 13.6 42.6
1953 46.9 12.3 40.8
in Northern representation preceded each of the contests and in the
1930 's the rapid swing from a predominantly Southern to a strongly
Northern party coincided with the spurt of battles. In 1947 the
pattern was about to be repeated. At the very time the membership
was becoming more Southern, Rayburn decided to retire. The newly
resurgent Southern delegation was ready to fight rather than allow a
Northerner to succeed Rayburn as leader.
Ideolp^al
_factional ism. The polarization between liberals
and conservatives that began in the mid-1930 's continued into the
1940 's and 1950':. Rural conservatives, mainly from the South, were
pitted against urban liberals, mostly from the North, on a broad
range of domestic issues although civil rights was the most emotional
and controversial subject. Turner's roll call study shows that the
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cratic disunity. Only In X948 did the D^oc.ae. exhibu skater co-
heslvenes. *en their score reached 63.5. largely because ^ny
Northern liberals had been supplanted by Republicans in the 1946
election. Thus, the data fro. 1944 and 1953 argue that the Dcmo-
crats can n^intain leadership stability-as Peabody recognized
between 1955 and 1966-in face of deep ideological cleavages. However,
shifts in the ideological balance of the party-even if thev tend to
make the membership more unified on issues-apparently can bring pres-
sure for leadership change.
Con^uence. From 1941 to 1955 the South was the largest regional
bloc within the Democratic House membership four times and the North
three times. The leadership carefully reflected the Democrats' di-
vision into two strong and nearly equal regional camps with Rayburn
and McCormack sharing the leadership duties as Speaker and Majority
Leader or as Minority Leader and MUp. The Majority Whips were also
recruited from the two dominant regions although the South had the
edge with three Southern Whips to one Northern Whip.
To overcome the deep split on policy, the Democrats seemed to
pick leaders who ranked near the center of the party rather than on
the ideological extremes. Both Rayburn and McCormack had reputations
Turner, p. 21.
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for
.oderaUo„=' and relied
.po„ persuasion and personal friendship
to sway the dissidents. The whips also appeared to be selected for
their ability to bridge the ideological gap. Aside fro„ Boland who™
Rayburn inherited as Whip, Rayburn consistently chose Southerners who
showed so,ne aloofness fro. the arch conservatives for Majority whip.
V. 0. Key, Jr., in Soutl^ Politics observed that urban Southerners
»ere more likely to desert the conservative coalition to side with
Northern De^crats than their rural counterparts. Ramspeck, who
represented Atlanta, would "stand out in the list"'" of Southerners
who voted with the North, according to Key. and Priest, who was fro.
Nashville, was one of two House Democrats who showed up m both wings
of the party in David Truman's analysis of roll call votes in the
6
1
81st Congress. Sparkman also was considered a moderate in the
Southern wing and was enough of a party man to be Adlai Stevenson's
running mate in 1952.
Summary of the Variables
, 1941-1955
The conditions that tended to be associated with the leadership
stability of this period were 1) majority status; 2) election down-
turns; 3) membership stability; 4) rising seniority; 5) alternating
59
David B. Truman, The Congressional Party; A Case Study, (New
York: John Wiley, 1959), p. 206.
^^V. 0. Key, Jr.
,
Southern Politics in State and Nation, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 378.
61
Truman, pp. 145-167.
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regional dominance between North and South; 6) sharp' ideological dif-
ferences between liberals and conservatives, perhaps best symbolized
in presidential politics by the Dixiecrat walkout from the national
convention in 1948; and 7) the recruitment of moderate leaders from
both major regional wings of the party, m short, the structure of
the party closely resembled what Peabody had observed between 1955 and
1966. It is hard to argue, however, that all of these variables in-
hibited conflict. Majority status, for example, was associated with
the upheavals of the 1930 's as well as with the stability in five of
the Congress between 1941 and 1955. Election losses coincided with
the lack of competition only slightly more often than election upturns
did. Seniority also seemed of doubtful value since a fight loomed in
"
the Congress in which veterans were strongest.
What does seem important is the interrelationship between member-
ship stability, factionalism, and leadership congruence. From 1941 to
1947 there were no dramatic fluctuations in the composition of the
Democratic party, which meant that the regional and ideological cleav-
ages, though deep, were stable. Since the leadership probably repre-
.sented the best deal either wing could realistically achieve, there
was no pressure for leadership change. In 1947 defeat reduced the
Northern wing but left the Southern bloc untouched. As the membership
moved to the right, there was a chance that the leadership would move
leftward if Rayburn retired. Southern conservatives found this situa-
tion intolerable and were ready to challenge McCormack's advancement
with one of their own informal leaders. The combination of Rayburn and
McCormack was still a compromise acceptable to all party factions so a
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ign-
or
fight was averted. i„ :,49
.
there
.as a large influx of new „e.bers
but since
.ost of the newcomers were Northerners, the effect of the
turnover was to reinforce rather than undercut the Incumbent leader-
ship. After 1949 there was a gradual decline in Northern strength hut
the erosion was not large enough to underline the basic factional ali
ment In the House, since the leadership continued to .irror the MaJ
division in the party, no fights developed.
Conclusions
. I93I -1955
Between 1931 and 1955 the Democrats clashed seven ti.es over the
leadership, six of the struggles occurred when the Democrats were
winning, undergoing rapid growth and membership turnover, and changing
into a Northern reform party. The seventh contest developed after the
factional alignments had stabilized but the sharp disparity between
the South
-s domination of the leadership posts and the North's numerical
supremacy created tension. The Congresses free of leadership conflict
tended to show greater membership stability, more stable factions, and
leadership that better matched the new regional and ideological struc-
ture in the House.
What is particularly intriguing about the Democratic pattern between
1931 and 1955 is how closely it resembles the pattern from the minority
Congresses. Before 1931 most Democratic fights also occurred when the
party did well in elections, was undergoing extensive membership change,
and when the North's share of seats was increasing. Another similarity
was that a leadership compromise that pulled the wings of the party to-
gether seemed to be important in bringing the wave of fights between
:s is
in
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the Bryanites and che conservatives to a close. The earlier equivalent
of Rayburn and McConnack had been Cha.p clarU of Missouri, who was
popular with the Bryanites, the Tann^ny organisation, and the Deep
south. When Clark became Minority Leader and then Speaker, the con-
tests stopped despite the vast membership changes in 1911 and 1913.
Overtime one conclusion that can be drawn about the Democrat,
that leadership fights are as likely to develop when the party is
the majority as when it is in the minority. Another is that although
both election defeats and victories can be associated with conflict,
in the Democratic party contests usually followed electoral upsurges.
Because of the Civil War and reconstruction, the Democrats have his-
torically had a solid southern flank, particularly as a minority party,
and the House leadership has reflected this membership bias. Consequent,
ly, victories were more likely to upset this equilibrium than defeats
because a victory was needed to bring Northerners into the party. The
victory did not cause the conflict but was the vehicle that produced
enough membership change to alter the regional and ideological struc-
ture of the party. After the Northern gains in the 1930 's proved last-
ing, a major defeat or several smaller but cumulative losses could just
as easily upset the new factional alignment by returning the South to
power. The amount of membership change does not always appear to be
as important as the impact of the turnover on the regional and ideologi-
cal balance in the party. Shifts in the factional structure of the
party that weaken the incumbent leaders' or an heir apparent 's position
in the party can bring pressure for leadership change. Sometimes, of
course, there can be a delay between the shifts in the factional align
meats and the pressure for leadership change. A junior faction, for
example, nnast wait until its members gain seniority to challenge a mor
senior faction, but once there are capable, senior aspirants in the
underrepresented faction, a battle seems likely.
Tl.ere is also a feedback element involved. Democratic leaders
have tried to keep the potential conflict in check by appointing Whips
who would add regional variation to the hierarchy and who were mod-
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erates. m addition, the Democrats have moved toward institution-
alizing the leadership succession although the 1947 example-when the
conservatives opposed McCormack's advancement-suggests that the
leadership ladder may be more fragile than it looks on paper. Promo-
'
tions may have come easily because the factional alignments have en-
dured without a great deal of variation from Congress to Congress in
the last three decades. One condition that would seem capable of dis-
rupting the leadership would be a massive infusion of Northern liberal
who found the incumbent leadership too moderate. The Democratic mem-
bers elected in 1974 fit this description. Although most of their
effort has been directed at ousting conservative or senile committee
chairmen, there have also been calls to replace Albert. The second
circumstance that might be conducive to leadership unrest in the future
would be a severe reduction in the Northern wing and a corresponding
increase iu the Southern wing. With no Southerner holding office in
Sullivan, pp. 25-44.
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the present leadership line-up-the only near ally is the Speaker from
a Border State, the South would likely demand more adequate repre-
sentation
.iust the way the Northern wing did in the 1930's.
CHAPTER V
CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN HIERARCHY, 1931-1955
Leadership Fights
. 1931-1941
After the 1928 landslide that cut deeply into Democratic fortresses
even in the South, the future of the Republican party looked bright, but
by 1930, with the depression deepening and Hoover's recovery programs
faltering, the Republicans were barely able to hold onto the House of
Representatives. In this atmosphere Speaker Nicholas Longworth of Ohio
faced his first challenge since winning the Speakership in 1925. The
Progressives, who held the balance of power in the closely divided
House, were determined to stall Longworth 's election just as they had
delayed GiUetfs election in 1923 until the House rules were liberal-
ized and unemployment and agriculture bills were considered.^ The Pro-
gressives, composed mainly of Wisconsin and Minnesota representatives
who had long participated in insurgent uprisings, were not the only
band of restless Republicans. The Kansas and Oklahoma delegations in-
tended to boycott the Republican caucus unless the Ways and Means Com-
mittee reopened debate on the oil embargo bill. Eastern legislators
wanted the bill shelved because its passage would raise oil prices in
2
New England. m order to ensure his own re-election, Longworth was
^New York Times (hereafter NYT ) , Feb. 25, 1931, p. 34- Oct 28
1931, p. 1; and Nov. 21, 1935, p. 5.
2
Ibid., Feb. 25, 1931, p. 34; and Feb. 26, 1931, p. 4.
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ready to bargain with the disside^nfc ja aents. He favored reconsidering the oil
bill and he was willing to permit amendments to the rules.
in February, 1931, the Republican caucus renominated Longworth for
speaker and John Tilson of Connecticut for Majority Leader. T^e absence
of eighteen Republicans, however, signalled that the Republicans would
not have a majority on the floor of the House and would have trouble
. . 3
maintaining control of the House.
In April, 1931, Longworth died. Since 1925 Longworth, Tilson, and
Bertrand Snell of New York, the Rules Committee Chairman, had ruled the
House of Representatives together. After Longworth's death, Snell and
Tilson waged a long, bitter fight to succeed Longworth to the Speaker-
ship. In the last session rifts had begun to develop among the "tri-
umvirate" as Tilson sided with Hoover on issues such as the tariff.
Prohibition, drought relief, and the veterans bonus while Longworth
and Snell started to carve out more independent stands.'^ Consequently,
although Hoover never publicly endorsed Tilson, most Republicans as-
sumed that Tilson was Hoover's favorite for the office.
Snell was strong in New York and Pennsylvania and appeared to have
inherited Longworth's coalition or power base, which was built around
the large Eastern states and Ohio. Snell was weak in the Midwest and
among Progressives, who disliked the autocratic way he had operated
the Rules Committee, but Snell was prepared to barter for votes. He
advocated lowering the tariff--a popular issue in the Midwest--and he
^Ibid. , Fc^. 27, 1931, p. 1.
^
Ibid .
,
Apr. 12, 1931, p. 22; Dec. 1, 1931, p. 4.
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win in
m
favored reducing the „un*er of signatures needed on a discharge petition
from 218 to 150-the very issue the insurgents had struggled to
1923, only to have overturned in 1925 with Snell's aid.^ nison,
turn, chided Snell for relying so heavily on a few large states for his
votes. Tllson's strategy was to put together a broader based alignment
consisting of votes from New England and a cross section of other Re-
publican states.
Neither Midwesterners nor the Progressive faction were entirely
satisfied with the choice of two Easterners for Speaker. Fred Britten
of Illinois briefly entered the race as a rallying point for Mid-
westerners and states like Michigan and Kansas leaned toward favorite
sons. The Progressives were busy rounding up a bipartisan alliance of
liberals to combat the depression and bring sweeping rules changes.'^
By November, 1931, the Democrats had picked up enough seats in
special elections to win control of the House of Representatives. As
the Republican leadership battle switched from electing a Speaker to
choosing a Minority Leader, tactics changed. Tilson began to argue
that a new caucus was not necessary because he had already been elected
Republican floor leader in February, 1931, when Longworth had been nom-
inated for Speaker. Snell disputed Tilson 's position by claiming that
^Ibid.
,
Apr. 13, 1931, p. 3; Apr. 14, 1931, p. 12, Apr. 18, 1931,
p. 7; and Nov. 16, 1931, p. 5. Jordan A. Schwarz , The Interregnum of
Despair : Hoover
,
Congress and the Depression
,
(Urbana: University
of Illinois, 1970), p. 59.
SyT, Nov. 28, 1931, p. 5; Nov. 30, 1931, p. 3.
Ibid .
,
Apr. 16, 1931, p. 6; Apr. 17, 1931, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1931,
p. 3; Oct. 28, 1931, p. 1.
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the Republicans needed to chooso =C e a new candidate for Speaker to oppose
Garner on the floor of the House.
^
At the December caucus, eight ballots were needed to pick a new
by the third ballot Snell had captured the lead, seventy votes to sixty-
five, with carl >^pes of Michigan and Ho.er Hoch of Kansas splitting the
rest of the votes. At the end of the seventh ballot. Tllson noted that
he was not able to attract the favorite son vote to his camp and ^ved
that Snell 's nomination be ».de unanlnK,us. Nevertheless, Tllson would
not concede defeat as floor leader. He admitted Snell had beaten him
for the Speakership nomination but argued that only "affirmative action"'
could depose him as floor leader. Enough Republicans acknowledged the
validity of Tllson's position to postpone a final decision until after
the organizational vote on the House floor.
When Congress opened, the Progressives' plan to delay the election
of the Speaker was thwarted by the Democrats' clear majority, m the
end only four of the sixteen dissidents who had been meeting together
deserted Snell to support George Schneider of Wisconsin for Speaker.
Afterwards, possibly because Snell had the votes, the caucus was not
reconvened to consider Tilson's position that affirmative action was
eded to oust him so Snell remained as Minority Leader. : rl Bachmannne
g
Ibid., Nov. 14, 1931, p. 2; Nov. 26, 1931, p. 20.
^Ibid. , Dec. 1, 1931, p. 1.
^^John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy
,
1921 - 1933
,
(New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 240.
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Of We=t Virginia replaced Albert Vestal of Indiana as Whip. Ho explana-
tion was Offered for the change, but Vestal died a few
.onths later so
he may have been too sick to carry on his duties as Whip.
In 1933 Snell was unani^usly re-elected Minority Leader and Harry
Englebright of California succeeded Bach^nn, one of the casualties of
the 1932 De«>cratlc landslide, as Whip. By 1934. as the Kew Deal was
passed into law over the vigorous opposition of the minority Republicans.
Sneirs ultra-conservatlsm came under fire. w. Kingland Macy, a former
New York Republican Chairman, urged House Republicans to elect a new
Minority Leader because Snell was the nation's "leading, if not the
most intelligent, reactionary."" Macy's public attack on Snell was re-
lated to a debate between the two men in New York politics. Macy, who
planned to run for Governor in 1936, wanted to revitalize the Republi-
can party by moving to the left, but Snell, the head of the conservative
faction of the state party, scoffed at such a notion. After Macy's as-
sault. House Republicans closed ranks behind Snell although Macy stated
that the replies to his telegrams indicated that, even If there were
not enough votes to dump Snell, there was strong dissatisfaction with
1 9
his leadership
. ''^^
In January, 1935, Snell was easily re-elected Minority Leader and
Englebright continued as Whip. Before the caucus, Usher Burdick of
•^"NYT, Nov, 22, 1934, p. 2.
Ibid., Nov. 22, 1934, p. 6; Dec. 8, 1934, p. 7; Dec. 10, 1934,
p. 4; Dec. 21, 1934, p. 13.
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North Dakota had threatened a revolt against Snell but the atte.pt
fizzled when only three of his colleagues joined the protest. Two
months later Snell's leadership was again under attacU. m a front page
story the New York Tinges disclosed that younger
.e.bers (who insisted
upon anonymity) wanted to oust Snell because of his passive leadership
and his failure to develop an alternative to the New Deal for the party
to campaign on in 1936. The reputed challenger was Everett Dirksen of
Illinois, a second term member who had taken more liberal positions
than Snell on issues like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National
Industrial Recovery Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.^"^ Snell
did not think such a junior member could unseat him and Snell 's ally,
Joe Martin of Massachusetts, suspected that the insurgents had over-
estimated their strength. Martin guessed that only "half a dozen"^^
Republicans were involved in the preliminary maneuvering and head-
counting. When an unofficial meeting of the Republican Steering Commit-
tee decided not to convene the caucus to review the leadership, as the
insurgents wanted, the movement to depose Snell quickly collapsed with
16the rebels blaming "premature publicity" for the failure.
^^Ibid. , Dec. 23, 1934, p. 2.
14
Neil MacNeil, Dirksen : Portrait of a Public Man
,
(New York:
World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 48-49; NYT, Mar. 8, 1935, p. 1; and
Mar. 10, 1935, IV, p. 8.
^^NYT, Mar. 11, 1935, p. 4.
Ibid.
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After the 1936 disaster that reduced the Republican contingent
the House to eighty-nine members, Hamilton Fish of New York warned
Snell to acknowledge that a more "liberal platform"" „as needed or face
a rebellion. Although Snell countered by saying that he was a "middle,
of-the-roader," there is no evidence that Snell moderated his views,
but the threatened revolt did not materialize. Both Snell and Engle-
bright stayed in office.
In 1939, Snell, despairing of ever becoming Speaker, retired. The
front runner to succeed him was Martin, a conservative, with close ties
to Snell, but also more approachable and flexible than Snell. In ad-
dition, as chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee, Martin had
received credit for the 1938 comeback. James Wadsworth, who was even
more conservative than Martin, also announced his candidacy. A
patrician, Wadsworth did not relish rough and tumble politics and dis-
liked making deals to sway votes to his side. His campaign manager,
Walter Andrews of New York, found little support for Wadsworth outside
New York and within the New York delegation prominent members like Fish
had declared for Martin before Wadsworth decided to run. Fish also
^^Ibid. , Dec. 2, 1936, p. 11.
'^md.
,
Dec. 9, 1936, p. 15.
19
MacNeil, p. 51; Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 82.
20
Alden Hatch, The Wadsworths of the Genesee
,
(New York: Coward-
McCann, 1959), p. 245; Martin, p. 82; NYT, Nov. 16, 1938, p. 3; Nov. 26,
1938, p. 6.
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thought that Martin
..could combine conservative and liberals in the House
.ore effectively than any other
.ember...^!
.^rly Decen^er, 1938, a
canvass of House Republicans revealed that Martin had the support of 125
of the 170 delegates. By the end of December, estimates of Martin's
strength reached as high as 140 votes. Acknowledging Martin's lead,
Wadsworth withdrew from the race in early January, 1939.^2 ^^^^.^
unanimously elected Minority Leader and Englebright continued as Whip.
Summary of the 1931 - 1941 Contests
Leadership discontent was common among House Republicans during the
depression decade. In 1931, Tilson and Snell battled to replace Long-
vorth; in 1934, Macy called for Snell's ouster; in January, 1935, Burdick
tried to foment a revolt against Snell; in March, 1935, junior members
began sounding out their more senior colleagues about the possibility
of replacing Snell with Dirksen; in 1937, Fish warned Snell that he must
change his outlook in order to avoid a confrontation; and in 1939,
Wadsworth and Martin maneuvered to succeed Snell. Despite the amount
of rumbling and the number of threatened revolts, only two fights
actually erupted--in 1931 and 1939--and both were over vacancies.
The number of fights seems low when compared with the Democrats who
battled in every Congress during this same time span or with the Re-
publicans before 1931, when fights occurred in nearly every Congress
^•"NYT, Nov. 28, 1938, p. 2.
^^NYT, Dec. 2, 1938, p. 2; Dec. 17, 1938, p. 4; Dec. 27, 1938,
p. 10; Jan. 1, 1939, p. 3.
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between 1909 and 1925. CSep t^kIo i f(.bee Table 1 for a summary of the conflict.)
Turnover was not extensive in the Republican hierarchy. Snell
and Martin handled the Minority Leader responsibilities whereas Bach-
mann and Englebright shared the duties of Whip. The only leadership
change that might possibly be attributed to membership dissatisfaction
was Bachmann's replacement of Vestal in 1931 but even this change can
probably be accounted for by the state of Vestal's health. The other
leadership changes were prompted by Longworth's death, Snell 's retire-
ment, and Bachmann's defeat in the 1932 landslide.
The Republicans appeared to be developing a less rigid set of ap-
prenticeship steps for advancement to the top of the leadership ladder
than the Democrats. Snell jumped from the Chairmanship of the Rules
Committee to Minority Leader, leapfrogging over Majority Leader Tilson,
and Martin climbed from a seat on the Rules Committee to Minority
Leader. From 1919 through 1941 all Republican leaders, except the
Whips, had been a member of the Rules, Ways and Means, or Appropria-
tions Committee prior to their election as a party leader. Martin
regarded his appointment to the Rules Committee as "a long step for-
ward. I was on the escalator now, so to speak, and I continued to
move as Longworth picked me as a member of his 'cabinet' as his steer-
23
ing committee was called." Moreover, both Snell and Martin had b°en
informal party leaders before their elevation as Minority Leader.
Snell had been a partner in the Longworth triumvirate and Martin,
besides being a member of Longworth's steering committee, became
Martin, p. 63.
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TABLE 1
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1931-1941
1931 Vacant-Party be-
came minority;
Speaker Long-
worth died.
1933 No vacancy
1935 No vacancy
1937 No vacancy
1939 Vacancy-Snell
retired.
1931 No vacancy
1933 Vacant
-Bachmann
defeated in 1932
election.
1935 No vacancy
1937 No vacancy
Minority Leader
Contest-2 major rivals
plus some favorite sons
from Midwest; decided
on 8th ballot at caucus
after Majority Leader
Tilson withdrew.
No contest
No contest-some talk of
revolt but no alternate
candidate publicly came
forward.
No contest-more rumbling
but no organized action.
Contest-2 candidates; one
withdrew before caucus.
Whip
Whip changed, possibly
because Vestal was ill.
Whip changed.
No change
No change
Snell elected
Snell re-elected
Snell re-elected
Snell re-elected
Martin elected
Bachmann
selected
Englebright
selected
Englebright
selected
Englebright
selected
1939 No vacancy No change Englebright
selected
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Snell's "unofficial assistant" in 1933. Hius, the Republican high
coramand was recruited from a relatively small circle whose members
were on inportant committees and had been given decision making re-
sponsibilities by the incumbent leadership. Unlike the Democrats,
no one individual, such as the Majority Leader, wcs singled out for
future promotion, but a small pool of Republicans seemed eligible for
advancement. Such a system provides flexibility but likely encourages
contests between equals.
Outside intervention, which had subsided during the Republicans'
last minority phase, again dropped off in the 1930' s. Hoover, who
apparently leaned toward Tilson in his duel with Snell, never pub-
licly endorsed Tilson and there is no evidence that any member of
the Hoover administration intervened on Tilson' s behalf. The only
example of outside interference was Macy's barrage of telegrams de-
manding that Snell be replaced, but this proposal backfired as even
Midwestern Congressmen immediately pledged their support to Snell.
Analysis of the Variables , 1931- 1941
Majority -minority status . Peabody hypothesized that minority
status was one of the conditions that contributed to the Republicans'
spate of fights between 1955 and 1966. During the 1911 to 1919
minor-
ity interlude, Congresses with contests had been more
frequent in the
Republican party than during either majority interval before 1931.
Between 1931 and 1941, however, there was a decline
in the amount of
Ibid.
,
p. 73.
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conflict. In the 1930's contests developed in 40 per cent of the
Congresses, but in the preceding majority phase, from 1919 to 1931,
leadership struggles occurred in 50 per cent of the Congresses.
Compared with the majority Democrats in the 1930' s, the difference
in the frequency of fights is dramatic. The majority Democrats, ex-
pected to be less prone to conflict, engaged in seven battles or over
three times the number of brawls waged by the minority Republicans
during this decade. Before 1931 the Democrats as both a majority and
minority party had been less combative than the Republicans so the
1930 's marked a reversal in the previous pattern.
The size of the party seemed to be related to the formation of
a contest. As Table 2 indicates, the larger the Republican contingent,
the more likely the party was to compete. In 1931 when the Republicans
were just shy of a majority and in 1939 when they held 38.9 per cent
of the House seats, they quarreled over the Minority Leader. The 1931
contest is particularly reminiscent of earlier Republican clashes.
Before 1931 contests occurred in five of the nine Congresses in
which the Republicans' proportion of seats hovered near 50 per cent.
When the Republicans were reduced to a tiny minority in the 1930' s,
ranging from 20.5 per cent to 27.1 per cent of the House membership,
no leadership challenge was pushed beyond the discussion stage even
though there was a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Snell.
Election returns
. From 1930 until 1938 the Republicans suffered
a series of election defeats, with two of them large enough to meet
Peabody's thirty to fifty seat threshold criterion needed to trigger
a contest. As Table 3 underscores, in 1931, after the Republicans
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TABLE 2
PARTY SIZE AND CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941
Size of Party # of Congresses # of fights
40.0 to 49.9% 1
^
30.0 to 39.9% 1 1
Under 30.0% 3 q
TABLE 3
REPUBLICAN ELECTION RETURNS, 1931-1941
# of House Seats Change from Previous % of Republi
Won Election Seats
1931 213
-54 49.0
1933 118
-95 27.1
1935 102 -16 23.4
1937 89 -13 20.5
1939 169 +80 38.9
indicates a contest
lost fifty-four seats, a fight did ensue, but in 1933, after the whop-
ping loss of ninety-five seats, no challenge was mounted. Moreover,
contrary to expectations, there was a contest following the 1938 come-
back victory in which the Republicans gained eighty seats. Thus,
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Republican contests developed after a .oajor defeat and a significant
victory whereas the three stable Congresses all coincided with elec-
tion defeats, two of which were mild, although cun^ulaLive, setbacks
but one was the worst Republican loss in history.
Membership chan^. The two contests of the 1930 's occurred under
contrasting conditions, as Table 4 illustrates. In 1931, when Snell
and Tilson clashed, the Republican membership in the House was ex-
ceptionally stable and showed little change from the previous Congress,
TABLE 4
REPUBLICAN CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1931-1941
^^^^ 7o New Members 7o Incumbents
1931 9.4 90.6
1933 25.4 74.6
1935 26.5 73.5
1937 19.1 80.9
1939 49.1 50.9
indicates a contest
Over ninety per cent of the Republicans elected to the 72nd Congress
were incumbents. On the other hand, the 1939 battle developed when
the Republican membership was undergoing rapid change produced by the
party's first election upswing in a decade. Almost half the Republi-
cans elected to the House in 1939 were newcomers. The three Con-
gresses without leadership fights were all characterized by moderate
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levels of membership turnover, with new xnexnbers ranging from 19.1 per
cent to 26.5 per cent. In short, conflict erupted, as anticipated,
when the Congressional party was unstable and fluid, but also when
the Republican membership was nearly static.
Hierarchy
.
A large freshman class was one of the variables that
was expected to provoke leadership contests. As Table 5 shows, of the
two Republican battles in this period, only the 1939 example cor-
responds to the theory. In 1939 the largest freshman class since
1915 was present in the Martin-Wadsworth fight, but in the 1931 con-
test less than 10 per cent of the Republicans were freshmen to make
it the smallest group of Republican freshmen elected between 1895 and
1941. Congresses in which the freshman class was in the medium range,
TABLE 5
CONFLICT AND SENIORITY IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941
Year Z Freshman % Sophomores % Seniors
1931 9.4 14.6 37.1
1933 22.0 9.3 37.3
1935 20.6 18.6 32.4
1937 16.9 16.9 36.0
1939 43.8 12.4 22.5
indicates a contest
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between 16.9 and 22.0 per cent, were consistently stable. Thus, as
with membership turnover, the contests occurred at the two extremes-
when freshmen were either very plentiful or very scarce-whereas the
stable Congresses clustered in the middle of the scale.
Adding sophomores to freshmen did nothing to clarify the re-
lationship between junior classes and leadership conflict.
With seniority, opposite sets of conditions continued to be at-
tributes of the contest Congresses. In 1931, over one-third of the
Republicans had at least ten years experience in the House. Except
for 1933, there were more senior Republicans in 1931 than in any
other Congress between 1895 and 1941. The 1939 skirmish, in contrast,
developed when the proportion of senior members was the lowest in this
decade. The three stable Congresses coincided with large senior
classes as expected.
In sum, in 1931 there was a large reservoir of senior members
and a small freshmen class but in 1939 the pool of veterans was de-
clining and the proportion of freshmen was expanding rapidly. One
possible reason conflict developed under such diverse conditions was
that the fights were very different types. The 1939 contest was over
a vacancy with no obvious heir apparent and would neatly fit into
25
Peabody's "open competition" category. The absence of a designated
successor along with a large, uncommitted body of freshmen made an
attractive opportunity for members with leadership ambitions. The
Robert Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States
House of Representatives," American Political Science Review
,
LXI
(September, 1967), pp. 677-678).
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1931 battle, instead, was xnore of a revolt. Although there was a
vacancy, Tilson was son^thing of an heir apparent since he had been
re-elected Majority Leader only ten months before his rejection as
Minority Leader. Moreover, because Tilson championed Hoover's poli-
cies, his defeat was widely interpreted by journalists and politicians
alike as a revolt against Hoover's inability to cope with the de-
pression by rank-and-file Republicans. Other revolts such as the at-
tempt to curb Cannon in 1909 or the effort by the Wilsonian Demo-
crats to depose Clark in 1917 also occurred when there was a large
bloc of senior members. Depth of seniority, instead of inhibiting
conflict, may actually encourage the formation of contests when vet-
eran Congressmen sense their careers are in jeopardy either at the
polls or inside the House because of the behavior of their party
leaders
.
Regional factionalism
. As Table 6 shows, both fights in the
1930 's took place when the Midwest was the largest regional faction
in the House Republican party. When Western representatives are added
to the figures for the Midwest, the two regions controlled over a
majority of the seats on the Republican side of the aisle each time
a battle materialized. In the three Congresses free of conflict in
the 1930' s, the East, instead, was the dominant faction. In 1935
the East was just short of a majority and in 1933 and 1937 the East
surpassed the other regions by a wide lead. These findings are con-
sistent with the pre-1931 Republican pattern in which fights usually
broke out when the Midwest was either enlarging or the strongest
regional group within the Republican party.
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TABLE 6
REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND CONFLICT IN
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941
Year % from Midwest 7 f-mm v^^t- "in/o ro East from West % from South
—
and Border States
1931 41.3 39.9 11.7 7.0
1933 32.2 56.8 9.3 1.7
"'^^ ^7.2 49.0 8.8 4.9
1937 38.2 51.7 5.6 4.5
1939 46.7 42.0 7.7
indicates a contest
Ideological factionalism. When the decade opened, the Progressives
remained an important minority bloc within the Republican party. See
Table 7 for the details. In 1931, in the early stages of the contest,
the Progressives held the balance of power in the evenly divided House
and planned to use this leverage to force the adoption of more liberal
policies. As the Republicans' narrow lead dwindled away, the Pro-
gressives lost their bargaining wedge and after 1931 the Progressives
faded away as an important voice in the Republican party. One reason
for the decline of the Progressives was that as the Republicans shrank
to such a tiny minority in the 1930's the Progressives could no longer
thwart the rest of the party by withholding votes on crucial organiza-
tional matters. In addition, the Progressives were weakened internally
when the Wisconsin Progressives abandoned their ties with the
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TABLE 7
^"^J^f °^ ™ PROGRESSIVE BLOC INTHE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941
Year # of Repub- # of Pro-
gressives
% of Pro-
gressives
ir of VOtpR P
o
publicans short
of majority
1931 213 16 "7 r~7.5 5
1933 118 17 14.4 100
1935 102 10 9.8 116
1937 89 12 13.5 129
1939 169 14 8.3 49
indicates a contest
Republican party. Moreover, as the old reformers retired from the
House and died, they were replaced by Democrats or by more conserva-
tive Republicans rather than by younger Progressives. Finally, as the
New Deal became more attuned to the problems of the cities, some of
the few remaining Progressives turned against the New Deal and began
to return to the conservative mainstream of the Republican party. By
the end of the decade, the locus of liberal thought among Republicans
had shifted from the Midwest to the East.^^ Eastern liberals, how-
ever, were too few and too junior to influence or shape the outcome
of leadership contests.
^^^arry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority Role, 1933-
1938," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. State University of Iowa
1960), pp. 315-323.
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Julius Turner's research confirn^ that the ideological split in
the Republican party became less severe in the 1930's. House Republi-
cans registered cohesion scores of 71.7 in 1933 and 70.2 in 1937. These
figures indicate that the Republicans were more unified in the 1930 's
than they had been in the 1920 's or than the Democrats were in the
1930's.^^
Thus, ideological fragmentation-one of the key characteristics
of Republican leadership battles prior to 19 31
-continued to be as-
sociated with Republican contests in 1931, but by 1939 ideological
factionalism had ceased to be an important element in the leadership
conflict.
Congruence. Although the Midwest was one of the two strongest
regions within the Republican party in the 1930' s, the Midwest had no
party leadership representation after Longworth's death in 1931. Both
of the Minority Leaders between 1931 and 1941 were Easterners, which
mirrored the East's prominence in three of the five Congresses, and the
Whips hailed from peripheral areas. Bachmann came from a Border State
and Englebright was from California, which elected few Republicans to
Congress during the depression. The only other period in which the Re-
publicans had failed to include a Midwesterner in the leadership hierar-
chy was between 1895 and 1899, when the leaders had been recruited ex-
clusively from the East. One reason for the Midwest's underrepresenta-
tion in the 1930 's was that after the 1932 election there were few
27
Julius Turner, Party and Constituency : Pressures on Congress
,
ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951)
,
p. 21,
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Mldwesterners with extensive seniority. Table 8 presents the comparative
data for Eastern and Midwestern veteran Congressmen, but even these
figures over-estimate the realistic nu„*er of potential leaders from
the Midwest. Several of the senior Mldwestemers were Progressives with
pro-New Deal voting records, especially In the earlier Congresses, and
were not con^atlble with the overwhelming majority of their Republican
colleagues.
TABLE 8
SENIOR REPUBLICANS CLASSIFIED BY REGION, 1931-1941
Year # of Senior Republicans # from East # from Midwest
1931
1933
1935
1937
1939
79
44
33
32
38
33
30
20
16
19
32
12
8
10
13
In terms of ideology, the leadership more accurately paralleled the
membership in that all the leaders were conservatives. In fact, the
leaders may have been to the right of the bulk of the memibership. One
roll call study of the 1930 's places Snell, Martin, and Wadsworth among
2!the twenty most conservative Republicans or in the "ultra-conservative"
^Morris, pp. 27, 90-91, and 227.
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faction of the House Republican
.e:^ership. m 1939, there was a fairly
widespread feeling that Martin was .ore of a moderate than either Snell
or Wadsworth. Although he was likely less conservative than Wadsworth
who even voted against Social Security when three-quarters of the Re-
publicans in the House voted in favor of the act, llartin's overall voting
record before 1939 does not justify a xnoderate label. Martin, however,
had a wanner, friendlier personality and was better at listening and
working with members with whom he disagreed than either Snell or Wads-
worth. Consequently, at the time of his initial selection, Martin's
reputation for moderateness, like Speaker Gilletfs, may have rested
more on personal traits than on his voting record.
Summary of the Variables
, 1931-1941
The contests of 1931 and 1939 developed under very different circum-
stances. In 1931 the Republicans had lost enough seats in the House to
be demoted to minority status, there were few freshmen, senior Congress-
men composed over one- third of the membership and incumbents accounted
for more than 90 per cent of the members. In terms of factional align-
ments, the Midwest was the largest regional bloc and the Progressives,
at least in the early stages of the battle, wielded power beyond their
raw numbers because of the near deadlock between Democrats and Republi-
cans. In 1939, instead, the Republicans were still the minority party
29
"William E. Sullivan, "Criteria for Selecting Party Leadership in
Congress: An Empirical Test," American Politics Quarterly
, III (January,
1975), pp. 25-44.
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but had Just staged an eighty seat comeback; the membership was changing
rapidly; there was a large freshman class; the proportion of senior
representative, had dropped substantially; the Midwest was the pre-
dominant sectional faction; and the ideological cleavage in the party
was no longer so deep. The only conditions that were common to both
battles were minority status and the prominence of the Midwest. Minor-
ity status, as noted earlier, had limited value in forecasting conflict
in the Republican party but factionalism had been extremely useful in
predicting previous Republican battles. Before 1931 there had been a
90 per cent chance for a fight when the Midwestern faction was expanding
or when the Progressives (or other dissident bloc) composed one-fourth
of the Republican membership or had the votes necessary to jeopardize
the Republicans' organization of the House. When none of these con-
ditions had been present before 1931, no contest developed. Between
1931 and 1941 the pattern continued as factional variables again sep-
arated Congresses with contests from those without leadership conflict
exceptionally well. In the 1930 's a fight erupted whenever there was a
large Midwestern delegation or the Progressives had improved their bar-
gaining position, but when neither characteristic was evident, the
leadership was secure. Table 9 summarizes the strong association between
factionalism and leadership conflict in the Republican party between 1895
and 1941. Table 9 first repeats the last table from Chapter III and then
adds the data from the 1930's. There is a slight variation in the
measurement of the Midwestern delegation in the 1930 's for the contests
no longer coincided with a growing Midwestern contingent but with a
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TABLE 9
FACTIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP COOTLICT IN THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1941
1895-1931
Rising Midwestern Progressives Held Progressives or FamRepresentation Votf^ i-n r>«r.^i«oi ^^^oi-essi aruiv ces to Deadlock Bloc Composed 15% of
^^o'^se Membership
1899 .
1903
1911
1903
1909
1911
1913
1917 1917
1919 1919
1923 1923 1923
1925
1927 1927 1927
1931-1941
Midwest Largest Progressives Held
Regional Bloc Votes to Deadlock
House
1931 1931
1939
indicates a contest
Midwestern plurality. As Table 9 demonstrates, when one of the three
indices of factionalism was present between 1895 and 1941, a fight de-
veloped in eleven out of twelve cases. When none of these conditions
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existed, the Republicans did not wage a single leadership contest.
Leadership Fights
, 1941-1955
From 1941 until 1947 Martin was re-elected Minority Leader by
acclatnation. The only Congress in which a clash seemed possible was in
1943. The Republicans had gained heavily in the off-year election and
the conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had
accordingly been strengthened. Wadsworth was the leader of the con-
servative coalition in the House and there was some speculation that
as the real power to lead and to shape policy flowed from Martin to
Wadsworth, Wadsworth might try to legitimize or formalize his informal
leadership role by challenging Martin for the Minority Leadership. In
30spite of the rumors, no revolt was organized. The only Leadership
change that did take place in this time span was the selection of Leslie
Arends as Whip to replace Englebright, who died in May, 1943.
In 1947 the Republicans won control of the House of Representatives
for the first time since 1929 and the quarreling over the distribution
of the leadership posts began the morning after the election. Martin's
elevation to the Speakership was regarded as a certainty but a number
of candidates started campaigning for the Majority Leadership. All the
contenders were from the Midwest. The two chief rivals were Charles
Halleck of Indiana, Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign
Committee, and Clarence Brown of Ohio, campaign director for the
30'
nYI , Nov. 8, 1942, p. 12
^^Ibid. , Nov. 6, 1946, p. 2.
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was
Republican National Committee. Both were considered the architects of
the 1946 victory and had "strong backing within the party ranks. "32
Although both man were conservative, they had ties to different presi-
dential contenders. Brown was close to Robert Taft whereas Halleck
reputed to belong to the Willkie-Dewey wing of the party even though
his voting record showed few signs of a liberal bias.^^ Furthermore,
in personality Brown and Halleck were vastly different. Brown ran a
subdued campaign, after announcing he was "available, but not campaign-
34
ing," and was popular with party elders who liked his competence and
modesty. Halleck, in contrast, was a more junior member, aggressive,
and had a talent for irritating his colleagues with his high pressure
tactics. Other candidates for Majority Leader were Thomas Jenkins of
Ohio, who spoiled Brown's chances by dividing the Ohio delegation, and
Dirksen of Illinois. Many Republicans speculated that Jenkins, who
had more seniority than Brown, had been flattered into running by
Halleck in order to neutralize Brown. Dirksen was apparently a self-
starter, who waged a half-hearted effort with backing from only the
35
large Illinois delegation.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid
. , Dec. 29, 1946, VI, p. 11.
^^Ibid. , Nov. 14, 1946, p. 32.
Henry Z . Scheele , Charlie Halleck : A Political Biography, (New
York: Exposition Press, 1966), p. Ill; MacNeil, pp. 77-78.
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In early December, 1946, Governor Thomas Dewey provoked a storm by
endorsing Halleck for the Majority Leadership. Before the announcement,
Dewey had conferred with the New York delegates, who planned to vote as
a bloc for Halleck and expected him to win. The furor erupted when Dewey
said Halleck "was entitled to the leadership by seniority and ability.
Jenkins, who had ten years more seniority than Halleck, quickly charged
that Dewey intended to "direct Congressional activities in the House
through Charlie Halleck"^'' while other Republicans interpreted Dewey's
endorsement as a move to stop the formation of a Taft-Ohio combine on
the way to the 1948 presidential nomination.
After Dewey's entrance into the battle, the fight became a heated,
bitter dispute pitting the Taft and Dewey forces. Arguments began to
rage over Martin's presidential preference as the Taft camp insisted
that Brown must be elected to offset Martin, who, in their view, be-
longed to the Dewey wing of the party. On the other hand, an article
in the New York Times placed Martin in Taft's corner and predicted a
rift between Martin and Halleck--if Halleck should be elected--because
38they would be pulled in opposing directions in presidential politics.
Finally, Clare Hoffman of Michigan thought the best way to resolve the
impasse was to select a compromise choice as Majority Leader and warned
those jockeying for presidential hopefuls to stay out of the fight:
^^NYT, Dec. 19, 1946, p. 1.
37
Scheele, p. 111.
p. 11,
Compare NYT, Dec. 27, 1946, p. 5, and NYT, Dec. 29, 1946, VI,
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le con-
Let me repeat: Let the members of Congressattend to their Congressional duties- polltlci-„,
litiTsM'- ^"="-"^1 -„didates'.^:p";t':r
Toward the end of December, Bro™ suddenly withdrew from th
test m order to restore harmony. Some observers, however, believed
that there was a connection between Taffs recent election in the Senat
as Chairman of the Republican Policy Co»ittee and Brown's withdrawal.
With Taffs star rising in the Senate, the Taft wing no longer needed
the House Majority Leadership to balance the Dewey adherents and de-
cided not to risk losing the first test for 1948. The morning of the
caucus Jenkins and Dlrksen also withdrew so Halleck was elected with-
40out opposition. Arends stayed on as Whip.
In 1949, the Republicans were returned to minority status and
Martin told reporters that he would have to check with the members
before declaring his candidacy for Minority Leader. Martin suspected
that the liberals might want to oust him. Governor Ernest Gibson of
Vermont called for a leadership change in the House because of Presi-
dent Truman's success in exploiting the record of the 80th Congress.
Young Republican associations at Eastern colleges urged the party to
decide on the type of presidential candidate they wanted to nominate
in 1952 and then elect Congressional leaders who would be compatible.
^^NYT, Dec. 27, 1946, p. 5.
40
Ibid., Jan. 1, 1947, p. 6; Jan. 3, 1947, pp. 1, 4.
41
Ibid., Nov. 5, 1948, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1948, p. 23; Dec. 9, 1948,
p. 41.
275
Despite signs of opposition to Martin from spokesmen outside the House
of Representatives, the New York Tmes predicted that Martin would be
re-elected Minority Leader easily. The Times' reasoning was that most
of the Congressional delegation consisted of "oldtimers" who had sup-
ported Martin before and that Martin "typified-'^^ the House Republican
membership.
At the caucus Martin was elected unanimously and Arends continued
as Whip. Halleck, the former Majority Leader, of course, was left with-
out a leadership title. Halleck wanted a formal office but he was un-
willing to challenge Arends. Arends' Illinois district bordered Hal-
leck 's Indiana constituency and the two men had developed a strong per-
sonal friendship. Instead, Halleck asked Martin to create a new post
of Assistant Minority Leader for Halleck, but Martin turned down the
request. Martin intended to "infuse new blood into the high command
by selecting half a dozen 'young and vigorous' members as unofficial
44
assistants" and hoped Halleck would be one of these aides. Next Hal-
leck asked Martin to promise to back Halleck for Majority Leader if
Martin should become Speaker again. Martin refused "because there was
at the time considerable d isgruntlement with Halleck in the ranks. Two
or three other men had intimated that they might want to run for leader
42
Both quotes are from NYT, Nov. 21, 1948, IV, p. 7,
43
Scheele, p. 126.
44
NYT, Jan. 1, 1949, p. 2,
I
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themselves. ""^^ From Halleck's point of view, Martin's decisions left
his future as a Republican leader uncertain, but Halleck made no effort
to mobilize a rebellion against either Martin or Arends in 1949.
In 1951 Martin and Arends were again chosen without opposition.
In 1953, with the Republicans capturing both branches of Congress
and the Presidency for the first time since 1929, Martin's re-election
as Speaker was considered "virtually certain"^^ although there were
rumors of a Halleck challenge floating around the House. Martin and
Halleck, however, both brushed aside the gossip as newspaper specula-
tion, Dwight Eisenhower's memoirs seem to confirm that no revolt
against Martin was underway in 1953. Eisenhower wrote that in 1955,
1957, and 1959, Halleck sought Eisenhower's acquiescence for a race
47
against Martin but that no such conference was held in 1953. At the
caucus, Martin, Halleck, and Arends—the same three officers from the
last majority Congress --were elected without a dissenting voice.
Summary of the 1941 - 1955 Contests
As Table 10 indicates, 1941 to 1955 was the quietest period in the
Republican party, for only one leadership contest developed. In 1947
four Midwesterners skirmished over the Majority Leader opening. Aside
45
Martin, p. 14.
46
NYT, Nov. 6, 1952, p. 21.
^^
Ibid . , Nov. 11, 1952, p. 23; Scheele, p. 141; Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Mandate for Change ; The White House Years, 1953-1956, (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 442 and Waging Peace : The White
House Years
,
1956 - 1961
,
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), p.
384.
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Year
1947
1953
1947
1953
1947
1953
1941
1943
1945
1949
1951
TABLE 10
REPUBLICM LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955
Status of Post
Vacant
-New Ma-
jority party.
Vacant-New Ma-
jority party
Vacant
-New Ma-
jority party.
Vacant
-New Ma-
jority party.
Vacant-New Ma-
jority party.
Vacant-New Ma-
jority party.
No vacancy
No vacancy
No vacancy
V-icant-Party be-
came Minority
No vacancy
What Happened Outcome
Speaker
No contest
No contest
Majority Leader
Martin elected
Martin elected
Contest-four con- Halleck elected
tenders; all but
one withdrew before
caucus
.
No contest- former
Majority Leader
re-elected.
Halleck elected
Majority Whip
No contest
No contest
Minority Leader
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
Arends elected
Arends elected
Martin re-elected
Martin re-elected
Martin re-elected
Martin elected
Martin re-elected
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TABLE 10 (continued)
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955
Year Status of Post
1941 No vacancy
1943 a. No vacancy
b. Vacant-Engle-
bright died.
1945 No vacancy
1949 Vacant-Party be-
came Minority
What Happened
Minority Whip
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
No contest
Outcome
Englebright re-
elected
Englebright re-
elected
Arends elected
Arends re-elected
Arends elected
1951 No vacancy No contest Arends re-elected
from this battle, there was some talk in 1943 that Wadsworth might try
to capture the Minority Leadership from Martin, but there is no evidence
that Wadsworth took any concrete steps to rally support and in 1949 Hal-
leck was obviously upset over relinquishing his post when the Republi-
cans returned to the minority. His efforts to retain an office, how-
ever, were confined to pressuring Martin behind the scenes.
The leadership in this interval was exceedingly stable. Martin
headed the House Republicans during both minority and majority phases
and after Arends' selection as Whip in 1943, he also continued in his
job whatever the party's fortunes at the polls. Each time the Republi-
cans became the majority party, Halleck won election as Majority Leader.
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I-lKe the De^crats with Sa. RayWn. the KepuhUcans shuttled Mattln hac.
and forth between the Speakership and the Minority Leadership, but un-
like the arrangement for John McCor^ck. the Republicans :..de no con.-
parable provision for moving Hallprk f^-^T,, •u iiec rom Majority Leader to Minority
Whip.
One interesting point noted in the 1930 's was that in contrast to
the Democrats the Republicans seemed to groom a circle of eligible cax.di-
dates for the top party leadership posts rather than concentrate on a
single individual such as the Majority Leader. Younger members with
leadership potential were co-opted into the hierarchy by being tapped
for party assignments like the Steering Committee, the Campaign Commit-
tee, or unofficial assistant to the floor leader and by being appointed
to the most prestigious House committees. Before his initial election
as Majority Leader Halleck had gained experience via this route as the
chairman of the Campaign Committee and as a member of the Rules Committee
whereas his chief opponent, Brown, had served on the Rules Committee also
and on the campaign committee of the Republican National Committee.
Martin apparently wanted to continue this type of loosely structured re-
cruiting arrangement when he decided to pick six aides to assist him in
1949, but Halleck wanted to establish a more definite pecking order along
the lines of the Democratic leadership ladder.
Outside intervention in the Republican struggles, which had reached
a low point during the depression, was rekindled in the mid-1940' s as
the Republicans began winning Congressional elections and as their
chances for taking the Presidency looked brighter. Both Taft and Dewey
as candidates for the Presidential nomination were keenly interested and
280
involved in the outcome of the 1947 Majority Leadership contest, and
after the unexpected Republican defeat in 1948 various moderate and
liberal voices, ranging from an Eastern governor to Young Republican
clubs, began examining the interrelationship between the Republican
convention platform and the Republicans' voting record in Congress. In
1953 Eisenhower did not participate in the House leadership election,
but after 1953 Eisenhower's counsel was sought at the start of each new
Congress. Eisenhower's involvement after 1953 was not unusual in Re-
publican politics since Roosevelt, Taft, and Coolidge had also been
drawn into Republican battles and rumors about McKinley's and Hoover's
choices had been common.
Analysis of the Variables
,
1941 -1955
Majority -minority status
. Minority status had been expected to
produce increased conflict, but in the five Congresses in which the Re-
publicans were the minority party between 1941 and 1955, no fights ma-
terialized. Instead, the Republicans' only quarrel developed in one of
the two Congresses in which they won control of the House. The long
range statistics indicate that from 1895 to 1955 the Republicans bat-
tled over the leadership in twelve Congresses~-seven times while in the
majority and five times while a minority party. In sum, as with the
Democrats, majority-minority status was not of value in predicting
leadership conflict in the Republican party.
As Table 11 shows, the 1947 contest occurred when the size of the
Republican party was at its peak. This pattern was somewhat unusual for
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TABLE 11
SIZE OF PARTY AND REPUBLICAN CONTESTS, 1941-1955
7o of Republican Members # of Congresses # of Contests
Over 55 1 1
45 to 55 3 0
Under 45 3 0
the Republicans for only two other Republican contests had occurred when
the Republicans held over 55 per cent of the seats in the House. The
more typical pattern was for contests to develop when the Republican
share of seats clustered around 50 per cent. After 1931, however, this
relationship disappeared probably because the Progressives, who had
strategically used a narrowly divided House to win concessions from
the regulars, had faded away as a significant faction within the Re-
publican party.
Election returns
. "Strong victories," according to Peabody, "pro-
moted good will" and severe defeats caused "pessimism, hostility, and a
search for scapegoats." The data in Table 12, however, show that the
lone Republican fight between 1941 and 1955 followed the party's biggest
victory in nearly two decades. On the other hand, the Republicans'
worst defeat in this period occurred in 1948 when Dewey lost the Presi-
dency and House Republicans dropped seventy-four seats and reverted to
Teabody, pp. 687-688.
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TABLE 12
REPUBLICAN ELECTION RETURNS, 1941-1955
Year # of Seats Change from Last
Election
1941 162
1943 208 +46
1945 191
-17
1947 245 +54
1949 171
-74
1951 199 +28
1953 221 +22
"L Republican Seats
- 7 37.2
47.8
43.9
56.3
39,3
45.7
50.8
indicates a contest
minority status. Because the record of the Republican-led 80th Congress
had been Truman's trump issue, Martin expected a backlash against his
leadership. Nevertheless, the anticipated revolt did not materialize.
Thus, the hypothesis that victory fosters leadership stability and de-
feat tends to contribute to conflict would appear to be invalid for the
Republican party for this fourteen year interval. In the sixty year
period covered by this study, however, defeats were associated more
often than victories with conflict in the Republican party. Of the
sixteen Congresses that followed an electoral downturn, contests broke
out in seven or 43.8 per cent of them. Of the fourteen Congresses that
followed election upturns, contests erupted in five or 35.7 per cent of
them.
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iiSabershlE Change. The leadership contest of 1947 occurred ,*en
the Repuhlican party was undergoing substantial
.e^ershlp change, as
Tahle 13 illustrates, m 1947 slightly over 30 per cent of the Republi-
cans had not served In the last Congress, but the figures fro™ 1943
tend to undercut the significance of this relationship, m 1943 «hen
an equally large proportion of the meri>ers were newcomers, no contest
ensued. Except for 1943, the Congresses without leadership struggles
were associated with low (under 15 per cent) or moderate (15 to 26 per
cent) rates of turnover. The high percentage of incumbents in 1949-
over 90 per cent-may provide some Insight into why Martin was not
TABLE 13
REPUBLICAN CONFLICT AMD MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1941-1955
Y^ar X New Members 7o Incumbents
1941 17.2
1943 30.8
1945 12.0
1947 30.6
1949 9.9
1951 25.1 74.9
1953 22.6 77.4
82.8
69.2
88.0
69.4
90.1
indicates a contest
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challenged in 1949 although he would have been a convenient scapegoat
to blazne for the 1948 debacle. Such a high rate of incund,ency meant
that there were few Republican members who had not ratified or con-
tributed to Martin's unanimous election as Speaker two years earlier.
In addition, if indeed the voting record that Truman attacked so suc-
cessfully had really hurt Dewey's chances, then these same incumbents
shared Martin's blame for the defeat since they had helped compile the
record, but in their view Dewey rather than Martin was the culprit.
Hierarchy. In 1947, when the fight over the Majority Leader took
place, the proportion of freshmen was high--over 25 per cent, but in
1943, when no battle occurred, the percentage of freshmen was even
higher. As Table 14 indicates, with the exception of 1943, the stable
Congresses had smaller freshmen classes, particularly in 1945 and 1949
when Republican freshmen dropped below 10 per cent of the membership.
If freshmen and sophomores are combined, 1947 represents the mid-
point in junior members. The Congresses without leadership clashes be-
fore 1947 tended to have higher rates of junior members than the stable
Congresses that followed the 1947 skirmish.
Seniority was lowest in 1947 when Halleck won the Majority Leader-
ship, which does tend to support Peabody's thesis that a pool of ex-
perienced members can stabilize the party but the absence of a large
bloc of senior representatives can be conducive to conflict. In ad-
dition, in 1949 when Martin feared that he might be ousted, the pro-
portion of senior Republicans jumped dramatically from 19.2 to 36.8
per cent because the large freshmen class of 1939 had come of age.
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Year
1941
1943
1945
1947
1949
1951
1953
TABLE 14
REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1941-1955
7o Freshmen
16.7
27.4
9.9
25.3
8.2
19.6
21.7
°L Sophomores
35.2
14.9
24.1
10.6
19.3
9.5
17.6
% Seniors
22.8
21.1
25.1
19.2
36.8
31.2
34.4
indicates a contest
In 1949 not only did Martin benefit from a high incumbency rate but
over one-third of his colleagues had been in the House since Martin was
initially elevated to a party leadership post. The very group from
which a rival candidate would have to be recruited consisted of the Re-
publicans who had helped elect Martin to the Minority Leadership four
previous times.
One note of caution should be added here. A stable membership,
top heavy with senior people seems to have helped prevent a revolt
against Martin in 1949 , but in 1931 these same conditions had been as-
sociated with the revolt against Tilson. That similar conditions
should appear to produce opposite results seems paradoxical. Table 15
points up this anomaly in Republican contests. From 1895 to 1955
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TABLE 15
SENIORITY AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONFLICT IN
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1955
No contest iq
assignments or rules.
49
Revolt
Republicans
24.5
Contest over vacancy 9
or to inqjrove committee ^^'^
26.4
seniority was lowest on the average in contests over vacancies or over
the rules. Seniority was higher on the average in both Congresses with-
out any type of conflict and in Congresses with revolts. A large bloc
of senior members apparently can be a mixed blessing to the incumbent
leadership. If there is little disenchantment among the senior repre-
sentatives, as in 1949, it may be hard to start a revolt because there
is no effective challenger, but if the senior members feel the incumbent
leader or heir apparent is a hindrance to the party, then there is a
large reservoir of potential candidates from which to pick a new leader.
49
The three revolts involved leaders who symbolized or were identi-
fied with a discredited policy- -Cannon, Mann (who was charged with
Cannonism)
,
and Tilson, who became the scapegoat for Hoover. Some of
the fights classified as contests over rules had elements of revolt
but they were not serious attempts to oust the incumbent leader or
heir apparent. Instead, they were efforts to improve the Progressives'
bargaining position in the party.
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Regional factionalism. The 1947 struggle occurred when the Midwest
was the largest geographical delegation on the Republican side but de-
clining in strength, as Table 16 depicts. Neither condition seemed
significant in forecasting conflict because the Midwest was the largest
delegation in every Congress in this time span and Midwestern power de-
creased in three of the seven Congresses. Thus, the old Republican pat-
tern, in which contests would usually follow a rise in Midwestern
strength from 1895 to 1931 or a Midwestern plurality from 1931 to 1939
,
broke down beginning in 1941. For the first time since 1895 regional
factionalism did not appear to be related to Republican conflict.
TABLE 16
REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND CONFLICT
IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1941-1955
Year
1941
1943
1945
1947
1949
1951
1953
7o from East
36.4
35.1
36.6
36.3
36.8
34.7
33.4
7o from Mid-
west
% from West
50.0
45.7
46.6
41.2
43.9
45.2
40.7
9.3
11.1
9.9
13.1
14.6
13.6
17.2
% from South
and
Border States
4.3
8.2
6.8
9.4
4.7
6.5
8.6
indicates a contest
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Ideological factionalism. The Republicans were highly cohesive
on roll call voting between 1941 and 1955 with scores of 70.8 in 1944,
76.7 in 1948. and 69.9 in 1953. These scores equal the high level of
unity achieved in the mid and late 1930 's. The 1947 contest developed
at the beginning of the Congress in which the Republicans reached their
greatest unity between 1921 and 1967 according to Turner's updated
50
study. David Truinan argued that in the 81st Congress the Republicans,
in spite of their overall level of accord, were frequently fragmented
into state blocs. Unlike the Progressive-regular cleavage that endured
from Congress to Congress for nearly three decades, the dissenting
groups observed by Truman did not persist even from issue to issue and
were difficult to label as liberal or conservative because the differ-
ences between the dissidents and the majority of the party were not
very great. Truman concluded that the Republicans' cohesion was built
upon a constantly shifting or "kaleidoscopic"^^ conservative base.
Like the 1939 fight, the 1941-1955 period represented a break with
the past. Without the Progressives or other stable dissident faction,
ideological factionalism no longer was associated with Republican dis-
cord. Instead, the sole contest of this interval erupted when the
Republicans were exceptionally unified.
Congruence . Even though the Midwest was the largest regional bloc
within the Republican party, the 1941-1955 period opened with the Midwest
50,Turner, p. 21.
^'•David B. Truman, The Congressional Party ; A Case Study (New York;
John Wiley, 1959), p. 185 for the specific reference to kaleidoscopic;
pp. 172-190 for the information.
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again excluded f.o. the leadership hierarchy as Martin of Massachusetts
and Englehright of California continued to hold office. Xn 1943 Arends
of Illinois replaced Englebright as Whip, which gave the Midwest its
first leadership voice since Longworth's death in 1931. m 1947 and
1953 the Midwest gained further representation with the election of
Halleck as Majority Leader, m 1947 all four contestants for Majority
Leader were Midwesterners
,
which aMost seemed to be a recognition that
the Midwest was entitled to the post. After 1943 the leadership better
paralleled the membership in terms of region, particularly in the ma-
jority Congresses, than in the previous decade.
In terms of ideology, all the Republican leaders
-Mart in, Halleck,
Englebright, and Arends-shared the membership's conservative outlook.
Although Halleck was identified with Dewey in the 1947 race, on policy
Halleck was much closer to Taft than to the Eastern liberals. His
alliance with Dewey was likely strategic. Dewey wanted regular allies and
Halleck thought a moderate Republican had a better chance of winning
the Presidency than Taft. Additionally, James Patterson, Taffs bi-
ographer, believes Halleck was fishing for the Vice Presidency, which
he knew Taft would never offer to a fellow Midwestern conservative.^^
Truman thought that Martin played a middleman role by mediating dis-
putes between the various Republican groupings in the House. However,
52James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy
:
Four-Party
Politics in America
,
(rev. ; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963),
p. 191.
53
James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican ; A Biography of Robert A.
Taft, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), pp. 412-413 and 415-416.
Truman, p. 206.
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since the Republican frag^aentation was not as severe or as durable as
the De„«cratic cleavage In this tl^ span, Martin's role cannot be com-
pared with the type of leadership compromise that Rayburn and McCormacU
symbolized in the Democratic party.
Summary of the Variables
, 1941-1955
A number of conditions previously associated with Republican con-
tests no longer coincided with the conflict of this period. For ex-
ample, parties evenly balanced in size, rising Midwestern representa-
tion, and a large or tactically important dissident faction were not
evident when the 1947 fight started. Instead, the one contest of this
period developed when the Republicans were the majority party, victor-
ious at the polls, and undergoing considerable membership turnover with
a large freshman class and low seniority. Additionally, the Midwest
was declining in strength and the Republicans were strongly unified on
roll call votes. The only variable, however, that sorted the single
Congress with a brawl from the six stable Congresses was low seniority.
When the Congresses from the 1930 's are included in the analysis,
a new Republican pattern begins to emerge in 1939. The 76th (1939-
1941), 78th (1943-1945), and 80th (1947-1949) Congresses can be dis-
tinguished from the rest of the Congresses in this twenty-four year
interval by four interconnected traits. In these three Congresses, the
Republican proportion of House seats surged forward by a min5.miim of ten
percentage points; membership turnover was high with new members account-
ing for at least 30 per cent of the Republicans; freshmen composed one-
quarter of the membership; and seniority declined to its lowest levels.
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in two of these three Congresses leadership battles developed and in
the third case Martin ndght have been vulnerable if Wadsworth had pressed
ahead with a challenge. Thus, beginning in 1939, extensive
.e^bership
change and a more junior party-variables that had not systen,atically
coincided with Republican contests from 1895 through 1931-started to
show up regularly as a correlate of Republican conflict and in the
1940
-s and 1950 's appeared to supplant factionalism as the key con-
ditions associated with leadership battles among Republicans.
Conclusions
, 1931 -1955
Between 1931 and 1955 the Republicans clashed three times over the
leadership, but no single condition or cluster of traits tied thes
tests together. The reason for the absence of a consistent pattern
this period was that the realigning elections of the 1930's altered the
structure of the Republican party as strikingly as the Democratic party.
When the decade opened the Republicans remained divided into two power-
ful and competitive regional blocs, the East and the Midwest, and into
two ideological wings, the regulars and the Progressives, that were un-
able to reach an accommodation on issues or the leadership. By the end
of the realigning era, not only had the Republicans been reduced to a
nearly permanent Congressional minority but the Republicans had also
been transformed into a more monolithic party in terms of region and
ideology. Without the Progressive wing, the Midwest turned into a con-
servative bastion that had few differences with the East. The few
Eastern liberals who began to be elected in the late 1930 's lacked the
ise con-
m
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had done. A. the co^osi.ion and
.t.uct..e o£ the RepubUean pa«.
chansed.^didU.,03,^^^^^
1931 battle was the last fight of the old regime nv.. Like every previous
Republican contest since 1895, the 1931 clash followed a factional
Change that bolstered the Midwest's or the Progressives' position with-
in the party. The 1939 contest coincided with both rising Midwestern
representation, which linked the struggle to past battles, and with
extensive membership turnover, a large and expanding freshman class,
and lower seniority, which tied the fight to the 1947 fray and also to
the conflict of the late 1950's and 1960's according to Peabody. m
1947 the break with the past was complete. Factional antagonisms no
longer were associated with leadership discord, instead, the fight
developed when new members and freshmen flowed into party and veterans
declined in strength. In short, although there was no uniform pattern
for predicting conflict between 1931 and 1955, the contests did not
occur randomly. Rather, the contests fell into two distinct patterns.
In the 1930's shifts in the factional balance that favored the Pro-
gressives or the Midwest continued to foster the formation of contests,
but in the 1940's and 1950's-wlth 1939 marking the transition-membership
turnover, more freshmen, and proportionately fewer veterans provided the
Impetus for leadership clashes.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
in this chapter, we return to our original questions. What con-
ditions were conducive to leadership conflict in the House of Repre-
sentatives between 1895 and 1955? Do the 1895 to 1955 results support,
contradict, or suggest modifications in the hypotheses about party
leadership conflict presented in Chapter I? is Robert L. Peabody cor-
rect in asserting that minority status, election defeats, a junior
party, and a cohesive party in terms of region and ideology may be the
key determinants of intra-party conflict? Or do other variables and
interpretations such as the size of the party, the amount of member-
ship turnover, and changes in the regional and ideological composition
of the party offer more insight into the causes of leadership conflict?
To help answer these questions, the statistical data from Chapters II
through V have been aggregated into Summary Table 1. In addition,
Tables 2 and 3 provide summaries for each party individually from
1895 to 1955.
'Pa.vty
.
Peabody has hypothesized that Republicans are more likely
to be beset by conflict than Democrats but between 1895 and 1955
Democrats and Republicans were almost equally prone to leadership fights
The Democrats battled in eleven different Congresses or just a shade
less than the Republicans, who fought in twelve Congresses. Although
Robert L, Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States
House of Representatives," American Political Science Review
,
LXI
(September, 1967), p. 693.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF UJADERSHIP CONPLIOI AND CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED ASPRODUCING CONGESTS FOR BOTH PARTIES, 189™
Condition # of Congres-
sional parties
# of Congres-
sional parties
with conflict
Party
Democrats
Republicans
Majority-minority
Status
Majority Status
Minority Status
Size of Party
Over 55%
45 to 557o
Under 45
Election Returns
Upturn
Downturn
Seats Added or Lost
+ 30 or more
+ 10 to 29
- 9 to + 9
- 10 to - 29
- 30 or more
Membership Change
Under 107„
10 to 19%
20 to 29%
30 to 39%
407o and over
Freshmen
Under 20%
20 to 29%
307o and over
30
30
30
30
19
20
21
30
30
16
11
7
12
14
4
17
21
12
6
26
21
13
11
12
12
11
7
10
6
14
9
7
6
3
2
5
1
3
8
7
4
% of Congres-
sional parties
with conflict
36.7
40.0
40.0
36.7
36.8
50.0
28.7
46.7
30.0
43.8
54.5
42.9
16.2
35.7
25.0
17.6
38.1
58.3
66.7
23.1
42.9
61.5
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TABLE 1 (continued)
SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP CONFLICT AND CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS
PRODUCING CONTESTS FOR BOTH PARTIES, 1895-1955
Condition # of Congres-
sional parties
Seniors
30% and over
20 to 29%
Under 20%
Regional and Ideological
Factionalism
15
23
22
# of Congres-
sional parties
with conflict
% of Congres-
sional parties
with conflict
1
12
10
See Tables 2 and 3
6.7
52.2
45.5
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADER-
SHIP CONFLICT: THE DL-MOCRATS, 1895-1955
Condition # of Cases
Majority-minority
Status
Majority status
Minority status
14
16
Size of Party
Over 55%
1^5 to 55%
Under 45%
9
9
12
Election Returns
Upturn
Downturn
16
14
Seats Added or Lost
+ 30 or more
+ 10 to 29
- 9 to -f 9
- 10 to - 29
- 30 or more
7
6
4
6
7
# of Congresses
with conflict
% of Congres-
ses with con-
flict
35.7
37.5
44.4
44.4
25.0
56.7
14.3
4
4
1
1
1
57.1
66.7
25.0
16.7
14.3
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TABLE 2 (continued)
Condition # of Cases # of Congresses
with conflict
Membership Change
Under 10%
10 to 19%
20 to 29%
30 to 39%
40%, and over
Freshmen
Under 20%
20 to 29%
30% and over
Seniors
30% and over
20 to 29%
Under 20%
Regional Factionalism
Northern Increase
Southern Increase
Rise in North while
underrepresented
Rise in North vThile
adequately repre-
sented
2
11
7
7
3
14
7
9
7
12
11
16
14
% of Congres-
ses with con-
flict
0
18.2
28.6
57.1
100.0
14.3
42.9
66.7
0
50.0
45.5
56.7
14.3
77.8
28.6
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONTLICT: THE REPUBLICANS, 1895-1955
Condition # of Cases # of Congresses
with conflict
7o of Congresses
with conflict
Ma i ority-minor ity
Status
Majority status 16
Minority status 14
Size of_ Party
Over 55% 10
45 to 557o 11
Under 45 9
Election Returns
Upturn 14
Downturn 16
Seats Added or Lost
+ 30 or more 9
+ 10 to + 29 5
- 9 to + 9 3
- 10 to - 29 6
- 30 or more 7
Membership Change
Under 10% 2
10 to 19% 6
20 to 29% 14
30 to 39% 5
40% and over 3
Freshmen
Under 20% 12
20 to 29% 14
30% and over 4
5
7
3
2
2
1
4
4
6
2
43.8
35.7
30.0
54.5
33.3
35.7
43.8
33.3
40.0
66.7
16.7
57.1
50.0
16.7
42.9
60.0
33.3
33.3
42.9
50.0
Seniors
30% and over
20 to 29%
Under 20%
8
11
11
25.0
54.5
45.5
298
TABLE 3 (continued)
SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADER-SHIP CONFLICT: THE REPUBLICANS, 1895-1955
Condition # of Cases # of Congresses % of Congresses
with conflict with conflict
Regional Factionalism
Increase in Midwest* 9
Increase in East* 9
Increased Midwestern
strength while
under-represented 4
Increase in Midwest
while adequately-
represented 5
Ideological Factionalism
Progressives or Farm
Bloc comprised 25%
of GOP or could dis-
rupt organization of
House 10
All other Congresses 20
66.7
33.3
50.0
80.0
90.0
15.0
These figures include only those Congresses in which the Midwest
or the East alone increased in size in the Republican party.
They do not include those Congresses in which both regions grew
in size.
the amount of conflict over time is comparable, each party went through
particularly stormy intervals as well as stable periods. In the Republi-
can party 80 per cent of the battles clustered between 1903 and 1933 and
in the Democratic party over 80 per cent of the contests occurred in just
two decades, from 1897 to 1907 and from 1931 to 1941. In the shorter
time span of 1955 to 1966, Peabody found the Republicans to be the more
combative party, but the important point is that in the broader historical
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perspective of .His study, „o difference between parties is found
The Republicans, however, were
.ore susceptible to successful
leadership revolts than the Democrats, as Peabod, sugsested.^ Between
1895 and 1955 the Republicans were battered b, three revolts,^ two of
which were successful, m 1919 Mann was denied the Speakership and in
1931 Tilson failed to win the Minority Leadership although Cannon sur-
vived the 1909 movement to depose him Tn fu na . I the Democratic party, how-
ever, both revolts were failures. In 1907 Williams turned bade the
challenge to his leadership and in 1919 Clar. regained the Minority
Leadership over the protests of the Wilson loyalists.
Another observation of Peabody's that is supported by the 1895
to 1955 evidence is that the Republicans are more inclined to compete
over the highest party offices than the Democrats."^ Although the list
of positions covered in this study is shorter than the one Peabody used,
the data presented in Table 4 show that the post most frequently con-
tested by Republicans was the Speakership. Next in line was the Minority
^ibid.
3
A .^^^f^^ ^J^? ^^^^ considered fights where there was a serious effortto drxve from office an incumbent leader or an heir apparent who wishedto move laterally. There are two types of heir apparents- chose who wishto advance to a higher office from a lower post such as a Majority Leader
who tries to climb to the Speakership and those incumbent leaders whotry to retain their notch in the leadership order when the party's ma-jority-minority status changes. In other words, they try to move acrossthe majority-minority gap rather than go upward.
4
Peabody, p. 693.
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tabij: 4
PARTY DIFFERENCES: A COMPARISON OF CONTESTED
OFFICES, 1895 to 1955
Party Nuniber of Fights over
Speaker Majority Leader Minority Leader Whip
Democrats 2 5 6 Appointed
Republicans 6 3 5 1
Leadership. In the Democratic party the highest number of battles was
over the Minority Leadership, followed by the Majority Leadership. The
fewest contests were over the Speakership.
Both parties have historically been alliances of uneasy partners.
The North-South cleavage in the Democratic party has been a continuing
source of friction and in the Republican party V. 0. Key once wrote that
the Eastern and Western wings could not "live for long in fraternity un-
tinged by fratricide."^ Since the potential for conflict is high in
both parties, it is not really surprising that given a long enough period
of time—as this study does—the amount of conflict should be about equal.
But what accounts for the differences in the nature of conflict in each
party? Why are successful revolts and Speakership fights more prevalent
in the Republican party? Part of the explanation is that in the Republi-
can party there is no clear line of succession within the party hierarchy.
No one individual is singled out as the heir apparent for the Speakership
or other top party post. Instead, since the 1920 's senior Republicans
on the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees have seemed more
or less equally qualified to advance to the highest party leadership
ire
a
un-
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offices. Both the absence of a clearly designated heir apparent and
the presence of .ore than one eligible aspirant have appeared to en-
courage conflict over the Speakership and Minority Leadership. Further-
^re. Republican leaders have been less tolerant of internal dissent
than the Democratic leaders. To further ideological unity in the party,
Republican leaders have often disciplined individual
.embers and ent
factions for taking independent stands. But the leaders have paid
price for exercising such power. As the highly visible syAols of
popular policies, Republican leaders have been more vulnerable to re-
volts and to efforts to curb their authority to wreck careers than their
Democratic counterparts.
In contrast, the Democrats have gradually recriiited more of their
top party leaders from the office one rung lower on the party leader-
ship ladder. As the promotion of the Majority Leader to the Speaker-
ship became more firmly accepted and established in the 1930' s, com-
petition was deflected from the Speakership to the Majority Leadership
where the line of succession was not as settled. Fights were also more
common over the Minority Leadership because, aside from the Speaker to
Minority Leader transition, there was no definite, universally accepted
heir apparent. In addition, Democratic leaders have been more willing
to seek coLrpromises between the wings of the party, to appoint Whips
from the minority faction in the party, and to recognize the demands of
an expanding faction for a greater leadership role. As a result of
their willingness to accommodate to and accept the existing cleavages
in the party. Democratic leaders have not aroused the hostility and ani-
ity that Republican leaders have generated and have not been as likelymos
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to become the target of a successful revolt.
M^jorit^-Hinor^ status. Also in contradiction to a Peabody
hypothesis
,
n^jcrit^.^^i^^ status little difference in the
— of leadersM^ conflict a ,art^
.
.^cording to Peabody
^ninority status encourages leadership conflict,' but contests developed
in 40 per cent of the majority Congresses and in 36.7 per cent of the
minority Congresses. When each party is examined separately, the Demo-
crats skirmished slightly more often as a minority party whereas the
Republicans competed somewhat more frequently when in the majority.
Not only does Peabody think minority status will coincide with in-
creased conflict, but he also suggests that the longer the period of
minority status, the more frequent contests will become as the frustrated
membership starts to blame the leaders for the successive defeats.^ Yet,
from 1895 to 1955 more minority fights developed at the beginning of the
minority cycle rather than toward the end. On the other hand, Charles
Jones expects a decline in conflict with prolonged minority status be-
cause the few senior leaders will become so thoroughly entrenched that
it will be hard to turn them out of office without a large influx of
8
freshmen. The evidence supports Jones, but it should be noted that
contests also dropped off the longer a party remained as the majority.
Seabody, p. 693.
^Ibid.
, pp. 687-693.
8
Charles 0. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress
,
(Boston: Little
Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 16 and 18.
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in other words, conflict was ™,re frequent when there wes a transition
from n.,:orlty status to minority status or vice versa and during the
fiddle of a majority or minority phase rather than toward the end of
a cycle.
Randall Ripley thinks fights will probably be more common in the
minority party because of the greater exodus of minority leaders from
the House in pursuit of careers elsewhere.^ With more vacancies, Ripley
expects the opportunities for conflict to expand. This hypotheses is
not supported by the 1855 to 1955 data. Minority Leaders did seek
Senate berths and retire more often than the Majority Leaders, but
vacancies and voluntary turnover were not greater in the minority party
than in the majority party because Majority Leaders abandoned their
jobs to seek the Speakership just as often as Minority Leaders left
the House,
Size of Party
.
Charles Jones suggests that a minority party that
is too small to have a realistic chance of winning a majority of the
House in the next Congressional election will behave differently from
a minority party that can win control of the chamber with the shift
of a few Congressional districts, but he does not predict how their
10
behavior will vary. Between 1895 and 1955 conflict was most common
when the size of a party ranged between 45 and 55 per cent . Parties
in this size range quarreled 50 per cent of the time. Parties with
9
Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives
,
(Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 32.
Jones, p. 34.
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over 55 per cent of the House seats battled 36.8 per cent of the ti.e
and s^ll parties or those holding under 45 per cent of the House seats
parties with the .ost severely reduced minorities-that is, under 35
per cent of the total seats, the rate of conflict fell even further to
16.7 per cent, m short, the s^llest minority parties seemed the
least prone to conflict and parties whose share of the seats hovered
around 50 per cent were the most likely to wage a leadership contest.
When the parties are compared, an evenly balanced House appeared
to be a more important attribute of Republican contests than of Demo-
cratic fights. Once the Democrats controlled a minimum of 45 per cent
of the House membership, the chances for a fight jumped from 25 per
cent to 44.4 per cent, but there was no variation in the rate of con-
flict as the Democrats grew beyond the 45 to 55 per cent range. In
the Republican party there was a fight in approximately one-third of
the Congresses in which the size of the party measured above or below
45 to 55 per cent, but in the 45 to 55 per cent category contests de-
veloped in 54.5 per cent of the Congresses. Because the preponderance
of fights in the 45 to 55 per cent range in the Republican party oc-
curred between 1903 and 1933, the difference in parties seems to be
related to the pivotal role of the Progressives, who took advantage of
a narrowly divided House to secure rule changes and better committee
assignments for themselves.
Election returns
. According to a Peabody hypothesis, election de-
feats stiraulace contests, but between 1895 and 1955 leadership conflict
Peabody, pp. 688-689.
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was more likely to occur folj^win^ an election upturn than a defeat
.
Winning parties battled in 46.7 per cent of the Congresses whereas
losing parties fought in only 30 per cent of the Congresses. This pat-
tern varies with party. All but two of the Democratic brawls followed
victories, but the Republicans were more likely to fight after they had
lost ground in the last election. Historical and factional reasons
seem to account for this contrast. In the Democratic party the size
of the Southern contingent remained nearly constant regardless of the
party's success at the polls. A few examples will illustrate the
South 's imperviousness to national election tides. In 1895 the Demo-
crats lost 113 House seats, but the Southern bloc contracted by merely
nine seats. In the Hoover landslide, the South lost three seats while
the non- South dropped fifty-seven seats. In 1933, when the non-Southern
contingent picked up ninety-three seats, the South actually lost two
seats. Since most of the Democratic leaders between 1895 and 1955 were
recruited from the South, a victory was more unsettling to the in-
cumbents since it weakened the regional congruence between leaders and
followers. In the Republican party the relationship between defeat
and conflict is restricted to the 1895 to 1933 era. During most of
the Congresses in which the Progressives were a significant voice in
the Republican party, the Republicans were the majority party in the
House. Consequently, defeats which reduced the Republicans' large
majorities to below 55 per cent were more likely to give the Progres-
sives leverage to disrupt the organization of the House than victories
which increased the Republicans' majorities to such a point that they
could safely ignore the Progressives. But even in this limited time
period de^oa.
.as not a neces.ar, correlate of eonHio.. wKen
..e
RepubUoan. were Che minority pa«y during UUso^.s Presidency one
Of the two electoral upswings that raised the RepuhUcans' share of
House seats to the 4S ^^. ^ -to 55 per cent level was associated with a fight
Peabody has also theorized that a thirty to fifty seat loss Is
the size of defeat
.est conducive to leadership tur^u. Martin
concurs that a massive defeat like iqs« -to ti ir 1958 is likely to touch off a battle
but does not cite any specific figures/^ The findings fro. 1895 to
1955 indicate that struggles were .ost con^on when a party added between
ten and twenty-nine seats. In the Democratic party there is almost a
perfect relationship between the addition of more seats and increased
conflict, and in direct contradiction to Peabody the Democrats fought
least when they lost between thirty and fifty seats. In the Republican
party there were more fights when the party showed the least change in
the number of seats added or subtracted although reverses in the thirty
to fifty seat category did rank in second place. What appears to be
important in assessing the chances for a fight is not whether the party
won or lost or even by how much but how well each faction or clique
within the party came through the last election. Elections do not
necessarily affect each wing of a party with equal force. Whether a
faction is strengthened or weakened by the election results is more
critical to the formation of a contest than the size of the defeat or
victory.
12Joe Martin, M^;: First Fifty Years in Politics
. (New York
McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 4-9.
H-bershiH turnover. Barbara HincKleys hypothesis that ™e.ber-
.hlp stability leads to leadership stability and high »e.*ershlp turn-
over encourages leadership instabn ^^.r^3 •ability is supported by the 1895 to
1955 data. As .ne^^ersM^
shiE fi^ also rose. With the single exception of the
-under 10 per
cent me^ership turnover" category, the trend was striking, when the
rate of tnetnbership turnover reached 30 per cent, there was a better
than even chance for a battle, and when the share of new :ne:.bers ex-
ceeded 40 per cent, then conflict erupted two-thirds of the time.
In the Dexaocratic party the pattern was even more pronounced. There
were no contests when incumbents formed over 90 per cent of the mem-
bership, but every time the proportion of incumbents fell below 60
per cent and newcomers reached 40 per cent a fight developed, m the
Republican party the relationship between membership change and leader-
ship conflict was more erratic. Except for the single contest in the
under 10 per cent category that may distort the results since the num-
ber of cases was so small, the likelihood of a contest was greatest
when membership change ranged between 20 and 40 per cent. Once new
members comprised over 40 per cent of the Republican membership, there
was a drop in the rate of conflict. The Republican pattern, however,
changed with time. If the Republican figures are divided with 1933 as
the separating point, the post-1933 Congresses showed a more direct
13
Barbara Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and
Support: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, XXXII (May,
1970), p. 270.
"
308
relationship between increased membership change and leadership con-
flict than the Congresses prior to 1933.
H^lliC. The results support Jones and Peabody's contention
that a junior party is more prone to conflict than a senior party
Between 1895 and 1955 as the pr^orti^ of freshmen expanded, so did
the likelih^ ^ , ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^
class was under 20 per cent, contests occurred in only 23.1 per cent
of the congresses but when the size of the freshman class reached 30
per cent, the probability of a fight jumped to over 60 per cent. The
pattern in the Democratic party was nearly identical to the aggregated
figures, but in the Republican party, although the same trend was
visible, there was less variation in the amount of conflict as the in-
flux of freshmen grew. When freshmen composed over 30 per cent of the
Republican membership, there was only a 50 per cent chance for a contest
The data particularly buttress Jones's argument that freshmen in
contrast to other junior members (with two to ten years service in the
House) are a key element in leadership change and conflict. Jones
thinks the socialization process in Congress erodes differences between
freshmen and incombents too quickly for other junior members to play
a vital role in challenging the party elders. Peabody places greater
emphasis ou the role of all junior members with less than ten years
service in the initiation of leadership contests, but between 1895 and
1955 junior members other than freshmen appeared to be a factor only
14
Jones, p. 18; Peabody, p. 689.
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during the Democratic battles of the 1930' s.
Peabody's hypothesis that a large body of senior members will tend
to deter conflict^^ is amply supported by the 1895-1955 evidence. As
the percentage of senior members increased
, the chances for a fijht
also mounted until veterans comprised 30 £er cent of the part;^ ^ember
-
shi£. At that point
,
battles became rare. As the pool of experienced
congressmen expanded from under 20 per cent of the party membership to
between 20 and 29 per cent of the membership, the frequency of conflict
climbed from 45.5 per cent to 52.2 per cent. But then as the proportion
of senior members rose to 30 per cent, the rate of conflict dropped
sharply to 6.7 per cent. Both parties followed this pattern.
In sum, membership stability and seniority tend to assure leader-
ship stability just as membership turnover and large freshmen classes
appear to stimulate leadership conflict. These findings underscore
how costly leadership fights and leadership change can be to the goals
and ambitions of incumbent House members, especially if they should end
up on the losing side of a battle. Congressmen who have devoted years
to slowly accumulating seniority, to getting better committee assign-
ments, and to developing good working relations with the party leader-
ship are not likely to upset the proverbial apple cart unless their
own careers are jeopardized by the leaders' policies or decisions.
In contrast, freshmen, who have invested little time and energy into
getting ahead in the House, do not have much to lose by becoming in-
volved in a party brawl. If a freshman should be on the losing side.
Peabody, p. 689.
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he may get a worse committee assignment than if he had not participated,
but the chances are he would not have gotten a very good one anyway.
If the victors should ignore or ostracize him, he is still not especial-
ly worse off since he would have received little attention or patronage
in his first term in any event. On the other hand, by being part of a
victorious coalition newcomers stand to gain a great deal in terms of
greater access to the leadership and better committee assignments.
For a freshman, the benefits may outweigh the risks.
Regional factionalism
. As Hinckley expects, changes in the
regional composition of a party bring pressure for leadership change.''"^
Between 1895 and 1935 changes in regional alignment that favored Northern
Democrats or Midwestern Republicans were far more conducive to conflict
than shifts that increased the size of Eastern Republicans or Southern
Democrats. When Northern Democrats were expanding, contests occurred
in 56.7 per cent of the cases. In contrast, when Southern Democrats
picked up seats, contests took place in only 14.3 per cent of the
Congresses. In the Republican party, contests were waged in two-
thirds of the Congresses in which the Midwest was gaining but in
only one-third of those in which the East enlarged. The relationship
between a growing Midwestern faction and conflict changed over time.
Before 1933, contests erupted 100 per cent of the time the Midwest
was expanding but after 1933 Republicans competed in only 25.0 per
cent of the Congresses in which the Midwest was adding seats. The
role of conflict for the Eastern wing did not vary as much over time.
'Hinckley, p. 270.
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Before 1933. there were fights In 37.5 per cent of the Congresses In
which the East was growing; after 1933 there were no fights when the
East increased in size.
The reason an improvement in the strategic positions of Northern
Democrats and Midwestern Republicans should be more likely to produce
a fight is linked to leadership congruence. From 1895 to 1955 the
South dominated the Democratic leadership in the House. The only
Northerner to serve as Speaker or Minority Leader in the entire sixty
year span was Rainey of Illinois, who was Speaker from 1933 to 1934.
Until the 1940-1955 compromise in which Rayburn and McCormack filled
the top two leadership posts, there were only two other periods in
which the leadership showed regional balance or seemed to be a gen-
uine accomir.odation between sections. From 1908 until 1911 Clark of
Missouri served as Minority Leader and from 1931 until 1934 the
Speakership and Majority Leadership were divided between a Northerner
and a Southerner. If one isolates those nine Congresses in which
Northern Democrats gained while underrepresented in the preceding
Congress, then the rate of conflict was 77.8 per cent. In those
seven Congresses in which the expansion of the North occurred when
the leadership had been well balanced in the last Congress, the rate
of conflict, fell to 28.6 per cent.
In the Republican party the Midwest was more often underrepre-
sented in the leadership than the East but seldom before 1933 when
the correlation between Midwestern growth and leadership conflict ap-
pears. Why the Midwest would challenge the leadership when it was
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already included can be explained by the interrelationship between the
Midwest and the Progressives. The Progressives were overwhelmingly a
Midwestern bloc, which meant that every time the Midwest increased its
share of seats between 1903 and 1933 the Progressives bettered their
tactical position within the Republican party. Because the Progres-
sives were deliberately excluded from the Republican high command,
they were usually ready to challenge the incumbent leaders and their
rules when the opportunity arose. In short, regional or ideological
changes that strengthened the wing of the party that was underrepre -
se^ted or excluded from the highest leadership offices were more like
-
IX to produce conflict than changes that bolstered the faction with
proportionate representation
.
Hinckley has cautioned that there might be a time lag between the
emergence of a new majority or clearly predominant faction and the re-
distribution of leadership positions. One of the interesting results
of this study is that although the actual leadership changes may be
delayed, leadership fights are not often postponed. One reason an
expanding faction that lacks the votes or the seniority to force a
leadership change might nevertheless pursue a fight is that something
of value might be gained simply by organizing a challenge. The Pro-
gressives, for example, were able to win rules concessions, wrestle
better committee assignments, and dislodge an occasional bill from
the Rules Committee through their contests. The Democratic hierarchy
rewarded the Bryanites and Northern New Dealers with the office of
Whip in hopes of heading off repeated confrontations. Another reason
contests follow closely behind regional and ideological shifts is
ion
m
Le seem
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that the battles that develop do not necessarily pit a contender fro.
the underrepresented but enlarging faction against a candidate fro. the
established but declining wing of the party. For example, in the Demo-
cratic party all the serious challengers for Minority Leader in 1923
and for Speaker in 1935 were Southerners despite the Northern advances.
The alteration of a party's composition apparently creates more oppor-
tunities for ambitious politicians to construct a new majority coalit
within a party. Potential candidates who might normally have stayed
the background if the composition of the party had remained stabl
tempted by the increased room for maneuvering to try their hand at
forging a new alignment.
Ideological factionalism. According to Peabody a monolithic party-
that is, a highly unified party on roll call votes-is more likely to
engage in leadership skirmishes than a party that is severely divided
over public issues. Peabody's reasoning is that a united party in a
sense can afford che luxury of a leadership fight because its voting
cohesion will not sacrificed. Parties with deep cleavages, on the
other hand, are uxider more pressure to reach an accommodation since a
fight may accentuate and intensify the existing division."''^ The results
from 1895 to 1955 do not substantiate Peabody's contention. The Republi
cans were most competitive when they were least united
. In those Con-
gresses in which the Progressives or Farm Bloc held 25 per cent or more
of the party's seats or had the votes to disrupt the regulars' ability
to organize the House, contests flared 90 per cent of the time. In
Peabody, pp. 689-690.
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those Congresses in which the Progressives vere non-existent or in which
their power to block the regulars was receding, battles developed only
15 per cent of the time. With the loss of the Progressive bloc and the
increased cohesion that resulted, there was sharp decline in conflict
in the Republican party. Between 1903 and 1933 the Republicans averaged
a battle in every second Congress, but after 1933 the Republicans waged
only one struggle in each decade.
Although the data are not complete, the Democrats also appeared to
become more embattled as they became more divided
. The Bryanite- con-
servative fights tended to develop in Congresses in which voting unity
was falling on key issues and a number of the Southern conservative-
Northern liberal brawls during the 1930 's occurred when voting cohesion
was lower than in the last Congresses of the 1920's. Unlike the Repub-
licans, however, the opposing wings of the Democratic party could peace-
fully co-exist for considerable lengths of time in spite of continuing
and deep ideological rifts as from 1908 to 1913 and from 1940 until 1955.
Perhaps the reason for this difference in parties can be attributed
to the Democrats' greater skill at devising leadership compromises that
pulled the disputing factions together. The wave of fights touched off
by the 1896 election was halted by the selection of Clark, who was a
moderate acceptable to Southern conservatives, Bryanites, Tammany chief-
tains, and Northern reformers. The spate of fights in the 1930 's ended
with the election of Rayburn and McCormack, moderates from the two major
factions in the party. The Republicans, in contrast, never included the
Progressives in the leadership or selected moderates who might have been
able to act as brokers between the rival camps. The absence of the
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Progressives from the lpaf1oT-ei,,'«eadership was not accidental since most Republi-
can leaders expended a great deal of energy and time In disciplining
the Progressives for their independence. Mann alone tried to entice
the Progressives back to narrv ^>-t-u^^ ^p ty orthodoxy by giving them desirable com-
mittee assignments. Cannon, Longworth, and Snell preferred to banish
-vericks from key co:™ittees or deprive them of their chairmanships or
committee seniority.
David Mayhew's concept of Inclusive and exclusive compromise seems
18
applicable here. m both parties ideological cleavages appeared con-
ducive to leadership contests, but parties of inclusive compromise were
more successful in curbing potential conflict than parties that con-
tinually excluded intense and durable minorities from a leadership role.
Parties of exclusive compromise wer^ more T_ikpT^ rr^ u^^^^^j^
^
fights until the ideological composition of the £art2 became more mono -
lithic.
18D^avid R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen: The Differencesbetween Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962, (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1966), pp. 149-159. On roll call votes dealing withdomestic issues, Mayhew found that Democrats were the party of "in-
clusive compromise" in the sense that all different types of Democrats,
i.e., Western Democrats, Urban Democrats etc., voted for each other's
programs. The Republicans, instead, were labeled the party of "ex-
clusive compromise" because they typically voted against the special
interests and needs of a segment or bloc within the party. This con-
cept can be extended to leadership conflict also. The Democrats seemed
more willing to include opposing factions in the party leadership.
In contrast, the Republicans excluded particular groups and factions
from the leadership.
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Summation
Of the variables hypothesized as contributing to leadership bat-
tles, three conditions stand out in explaining the presence or absence
of conflict: membership change (or the percentage of freshmen);
regional-ideological factionalism; and leadership congruence. Two
other variables--the size of the party and election victories corre-
lated with conflict but on closer inspection did not seem to directly
or independently encourage conflict. Instead, these variables ap-
peared to be associated with conflict only because of their inter-
relationship with two of the key conditions, membership change and
factionalism. - For instance, a closely divided House did not appear
to stimulate Republican contests except in the sense that the narrow
margin gave the Progressives a strategic advantage. Likewise, an elec-
tion victory contributed to the fights only in the limited sense of
being more often the vehicle for membership and regional- ideological
change than election defeats, which sometimes served equally well in
altering the composition of a party enough to produce a struggle.
Finally, two of the conditions expected to produce leadership contests
can be eliminated altogether as determinants of conflict. Over time
neither party nor majority-minority status seemed to affect the proba-
bility of a contest.
Between 1895 and 1955 when the membership of a Congressional party
was undergoing rapid turnover and the regional-ideological alignments
were shifting in favor of the faction underrepresented or excluded from
the leadership, the incidence of conflict was very high. In the Re-
publican party both conditions were not needed in any single time
317
period to produce a skirmish. During the 1930's
.e.bership change dis-
placed ideological and regional change as the key condition capable of
triggering a battle. In the Democratic party, however, both membership
turnover ar^ regional- ideological alterations tended to be necessary
before a contest took place although there were variations over time
in the emphasis that should be placed on each condition. Before 1931
extremely high men^ership turnover was more characteristic of Democratic
fights than afterwards while the regional transformation in the Demo-
cratic party during the 1930 's probably assumed greater importance in
creating tension than the smaller and temporary Northern inroads before
1931. There were ten Congresses in which new Democratic members ac-
counted for at least 20 per cent of the party membership and in which
the regional fluctuations favored the North either while underrepresented
in the leadership or when the leadership compromise of the previous Con-
gress had dissolved before the new Congress met.^^ Contests erupted in
nine of these ten Congresses. There were fourteen Congresses in which
the regional- ideological equilibrium in the Republican party shifted to
favor the Midwest or the Progressives before 1933 or in which newcomers
comprised at least 30 per cent of the Republican membership after 1933.
Contests occurred in twelve of these fourteen cases. Thus, of the
twenty-four cases which fulfilled the criteria outlined above, conflict
19In 1933 and 1935 the North increased its majorities in the Demo-
cratic contingent. In each of the preceding Congresses the North had
been represented in the leadership, but by the time the new Congress
convened the compromise had collapsed. In 1933 the cause for the
dissolution was Garner's election to the Vice Presidency and in 1935
Rainey's death.
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flared in twenty-one of them or 87.5 per cent of the time. But of the
thirty-six Congresses that did not meet the conditions usually conducive
to conflict and therefore would be expected to be stable, clashes de-
veloped in only two instances for a 5.3 per cent rate of conflict. In
other words, in fifty-five of the sixty cases investigated
, membership
change, regional-ideological variation, and leadership congruence ac-
curately sorted or predicted whether or not a contest took place.
In analyzing the five deviant cases, reference will be made to the
skill of the incumbent and the intervention of the President--conditions
hypothesized as contributing to conflict but that have been treated as
residual variables in this project. In 1913, 1927, and 1943 although
the characteristics of the Congressional party indicated a battle was
imminent, no fight developed. In 1913 in the Democratic party the
North had become the dominant faction, but, because the only Northerners
with enough seniority to be considered eligible for a leadership post
were more conservative than the majority of the party, no one was avail-
able to run against Clark or Underwood. In 1927 in the Republican
party the Progressives had the votes to deadlock the House but did not
press ahead. LaFollette had died in 1925 and no other Progressive had
stepped forward to fill the leadership vacuum left by his death. By
1931, however, La Guardia seemed to have replaced LaFollette as the
driving force behind the Progressives' strategy sessions and publicity
campaigns. Longworth's harsh disciplinary measures against the Pro-
gressives in 1925 might be offered as an alternative explanation for
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the Progressives' behavior in 1927, but it does not see. as persuasive
since the Progressives had never before shied away from a fight because
of the risks involved or the penalties
.eted out. m 1943, when .e.-
bership change was extensive in the Republican party, Wadsworth did not
try to topple Martin. Wadsworth was an aloof, dignified man whose
personality apparently acted as a brake on his leadership aspirations.
A politician with a more aggressive, abrasive personality such as Hal-
leck's may have been eager to run under similar circumstances. A
fascinating pattern begins to emerge from these exceptions. Peabody
thinks that an incumbent's skill is one of the key variables contrib-
uting to contested leadership change, but these three examples suggest
that the availability and personality of a challenger or key organizing
figure in the dissident wing (either the challenger or a different in-
dividual like LaFollette) may be more important than the competence of
an incumbent in producing a fight. Changes in the composition of a
Congressional party that erode and weaken the leader's power base sets
the stage for conflict, but before a fight can actually develop a chal-
lenger is needed to take advantage of the instability.
The 1919 and 1940 Democratic contests took place under conditions
normally associated with stability. In part these fights may have been
delayed reactions to the huge Northern gains of 1913 and 1931-1933.
In 1913, when the North surpassed the South numerically, the North
could not capitalize on its lead because there was no Northerner avail-
able to run for Speaker or Majority Leader. By 1919 the North's pool
of potential leaders was sufficient to challenge the South 's domination
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of the leadership, but the North's bid to rectify the leadership im-
balance failed because the North's inajorities had vanished. m the
early 1930 's .:he North was not caught quite so short-handed on eligible
leadership material and succeeded in electing Rainey first Majority
Leader and then Speaker. After his death, however, the handful of
senior Northerners were no match for the larger pool of extremely able,
veteran Southerners. As a result, the North did not have a leadership
role proportionate to its membership size between 1934 and 1940. In
1940 when the younger Northerners with leadership potential had matured,
the North moved to snare a greater number of leadership posts. This
time, although the South had increased its strength in the last elec-
tion, the North still had the pluralities necessary to prevail. These
two examples illustrate Hinckley's point that there can be a delay
between the regional-ideological change in the composition of the
party and the leadership changes. Thus, by utilizing the time lag
concept, both of these deviant contests can also be classified under
the membership change, regional- ideological change, leadership con-
gruence rubric.
However, an equally plausible explanation for these last two de-
viant cases is Presidential or at least administration intervention.
In 1919 Wilson's cabinet and closest aides helped initiate the revolt
to unseat Clark because Wilson needed a leader more sympathetic to the
League of Nations and in 1940 Roosevelt was widely believed to have
insisted upon the immediate election of McCormack as Majority Leader
to offset the obstructionist tactics of the Southern conservatives.
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Presidential participation did not systematically contribute to conflict
since nearly half the skirmishes occurred in the party that did not con-
trol the Wtiite House. But in particular cases, especially when the
dominant leadership faction was being strengthened by current membership
changes, Presidential involvement on the side of the underrepresented
bloc appears to have been an important variable in initiating contests.
Aside from the President, no other individual or group outside the
House of Representatives seemed influential in starting a fracas under
adverse conditions. The national Progressive leaders like Roosevelt or
LaFollette intervened in an advisory capacity under circumstances favor-
able to their position, but the more typical response of other poli-
ticians or interest groups was to intervene on behalf of a particular
candidate after the contest was under way.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates the benefits of examining
leadership conflict over an extended period of time. Concentrating on
a single decade or two--particularly when the conditions are stable--
can provide misleading results. The 1930' s, for example, would clearly
indicate that the Democrats as the majority party were more prone to
conflict than the minority Republicans just as Peabody's slice of time
showed that the Republican minority tended to be more combative than
the Democratic majority. Over time, however, these short term fluctua-
tions are balanced out and the more constant or permanent conditions
producing conflict become visible. Furthermore, because the conditions
hypothesized as facilitating conflict varied considerably over this
sixty year time span, it was possible to control for one variable to
see the impact of another, which Peabody could not do. As a result,
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this study not only shows which variables encouraged leadership contests
in each party between 1895 and 1955 but also identifies the conditions
that did not contribute to conflict.
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